Controversial Outsiders
A cross-national study of Media Attention to the far-right 1986-2004
CONTROVERSIAL OUTSIDERS
A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY OF MEDIA ATTENTION TO THE FAR-RIGHT 1986-2004

Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de Sociale Wetenschappen

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Petrus Herman Joseph Schaafraad
geboren op 31 juli 1973 te Enschede
Promotores: Prof. dr. F.P.J. Wester
Prof. dr. P.L.H. Scheepers

Commissie: Prof. dr. J.W.J. Beentjes
Prof. dr. J. Kleinnijenhuis (Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam)
Dr. M. Lubbers (Universiteit Utrecht)
Acknowledgements

While I was writing my MA thesis in the early months of 2001 I came to like research so much, that I developed the ambition to pursue my academic career after graduation rather than ending it like most students do. So far that plan worked out fine. As you can see, the result of my endeavour so far is this dissertation. It is a very different dissertation than the one I planned on writing back then. Different subject, different university, different city, different traditions, different people, different almost everything.

Working on that MA thesis inspired me to dive further into theories of social movements and activism and their dynamics in a globalising world. Encouraged by Geert de Vries (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) and brainstorming with Saskia Poldervaart, I worked on various versions of a research proposal about ‘the alterglobalisation movement’. When our final version was up for competition for funding of the Dutch science foundation (NWO), I applied for a PhD position in Nijmegen. Suddenly I had to make a harsh decision. Leaving the uncertain path of competition for funding for a new challenge in Nijmegen, or not? In the end, I took up the Nijmegen challenge and I have not regretted it, even though I had a lot of ‘what if’ thoughts when the Amsterdam proposal received funding ten months later.

In Nijmegen I soon found out that mass media, content analysis and right-wing (instead of left-wing) movements are equally interesting, fascinating subjects. For almost five years I worked on the project, of which the report lays before you now. I did not do that alone of course. First of all, I was lucky to have two supervisors, with different interests and different perspectives, but the same enthusiasm and dedication to good scientific research: Fred Wester and Peer Scheepers. I must thank them deeply for all their encouragement, advice and criticism. A pilot study for the content analysis was carried out in Leuven, early 2005. This would not have been possible without Leen d’Haenens. For the necessary support in the methodology department I could always rely on Maurice Vergeer, Pieter van Groenestijn and Ruben Konig. In the data collection department Annemarie, Mariska, Ottelie, Jana and Norma were of great help, and scientifically more important: reliable coders! Moral support and ‘senior’ advise from experience came from Gabi Schaap and Alexander Pleijter. Loads of coffee I drunk with, or in company of, Jelle, Pascale, Ivar, Margot, Renée, Baldwin, Liesbeth, Henk, Asia, Rod, Serena and Judith. Of course, I must mention my other colleagues at the department of Communication Science of the Radboud University, as well as my colleagues Tonny, Pauwke, Marc, Jiska, Susanne, Erik, Bernadette, Nel, Linda, Koen and others at the Department of Media and Communication of Erasmus University where I have been working as well since 2008, when the book was ‘almost done’. Last but not least I must pledge my gratitude to my dearests. First mom, then all brothers, sisters, dad, boyfriends of sisters, friends here and there. And she may have missed the beginning and the middle part, but joined me to make a happy ending: Eva, it was a pleasure to finish it with you, let’s do tons of other stuff together now!

Pytrik
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CHAPTER ONE
THE FAR-RIGHT IN THE MEDIA: INTRODUCTION, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1.1 THE FAR-RIGHT IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

In civil society, politics and in academia the developments in the popularity of the far-right, as well as the activities of far-right groups and political parties, have been followed closely ever since the end of World War II. The main reason for this vigilance was, and is, the fear that the far-right could once again become a relevant faction in the political landscape in West European countries. Until the mid-eighties the far-right had never established a position where it was considered a serious threat. Although far-right parties managed to win sporadic parliamentary seats, they never consolidated their electoral successes. From the mid-eighties onwards, however, the far-right started to gain ground in electoral competition (Cole, 2005: 204). By the mid-nineties the state of affairs had become such that the far-right had gained some stable ground in various West European countries like Belgium, Italy, Denmark and Austria, and lately in the Netherlands.

In recent years, an increasing amount of research has been dedicated to the success and failure factors of far-right political parties in elections. Academics from disciplines such as sociology, social psychology and political science have found distinct explanations for the varying levels of success of far-right parties in (West) European countries. By now there is fairly clear evidence of the influence of different variables on the level of individual voters, social-structural factors, political and election opportunity structures, historical and – to a lesser extent - cultural factors (for overviews see: Kitchelt, 1997; Rydgren, 2005; Ignazi, 2006).

One important field in contemporary societies, however, the media, has hardly been investigated for its role in the popularity of the far-right. The media are considered an increasingly important player in the political constellation and in the relationship between civilians (voters) and politics (Brants & Van Praag, 2000; Kleinnijenhuis et al, 2003; Weaver, McCombs & Shaw, 2004; Walgrave, Soraka & Nuytemans, 2007). Some even suggest that we are moving from democracy towards mediacracy (Brants, 2002: 163). Also in the specific matter of the position of the far-right in different (West) European societies, the media have been mentioned by academics as a factor not to be ignored (see Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001; Van Donselaar, 1998; Walgrave & De Swert, 2004). The role of the media in this matter has also been conceived as ‘discursive opportunity structures’ (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004), meaning media offer essential and directing opportunities for public debate. However, systematic empirical research on the matter is scarcely available. Some of the available studies suggest a relationship between media attention and the popularity of the far-right. Lubbers & Scheepers found a significant relationship between the amount of attention in a German newspaper and the popularity of far-right parties in Germany (2001: 441, 443). The scope and level of detail of this study, however, are very limited. Lubbers did not find a similar result in the Dutch context (Lubbers, 2001: 165).
Other studies focussed on the relationship between attention to ‘far-right issues’ and far-right voting (Walgrave & de Swert, 2004; Boomgaard & Vliegenthart, 2007). The relationship between the content of the media coverage and the popularity of the far-right has not been investigated systematically, let alone longitudinally and cross-culturally, until now. Numerous questions about media coverage of the far-right remain unanswered.

This study attempts to provide answers to some of these. Newspaper coverage of the far-right in three countries (each with very different positions in respect of the far-right) will be investigated, across time and cross-culturally. The findings will be used to develop a theoretical understanding of the meaning of the variation in the media image of the far-right.

The study is grounded in a theoretical understanding of the far-right, the historical background of the far-right in Flanders, Germany and the Netherlands, and in media theories. The remainder of this chapter will discuss these bases and elaborate the central problem into research questions and hypotheses. In the following section the way the far-right is conceptualised will be described. Section three gives a preliminary short overview of relevant characteristics of the far-right in the three contexts. Then, in section four, the way the role of the media in explaining electoral successes of the far-right has been studied will be reviewed critically. This review will then result in the identification of the central focus and perspective of this study. In section five the three dimensions of the comparative approach of this study - across time, between types of newspapers and cross-culturally - will be elaborated.

1.2 DEFINING THE FAR-RIGHT
A significant proportion of the extensive body of literature on the far-right is dedicated to the problem how to define the far-right (for an overview see Ignazi, 2006; Kitchelt, 1997; Mudde, 1998). All of these studies emphasise that establishing a proper definition remains problematic. One of the reasons for this difficulty is the huge difference in historical contexts in which the far-right operates, even within Western Europe. The terminology is confusing at times; ‘extreme right’, ‘radical right’, ‘far-right’, ‘anti-immigration parties’ and even more specific terms such as ‘fascism’ are used, sometimes interchangeably, in other cases they have specific and distinct meanings. Fascism, of course, is a specific political ideology that is located at the far-right of the political left-right spectrum. In Germany a distinction has been made between radical right and extreme right. The German ‘Verfassungsschutz’ reserves the term extreme right for those formations that potentially endanger the constitution, while the radical right is considered to contain no such risk1. There are more examples of such specific use of these terms (see Ignazi, 2006: 28). In this study the term ‘far-right’ is used because it is to-the-point and is less problematic than ‘extreme right’ due to its specific meaning in other literature, or symbolic meaning in public debate. Others have opted for populist right or anti-immigrant right. However, I agree with Ignazi that “it is not appropriate to reduce the far (extreme) right to its most publicized issue”,

1 http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/FAQ/ (12-07-2005)
or to its most recently emphasised feature, for that matter (2006: 229). Here, the far-right refers to all groups, parties and organisations as well as ideologies at the far-right of the political spectrum. Far-right groups and organisations take all kinds of shapes and forms, from ad hoc formations to hierarchically structured military(-esque) organisations and political parties.

The conceptualisation of far-right is greatly influenced by its historical roots, both in specific situations and more generally by the Fascist and Nazi regimes of Mussolini (1924-1943) and Hitler (1933-1945). The specific history of the three contexts in this study, will be discussed in section 1.3 (Dutch, German and Flemish far-right). Here we focus on two general aspects of the conceptualisation of the far-right, namely its sociogenesis and its ideologies. The different aspects of the sociogenesis and ideologies together form the guidelines along which the various manifestations of the far-right can be recognised in the field (Blumer, 1954: 7). The far-right, as such, is defined as a ‘sensitising concept’ (cf Blumer, 1954; Tennekes, 1990). In different contexts and times the term far-right covers different formations and sets of ideologies. “Because of this varying nature of the concrete expressions (...) we have to rely on general guides and not on fixed objective traits or modes of expression (Blumer, 1954: 8).” These dynamics must be included in a conceptualisation of the far-right, in order to record differences and changes in how the far-right features in the newspapers. The sensitising concept, as it is introduced in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, is not an attempt to formulate a definition of the far-right, but serves to identify the various aspects of the far-right identity in order to be able to recognise them in the content analysis of the newspaper coverage.

1.2.1 THE SOCIGENESIS OF THE FAR-RIGHT

It is sometimes hard to draw the line between what is a far-right group or party and what is not. Such a difficulty appeared, for example, in the Netherlands with the rise of Pim Fortuyn, his parties and successors in 2002-2004. It is difficult to determine the status of these and other contemporary political parties or social movement groups by considering exclusively their ideological standpoints, as some authors do (Mudde, 1997; Cole, 2005). Political organisations and scarcely organised political groups are much more than their political programme. Their identity also consists of their sociogenesis. The concept of sociogenesis is coined by Norbert Elias in his Civilisation Process (1982). Here we use it to refer to the characteristics of far-right formations that are not part of official ideology, but originate in the figuration of individuals, groups and organisations of which a far-right formation is part and the interaction that takes place therein. The sociogenesis of far-right formations contains all their explicit and implicit social ties and sheds light on the sort of relations between the far-right formation and its environment. We distinguish core members of the formation (such as party officials, MP’s, founders, group organisers) and followers (such as party members, voters, fans and sympathisers). For both of these groups, five aspects of their sociogenesis should be examined.
First we need to consider to what extent members of far-right formations, and especially their leading figures, have individual deviating ideological standpoints. These might be much more extreme or explicit than the official or public programme. In the case of Fortuyn’s LPF and Rotterdam’s local party Leefbaar Rotterdam, the parties’ sociogenesis turned out to be more radical than Pim Fortuyn himself, or their party programme. Various members, and especially voters, had strong anti-immigrant views. Less organised far-right formations may have no programme at all, in spite of radical and explicit statements or actions of their members. This first aspect becomes increasingly important because new far-right parties often have a minimal official programme, while their leaders continuously make bold statements in public.

The actions and behaviour of a far-right formation and its individual members (foremost its leaders and spokesmen) also add to its identity. Action must be understood in a very broad sense, from behaviour in parliament to public occasions, and even in their private lives politicians’ actions will be remarked and therefore must be taken into account. Some far-right parties are known for the unorthodox behaviour of their leaders.

A third aspect of the sociogenesis of political formations consists of the ties with other, sometimes much more explicitly extreme, far-right formations. Far-right formations with a relatively ‘normal’, or mainstream image or mild party programme, sometimes have strong ties with more radical social movement organisations. The ties between Vlaams Blok and Voorpost and the Flemish nationalist student organisation NSV are well known examples of this (Deschouwer, 2001). Such relations were an issue that created a high degree of tension within Fortuyn’s Leefbaar Rotterdam and LPF, resulting in party splits.

A fourth aspect contains the historical roots of a far-right actor, or what Van Donselaar & Rodrigues call the social genealogy of the formation (2002: 77). Most far-right parties are successors of previous ones, or are founded by ex-members of other (prior) far-right organisations. As will be shown in section 1.3, a large part of the histories of various Dutch, Flemish and German far-right groups is a long succession of splits and fusions (Mudde, 1998), sometimes dating back to NSDAP memberships, or Nazi-collaborators. This aspect is described by Van Donselaar on various occasions, one of his examples concerning former NSB members who joined the far-right Boerenpartij in the sixties (Van Donselaar 1995: 16).

A last aspect that is considered part of the sociogenesis, but must also be examined separately in the light of this project, is the depiction of far-right formations. The sociogenesis might not have been the first concern of researchers of the far-right, but the media seem to have an eye for it. The way the media depict or label far-right formations seems of considerable concern to their sociogenesis. Dubious relationships or ideas of far-right leaders

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2 Fortuyn was party leader of both the local party Leefbaar Rotterdam (LR) during the local elections of March 6th 2002 and the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) for the national election of May 15th 2002.

3 The LR city council member Michiel Smit eventually left to start his own party Nieuw Rechts, after he was expelled for openly having friendly relations with Filip Dewinter of the Vlaams Blok.

4 The NSB was a Dutch political party which collaborated with the Nazis in WWII.
are popular topics for journalists. More precisely, we include how far-right formations are depicted by third parties, such as the media, competing politicians, or other formations interested in clarifying their standpoint in relation to the far-right formation. This depiction is closely related to what Gitlin calls ‘the public image’ of a movement (Gitlin, 1980). Again, in the example of Pim Fortuyn this aspect was very influential in the election campaigns of 2002. Fortuyn’s LPF was accused of being ‘extreme right’ in the media and by competing party leaders (D’66 leader De Graaff referred to Anne Frank in his reaction to Fortuyn’s plan to abolish the anti-discrimination article from the constitution5), which had far-reaching complications for people and organisations involved (Fennema, 2005). Depiction also involves what is called positive identification, which means that other far-right formations openly associate themselves with the formation in question. This happened frequently with LPF, greatly against their own inclination. Many far-right actors, such as small far-right or even Nazi parties, websites and groups (such as the nationalist-socialist group around the widow Ross-van Tonningen: Consortium de Levensboom) publicly sympathised with the LPF and its leader and some of them even tried to create bonds with the LPF that were not answered positively (Van Donselaar & Rodrigues, 2002: 78-81).

The sociogenesis of far-right formations thus consists of their relationships with other far-right formations, their historical roots, the non-official ideological standpoints and actions of the members and the public depiction of the far-right by others.

1.2.2 FAR-RIGHT IDEOLOGIES

The literature on the far-right discusses a wide variety of ideological issues, attitudes and standpoints. In most cases these investigations include multiple variations of the far-right, not infrequently put in a binary timeframe of ‘old’ and ‘new’ far-right. On an ideological level, there are serious differences between contemporary far-right parties (Fennema, 2005). Mudde (1998) distinguished as many as 52 definitions of what the far-right is (defined by ideologies). In an attempt to order this jumble, some authors created typologies to distinguish far-right formations from each other, based on the most relevant aspects of their ideologies (e.g. Kitchelt, 1997; Rydgren, 2005, Ignazi, 2006)

According to Mudde, from the long list of issues that are recognised as a part of far-right ideologies, five points are mentioned in almost all relevant literature (1998: 274). ‘Mudde’s five’ are anti-democratism, nationalism, racism, xenophobia and an emphasis on the strong state. This is not to say that these are the only relevant standpoints. The following picture draws on a vast body of studies of the far-right (Maolain, 1987; Kitchelt, 1997; Holsteyn & Mudde, 1998; Lucardi, 1998; Mudde, 1998; Minkenberg, 2000; Lubbers, 2001; Van Donselaar & Rodrigues, 2002; Coffé, 2005; Cole, 2005; Rydgren, 2005; Fennema 2005; Ignazi, 2006) Here we use ‘Mudde’s five’ only as a starting point to draw up a portrait that best suits the purpose of this study.

5 Het nationale chagrijn; De brede steun voor Pim Fortuyn, Nrc handelsblad 9 maart 2005.
The anti-democratic attitude is strongest in circles of traditional far-right formations. Among post-industrial far-right formations the anti-democratic attitude is not always present; sometimes it is replaced by more populist attitudes, or anti-political establishment sentiments or even advocacies of direct democracy (Fennema, 2005; Rydgren, 2005). Often, far-right actors’ attitudes towards democracy are somewhat unclear, or democratic values are expressed primarily for strategic reasons. According to most authors reviewed, populism features at least as much as anti-democratism in contemporary far-right ideologies. Both populism and anti-democratic attitudes are related to concepts such as charismatic leadership, anti-political establishment, intolerance for political plurality, anti-progressive and conspiracy theories. They can overlap as well as being two ends of a continuum. In finding a family resemblance they will be grouped together as a first ideological orientation, because they are both expressions of political attitudes against the political status quo.

Next, Mudde mentions three different, but closely related issues, namely nationalism, racism and xenophobia. Nationalism is a key concept in all reviewed descriptions and can be divided in state nationalism and ethnic nationalism. The former is often linked to more moderate and to original fascist far-right parties (i.e. Mussolini’s fascism), whereas the latter is attributed to more extreme formations, as well as generally to post-industrial far-right formations (Kitchelt, 1997). ‘Parochial’ ideologies, often meaning ethnic homogenous communities bound to a certain territory, in terms of ‘Blut (ethnic) und Boden (soil)’, are usually expressed in nationalist terminology, taking the nation state as the territorial unit of the community. German far-right parties, Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People’s Union) and Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-democratic Party of Germany) for example, claim former German territories because they ‘belong’ to the German people (Lubbers 2001: 12). Nationalism as such (in both its ethnic and state versions) will be included in our family resemblance as the first standpoint within the ethnic community orientation.

The second term in this trilogy, racism is probably seen as the most central aspect of far-right ideology in both academic and public discourse. Despite that preconception, racism is not central or even present in all far-right ideologies. In certain interbellum fascist formations it was not present at all (Kitchelt, 1997: 31). Fennema states it is not present in all ‘new’, post-industrial, or as he calls them “anti-immigrant” formations (2005: 17). Racism maybe the most well-known discriminatory attitude, but it is not the only one in many far-right ideologies. The problem with the concept of racism is that it is somewhat diffuse. From its original meaning “a complex of more or less related beliefs that envision a biologically determined relation between genotype and cultural behaviour of races (Eisinga & Scheepers 1989: 11)”6, it has become an emotionally charged term. For the more distant and also broader concept of xenophobia, such problems are not expected. Xenophobia basically is the fear or aversion of the stranger, or everything that differs from the own ethnic group, or is Volksfremde. To put it in another way, there is a strong prefer-

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6 My translation.
ence for the own ethnic group, or ethnic particularism. Xenophobic attitudes may cause racist behaviour. Xenophobia, as such, is included in our family resemblance of far-right ideology as the second standpoint within the ethnic community orientation. Exclusionist policies (such as welfare chauvinism) however, must be mentioned separately, precisely because not all far-right formations are racist according to Fennema (ibid), but do advocate exclusionist policies. Racist or xenophobic ideologies are often difficult to trace in news coverage, while exclusionist policies can be expected to be more easily traced. Exclusionism, as a general term to encapsulate a multitude of social phenomena related to individuals or organisations that try, or set out to exclude minorities from certain rights, or communal membership (Scheepers et al. 2002), is the third standpoint included in the ethnic community orientation.

The strong state is the last of ‘Mudde’s five’. In the concluding chapter of his dissertation the strong state is replaced by ‘law and order’, meaning “... in which the state should maintain a strict legal system and should enforce these rules actively and rigorously” (Mudde, 1998: 272). ‘Law and order’ thus includes a strong state, but concentrates mostly on law enforcement within the state and protection of the national community from the outside (i.e. from immigrants). Contemporary far-right actors seem to be concerned first with inner state homogeneity and stability and less with militarism and expansion (Cole, 2005; Kitchelt, 1997; Mudde, 1998). In line with this argument, from most literature reviewed it can be concluded that such a conception of law and order is more relevant to all forms of contemporary far-right, than the more traditional far-right ‘strong state’ in which it originates. Therefore it is included in the family resemblance within the third conservative orientation.

Not listed as one of the five most mentioned features of the far-right, but put forward as a central part of far-right ideologies in most reviewed literature is the idea of advocating and protecting traditional values. This includes firstly a strong emphasis on the traditional family as a central unit in society. This emphasis is accompanied by other traditional values, such as strict division of roles for men and women, anti-abortion, anti-euthanasia and often homophobic standpoints. It fits in the conservative orientation, next to law and order standpoints. All together, the ideological issues of the far-right can be summarised as in Figure 1.1.

1.2.3 DIMENSIONS OF VARIETY WITHIN THE FAR-RIGHT
Above, I elaborated on two different core elements of the far-right, its sociogenesis and ideological standpoints. As central elements of the family resemblance, they provide a cadre within which there is much room for variation, between far-right parties, within parties at a certain moment in time, within parties across time and within the far-right as a whole. Therefore, at first sight, some far-right formations may have little in common and still belong to the far-right family. Like other institutions, far-right formations change constantly and their far-right identity is captured in the continuity of successive changes (see Goudsblom, 1988).
Differences between far-right formations are often easy to detect and have had most scholarly attention. A range of typologies have been developed; roughly speaking, these all make a division between old and new far-right. To be accurate though it is better following Ignazi - to put it in terms of ‘traditional’ and ‘post-industrial’ far-right (2006: 34), because both ‘old’ and ‘new’ characteristics are to be found among contemporary far-right formations. Traditional refers to formations that draw on the tradition of inter-bellum fascism that includes corporatism, anti-democracy and authoritarianism with strong hierarchical structures (Kitchelt 1997: 30; Ignazi, 2006: 34), whereas the new, or post-industrial far-right emerged in the early eighties as a result of the ‘silent revolution’ of post-industrial society, simultaneously with the green party family (Ignazi, 2006: 34; Cole, 2005: 205). The French National Front is identified as the first, or prototype, post-industrial far-right party with its ‘nouvelle droite’ (Rydgren, 2005: 475; Ignazi, 2006: 22-23). Needless to say, this distinction consists of ideal types. Other authors use more or less similar typologies, moderate versus radical (Mudde, 1998), extreme right versus racist versus populist (Fennema, 2005), old versus new radical right (Kitchelt, 1997), new versus old (Cole, 2005), radical right wing populist versus old (Rydgren, 2005).

Sometimes there are serious differences between ideologies put forward in official party publications and statements and other outlets (of one and the same party). Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie use the difference between front and back stage ideologies here (2005). Front stage statements are often more mellow than back stage, not only for legal reasons (anti-discrimination legislation has led to many convictions already), but also attempts to increase acceptance as a ‘normal party’ leads to such differences between front and backstage standpoints (Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie 2005). In this way considerable differences may occur within one party at a particular moment in time.

### Figure 1.1 Ideological Standpoints of the Far-Right

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<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Ideological Standpoints</th>
<th>Key words</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political orientation</td>
<td>1. Anti-democratic</td>
<td>Anti-democratic, Authoritarianism, Populism, Charismatic leadership, Anti-political establishment, Intolerance for political pluralism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Populism</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic community orientation</td>
<td>3. Nationalism</td>
<td>Ethnic homogeneous community, Blut und Boden, Ethnic threat (ethno-cultural) Particularism, Exclusionist policies (i.e. welfare chauvinism)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Xenophobia</td>
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<td>5. Exclusionism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservative orientation</td>
<td>6. Law &amp; Order</td>
<td>Strong state, Strong leader, Repressive law enforcement, Traditional family, Paternalism, Homophobia</td>
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<td>7. Traditional Values</td>
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Some far-right formations have made significant changes and have become more radical, or moderate across time. One such example is the Flemish party VLAAMS BLOK. In its first years it held a primarily regionalist or Flemish-nationalist programme directed at protecting the Flemish people from the federal government and the French speaking part of Belgium, and striving for Flemish independence. From 1984 on its programme included an anti-immigrant standpoint and with that became more radical. In 1992 it published a 70 point anti-immigrant programme in which what can be considered its most radical standpoints were formulated. A law-suit in 2004 forced VLAAMS BLOK to moderate its programme again. In the early nineties it recruited many cadre members from militant groups and was involved in violent incidents. This became less apparent at least in recent years. Other far-right parties that changed significantly over time for example were the Austrian FREIHEITLICHE PARTEI ÖSTERREICHS (more radical) and the Italian ALLEANZA NAZIONALE (more moderate) (Ignazi, 2006: 230).

This fluidity, as opposed to rock-steady rigidity, explains the enduring confusion and discussion about what exactly is the far-right. Here it serves to explain the main dimensions of variety within the family resemblance. Piero Ignazi gives an additional guide in the epilogue of the paperback edition of his Extreme right parties in Western Europe; a formation is far-right, when it (1) is at the furthest right of the left-right spectrum in a given society and (2) ideologically rejects “the principles of equality and plurality”, as these are central values of contemporary liberal democracies (Ignazi, 2006: 225). For the purpose of this study, it is important to emphasise the broadness of the family resemblance, because all of this variation may appear in the media coverage of the far-right without explicit mention.

1.3 SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE FAR-RIGHT IN THE NETHERLANDS, GERMANY AND FLANDERS

A short look into the recent histories of the far-right in the three national contexts featured in this study will give some insight in the variation within the family resemblance of the far-right and show why these three countries are particularly relevant cases for this study.

The Dutch far-right is characterised by a lack of continuity. Various parties and leaders constantly competed for hegemony within the far-right. During the research period three parties succeeded in gaining seats in the Dutch parliament. Until 1986 this was the CENTRUMPARTIJ (CP) and from 1989 on, its successor CENTRUMDEMOCRATEN (CD) under the same leader, Hans Jannaat. This party reached its peak in 1994, when three of its candidates were elected to parliament. In 1998 they were not re-elected and the party vanished from the political scene. In 2002, Pim Fortuyn stormed into the Dutch electoral competition with his LIJST PIM FORTUYN (LPF). Fortuyn was assassinated nine days before the elections. His party still collected 26 seats in parliament and entered the coalition government, which fell a few months later due to continual infighting within the LPF leadership. In the following elections the party lost considerable ground. During the entire research period there were countless smaller far-right parties, with no real significance at the national or European level (see Lucardi, 1998; Van Donselaar & Rodrigues, 2003).
Since the mid-eighties three legal far-right parties have been active in Germany. The most well known of these is the Republikaner (Rep), which is the only one to have enjoyed considerable electoral success, this being in the European Parliament elections in 1989. The other two parties, Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) and Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), never crossed the threshold at national nor European levels. In 2001 these three parties were joined by a fourth and new party led by a former judge Roland Schill (Schill Partei). After a local success in Hamburg, it met with failure in the national elections in 2002 and was dissolved soon after. From the early nineties on, a violent extra-parliamentary far-right became increasingly active and caused a wave of anti-immigrant violence that reached a peak in 1994. Traditionally, the German far-right is concentrated in the southern states, but has become increasingly popular in the ‘new’ eastern states and had electoral successes on local and regional levels (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000: 63-64; Ignazi, 2006: 70-1).

Belgium consists of three political regions, of which only the Flemish one is included in this study. Flanders has its own political parties and a unique position in the far-right. Since the late seventies, Vlaams Blok (VB) is the only far-right party in Flanders. The party has been successful in elections almost since its beginnings, but especially from 1987 on it grew in every election at all political levels (local, regional, national or European). Since its electoral breakthrough in 1991 VB has become a significant opposition party. In Antwerp it collected almost 1/3 of the votes in the last two local elections, and in the regional elections for the Flemish parliament in 2004 it collected 24.2% of the votes making it the second biggest party in Flanders. The party is deeply rooted in the separatist regionalist movement for an independent Flanders, which is one important explanation for its continuous successes (Coffé, 2005).

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flanders (Belgium)</td>
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Sources: CBS, www.elections.de. The German voting percentages are ‘Zweitstimme’ in Bundestag or European Parliament elections. Belgian figures are percentages of the total number of Belgian votes (not just the Flemish votes).

In a sense, the Netherlands and Flanders are extreme cases because (1) whereas the Vlaams Blok has grown into an irrefutable power factor, in the Netherlands the far-right has remained, or become, a shadowy marginal phenomenon; (2) the system and ideology of party hierarchy in Flanders contrasts sharply with the poorly-organised party structure in the Netherlands; (3) the social, historical and cultural context of the Vlaams Blok as part of the Flemish nationalist tradition (see, among others, Spruyt, 1995; van den Brink, 1999; Achten, 2000) is in sharp contrast to the groups in the Netherlands that have remained isolated. However, the sudden appearance and success of the LPF suggest a sizable
right-wing potential. The German case has yet another, completely different, character. The fluctuations in far-right voting behaviour in Germany put that country electorally into a middle position. However, due to the electoral system, the German far-right never succeeded in entering the German parliament, and Germany is the only country (in the three considered in this study) with a considerable extra-parliamentary far-right (Kühnel, 1998). In short, the notable differences between the three contexts with regard to far-right voting behaviour justify the suspicion that media attention to the far-right in the Netherlands, Germany and Flanders will differ considerably. These differences will enable us to reach a better understanding of the variation in media attention within these countries, as well as media attention to the far-right in general.

I.4 Media attention to the far-right

A vast body of literature has been dedicated to the development and empirical testing of various explanations of the differences and changes in the popularity of the far-right in the last two decades. Authors focus on a broad range of aspects, from party dynamics to culture and political opportunities. In recent years, explanations on the level of individual voting preferences have been systematically tested in comparative and longitudinal designs (cf. Lubbers 2001). Characteristics that may influence far-right voting behaviour are on the individual as well as the contextual level. The most important individual characteristics are: level of education, employment, income level, gender, age and church membership. Contextual characteristics that have been investigated are: unemployment levels, change in unemployment levels, number of immigrants and the combination of the last two. These explanations have been tested in multi-variate models by Lubbers and colleagues (Lubbers, Scheepers & Billiet, 2000; Lubbers, 2001; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001). By now, a generally acknowledged idea, based on these empirical tests, of the influence of these factors individually as well as in combination, exists. “The trends in extreme right wing voting are above all explained by anti-immigration attitudes and the changes therein, which are influenced by the actual increase in the number of ethnic immigrants present (Lubbers, 2001: 179).” However, this does not mean the variation in far-right voting is now completely mapped out. There are still aspects that have not been given much attention as yet.

Scarcely any attention has been paid to the role of the media in this matter, despite the fact that the media are considered to be an important factor in the communication between politicians and voters, especially at election times (Brants & Van Praag, 2000; 2005; Kleinnijenhuis et al, 2003). In the field of election studies some even speak of a mediacracy (Brants, 2002). Many within as well as outside academia consider media coverage of the far-right a delicate matter because of its assumed agenda-setting effects (i.e. Van Donselaar et al., 1998). Therefore the suggestion that the media have a role in the decision-making process whether to vote for the far-right or not is legitimate. Lubbers (2001) tested this hypothesis of media influence for Germany and the Netherlands. The results reveal a connection between the amount of newspaper coverage of the far-right and far-right voting behaviour; however, the characteristics of this relationship remain unclear (see below). Hence the goal of this study is to explore the contents of the newspaper
coverage of the far-right and its relation to the variations in far-right voting over time and between nations.

The blind spot of the relationship between voting for the far-right and media coverage is not only addressed by Lubbers et al., but also (although from different perspectives) by De Swert (2002), Walgrave & De Swert (2004) and Van Donselaar et al. (1998). The latter, however, limit their focus to journalists’ strategies to deal with the far-right or media coverage of far-right ideological issues. As far as I know, no one besides Lubbers and – to some extent - Walgrave & De Swert and recently Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart (2007), have looked into the relationship between the volume of newspaper coverage on the far-right and voting behaviour/preferences.

1.4.1 FINDINGS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIA ATTENTION AND FAR-RIGHT VOTING
For two countries, Germany and the Netherlands, the relationship between newspaper coverage of the far-right and far-right voting has been investigated by Lubbers. He came to somewhat surprising conclusions (2001: 239). In accordance with his findings on contextual factors, he concentrated his research on the role of the media on two issues, asylum seekers and the far-right parties themselves. The number of articles on asylum seekers as well as the number of articles on far-right parties were related to election polls during the nineties. He then found that there is no significant relationship between the number of articles on asylum seekers and far-right voting in neither of the two countries. Also in the Netherlands there was no relationship between attention for far-right parties and far-right voting. In Germany however, he did find a positive relationship between the frequency of articles on the far-right and far-right voting (2001: 174). The reasons for this difference are as yet unclear.

A closer look at the outcomes of Lubbers’ study reveals – although not statistically significant – opposite effects on both variables in the two countries. An increase of articles on the far-right in the Netherlands relates to a decrease of far-right votes. While the frequency of articles on asylum seekers in the Netherlands relates to an increase in far-right votes, it has a negative effect in Germany (2001: 237). Both the strength and the effect of the relationship vary between the two countries. The increasing amount of articles in Dutch newspapers at the moment of decreasing support for the parties CD and CP’86 in 1994 found by Lubbers (2001: 200) may be thus explained by a negative content of the news coverage. That would be a reversed effect of Lubbers’ hypothesis: “the higher the media attention to extreme right-wing parties, the larger the likelihood of voting for an extreme right-wing party (2001: 166)”, but would at the same time support the hypothesis that newspaper coverage does influence far-right voting behaviour negatively or positively, depending on the contents of the coverage. The contents of newspaper coverage of the far-right therefore needs to be investigated.

1.4.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF MEDIA CONTENTS
Lubbers chose not to go into the contents of newspaper coverage and measured only the
amount of media attention by the number of articles in the newspapers. He did so, not only for practical reasons, such as limited time, but states that he finds his arguments to do so in media theories as well. However, the assumption of this study is that the content of newspaper coverage on the far-right is relevant. This expectation is built upon various hints from media and social movement theories and finds support in Lubbers’ results as well as in some of his remarks thereon. This study will further elaborate on these arguments below.

Using the results of Vergeer’s (2000) study on the relationship between media and attitudes towards immigrants, Lubbers argues that the content of the newspaper coverage is not important. According to this study, the newspaper read has little influence on people’s opinion on ethnic relations and people usually choose a newspaper that matches their existing opinions (Vergeer, 2000). Referring to Stappers, Reijnders & Möller (1990), he adds that mechanisms of selective perception and selective retention support this assumption; “Research has shown that people with racist attitudes interpret anti-racist texts which contrast their opinion in such a manner that their pre-existing attitudes remain valid to them (Lubbers, 2001: 166).” The outcome of Vergeer’s study is confirmed in studies on the relation between media and election campaigns. Van der Brug & Van der Eijk (2005: 264) state that changes in party preferences among voters do not relate to media use, but there are significant “across the board” effects. This does not mean that content does not matter, but only that there was (in the 2002/2003 elections in the Netherlands) little difference in the content of the coverage of various newspapers. Walgrave & De Swert (2004: 495-496) found effects of Flemish news media’s attention on voting behaviour for certain far-right ideological issues. These authors thus have empirical arguments against neglecting the content of newspaper coverage.

There are also remarks to be made on Lubbers’ interpretation of the mechanisms of selective perception and selective retention. Even if this mechanism is at work, it is still insufficient reason to ignore the content of newspaper coverage of the far-right. For readers’ opinions on political issues, in this case racist attitudes, and the evaluation of political parties, the confirmation, denial or (possible) legitimation of these opinions by third parties has proved important (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). Research on party choice has made clear that, after having formed an opinion on issues, people use accessible information to evaluate which party with similar views suits them best. A two-step model is at work here. People first compare their views with those of competing political parties. The parties with points of view closest to their own are then evaluated on whether they are a ‘normal democratic party’ or not, and on their strategic value (Van der Brug, Fennema & Tilly, 2005: 564). In research on far-right violence it has become clear that the amount of support of mainstream politicians and public opinion of this violence depends on the visibility, resonance and legitimation in the media (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). Important third parties providing this feedback are politicians, journalists and experts whose message is accessible almost exclusively through the media. So between finding agreement between individual opinion and party ideology and voting, voters evaluate other aspects of their voting decision, based on media-provided information.
These arguments match findings within the communication science framework. Second order agenda setting theory emphasises the relevance of the way (far-right) actors receive attention in the media is meaningful for the evaluation of these actors by the readers and their voting behaviour (Weaver, McCombs & Shaw, 2004: 262). Others make a similar argument, stating that a cumulative particular way of reporting on a subject has an increasing effect on voters’ ideas on the subject (Scheufele, 1999; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). In this way, media make an important contribution to the public opinion of the far-right, although this influence is seldom direct (McQuail, 2005: 516). Due to the fact that journalists report on movements in a routine way, using a limited set of ‘frames’ (Gitlin, 1980: 266), a repetition of a limited range of images of a political movement occurs in newspaper coverage, or, as Van Zoonen states: “once you have a media image it is quite hard to get rid of it” (1992: 457). This image is built by emphasising certain aspects of a movement or focussing attention on repeated events around a movement (Gitlin, 1980: 27; Van Donselaar, 1998: 47). This does not mean the public image of a movement is static. If significant changes in the social or political context occur – a ‘political crisis’ in Gitlin’s terms - this may lead to changes in journalistic routines and a changed public image of the movement (Gitlin, 1980: 273). These arguments confirm our idea that the portrayal of a movement, in this case the far-right, is of great significance both as an expression of political discourse and as an information source for voting decisions. This means that we have to investigate how media pay attention to the far-right as a prerequisite to be able to explore adequately the relationship between media coverage of the far-right and far-right support. The central problem of this study is to investigate how media pay attention to the far-right and how it varies between cultural-political contexts, newspapers and over time.

1.4.3 MEDIA ATTENTION: A CONCEPTUAL ELABORATION

By investigating how media pay attention to the far-right we can determine if there is a ‘sensus communis’ way of reporting on it. In literature we found hints as to what aspects of media attention need to be examined if we want to get a grip on the contents of media coverage of the far-right. To be able to review variation in the content of the coverage of the far-right we distinguish four relevant aspects of media attention. The first two are quantitative measures (attention volume and formal attention), which cover the same aspects of media attention as much agenda setting research (Weaver, McCombs & Shaw, 2004: 257; Kosicki, 1993; Walgrave & van Aelst, 2006). The other two are more ‘qualitative’ measures of media attention and thus give us insight in the image of the far-right constructed in newspaper coverage (substantial attention and support attention). These last two aspects of media attention have been developed to analyse the ‘how’ question of media attention for the far-right in a structural way. The assumption behind it is that emphasis on certain aspects of the far-right and repetition of this emphasis make a certain image of the far-right more salient (Gitlin, 1980, Entman, 1991). For this improvement of the study of media attention for the far-right, we apply knowledge from studies on related subjects, such as that on media images of social movements by Gitlin (1980), social movements’ discursive opportunities (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004), framing (Entman, 1991, 1993) and the process to come to a far-right vote (Van der Brug, Fennema & Tilly, 2005).
VOLUME ATTENTION
Most studies on the media and the far-right simply counted the number of articles on the far-right (or migration issues) within a given period and related those numbers to voting or polling data through various statistical procedures (Lubbers, 2001; Walgrave & de Swert, 2004; Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007). This volume of attention is a relevant first measure to judge how much, or how little, attention media pay to the far-right. Media are often said to ignore the far-right completely. If this thesis of editorial ‘minimal attention policy’ (Van Donselaar et al., 1998: 46) is correct, we would find a very small attention volume.

FORMAL ATTENTION
The second aspect of media attention to the far-right is actually a further investigation of the first. Beyond volume, other quantitative measures are used to see how much attention the far-right received. The visibility of the far-right as an actor or topic in the articles is taken into account, as well as the level of prominence the far-right has in the articles. Formal attention provides a cue to the newsworthiness of the far-right. High levels of formal attention measures may increase the relevance of media information when voters judge far-right parties at the ballot box (see Koopmans & Olzak, 2004: 203).

SUBSTANTIAL ATTENTION
This third aspect of media attention is the first that gives the ‘how do media pay attention to the far-right’ question real substance. Far-right voting increases when voters evaluate these parties as ‘normal’ democratic parties instead of, for example, ‘too extreme’, ‘undemocratic’, or ‘unreliable’ (Van der Brug, Tilly and Fennema, 2005). This suggests we should focus on the portrayal, or media image of the far-right itself in the coverage. This third aspect is called substantial attention. We consider four dimensions of substantial attention. Firstly, we ask if the far-right is represented passively or actively as a source. For similar indicators see Scholten & Ruigrok (2006) and Ter Wal (2004). A low level of active representation suggests a greater distance between journalist (and reader) and the subject. In cases of passive representation the latter is ‘not involved’ but only ‘talked about’. In other words: are far-right actors portrayed as objects or subjects in the coverage?

A second dimension consists of the roles in which far-right actors receive news coverage. This can be in ‘normal’ or positive roles, roles that can be expected for political parties, for example, as a participant in parliamentary debates and party conferences; or more negative ones, such as in legal conflict (e.g. when a far-right politician is charged with racism), or in forms of extra-parliamentary activity. The way in which newspapers present how far-right actors operate is one of the most important aspects of its media image (Van Zoonen, 1992: 463-468).

The third dimension of substantial attention is the presence of stigmatising associations with the Nazis and (their) anti-Semitism, or associations with extremist (violent) groups (such as neo-Nazis, or skinheads) or violence. The presence of such associations attribute a negative media image to the far-right and increase the distance from a ‘normal demo-
cratic party’ image (Van der Brug, Fennema & Tilly, 2005). Therefore, we assume that such associations may function as disqualifiers in the electoral competition. It is a fact that they are used as such, for example in the case of Pim Fortuyn in the Dutch election campaign of 2001 (Van Donselaar & Rodrigues, 2002: 62). A high level of stigmatising associations in the coverage strengthens an extremist, or violent media image of the far-right. The fourth and last dimension of substantial attention is the presence of far-right ideological standpoints. Whereas the first three dimensions are more directly related to the far-right’s sociogenesis, this last dimension represents the ideology. The ideological standpoints attributed to far-right actors in the coverage add to their media image. Both the range of standpoints and the intensity of their appearance in the media may be important. For example, when a party is only related to one standpoint, it may acquire the image of a one-issue party.

These four dimensions form an image that may, or may not meet the standards of a ‘normal democratic party’ (Van der Brug, Fennema & Tilly, 2005: 546). Portrayal of the far-right in ‘normal democratic’ roles would increase the appeal of a far-right party. In the same way, portrayal in, by general standards, unacceptable circumstances would decrease the appeal of the far-right.

**SUPPORT ATTENTION**

Not only the image, in a restricted sense, matters in this respect. Other stakeholders, or ‘claim makers’ (Koopmans & Statham, 1999) relate to far-right formations and their standpoints as well. Journalists can decide to include these attitudes in their coverage of the far-right. Most studies on the public image of movements and parties have ignored this support as a part of the media image. Therefore the fourth aspect of media attention in our study is support attention that considers the way the far-right or their standpoints are evaluated by non-far-right stakeholders, such as other politicians, civil organisations and government, and thus measures legitimation and distance from other political parties. We distinguish two dimensions of support attention. First we look at the attention to attitudes of non-far-right actors towards the far-right. Koopmans & Olzak distinguish resonance and legitimacy as “mechanisms of positive and negative feedback (2004: 223)”. Where resonance is a ripple effect, assuming that in a reaction of a third party, the original message is at least partially repeated. Legitimacy refers to whether the message is approved (legitimated by a stakeholder) or disapproved (de-legitimated) (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004: 204-5). Our assumption is that reported favourable attitudes of non-far-right actors (legitimation) add to the image of a ‘normal democratic party’, while unfa-vourable attitudes (de-legitimisation) would add to an unacceptable image. The second dimension of support attention is the attention to debates among stakeholders on how to deal with the far-right. The idea is that the more frequently such debates are reported, the greater the contribution to an undemocratic and unacceptable party image, because the debates are centred around the question whether or not the far-right can be treated as any other political party. Often such debate is focussed on the necessity and possibility of prohibition of a far-right organisation or party, or non-cooperation agreements among other parties, such as have been made in Belgium (Deschouwer, 2001).
1. The far-right in the media: introduction, theoretical framework and research questions

**Figure 1.2** Four aspects of media attention for the far-right

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTENTION ASPECTS</th>
<th>DIMENSIONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>I Volume attention</td>
<td>Number of articles</td>
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<tr>
<td>II Formal attention</td>
<td>Visibility in newspaper</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Prominence in articles</td>
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<td>III Substantial attention</td>
<td>Representation of far-right actors</td>
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<td>Situated roles far-right actors feature in</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stigmatising associations</td>
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<td>IV Support attention</td>
<td>Non-far-right actors’ attitudes towards the far-right</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debate on how to deal with the far-right</td>
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1.5 VARIATIONS IN MEDIA ATTENTION TO THE FAR-RIGHT: QUESTIONS

We now have four aspects of media attention for the far-right to structure our central question (RQ1) how do media pay attention to the far-right? In order to find out how these characteristics of media attention to the far-right are relevant for the study of the relationship between media attention and far-right voting we need to investigate the variation in the media attention to the far-right. In this section we specify the primary question into three research questions of variation in media attention to the far-right, longitudinal variation, variation between different kinds of newspapers and variation between different national contexts. If there is something like a ‘sensus communis’ of reporting on the far-right, how far-reaching is this across time and culture and different types of newspapers?

1.5.1 LONGITUDINAL CHANGES

In recent history of the far-right and its popularity among voters there are numerous ups- and-downs that should be mentioned, as well as some serious events, such as the wave of far-right violence in Germany, the sudden rise and assassination of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands and the successful lawsuit against the Belgian far-right party VLAAMS BLOK (VB, Flemish Block). For the purpose of this study it is relevant to investigate to what extent these electoral fluctuations and events have been preceded or followed by changes in media attention. Especially interesting is the question whether there are specific patterns in this longitudinal variation, such as that found by Van Gorp in the Belgian press’s attention to asylum seekers around Christmas, when all newspapers suddenly shifted to the same frame, regardless of their previous dominant framing (Van Gorp, 2005). Other than Lubbers’ argument that increased volume attention will cause increased popularity of the far-right, there are no indications that specific patterns occur. Therefore an open research question is formulated (RQ2): Are there any changes in the media attention to the far-right between 1986 and 2004?
1.5.2 DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN NEWSPAPERS
Research on political news showed different, sometimes contradictory results of comparative analyses between types of newspapers. Some studies show few differences between newspapers, while others stress that significant differences exist (Scholten & Ruigrok, 2006; Van der Brug & Van der Eijk, 2005). In order to create a valid basis for this study and to be able to investigate possible differences between types of newspapers, three different daily national newspapers in each country were selected, two so-called quality newspapers and one popular newspaper. The popular newspaper is considered to be right of the political middle (Ohlemacher, 1996; De Bens, 2001; Ward, 2005). Of the quality newspapers, one is left-leaning and one right-leaning. With this newspaper selection we can compare quality and popular newspapers, as well as left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers (see chapter two for further details on the newspaper selection). Research question 3 therefore is: Are there any differences in the attention to the far-right in different types of newspapers?

MEDIA ATTENTION TO THE FAR-RIGHT IN QUALITY AND POPULAR NEWSPAPERS
A general difference between quality and popular newspapers revealed in various studies is that quality newspapers pay more attention to politics and political parties (Scholten & Ruigrok, 2006: 10, 24; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2007: 98). It would be logical to expect that this also applies to specific political parties, in this case far-right political parties. Therefore we expect the following:

H1 Quality newspapers pay more volume attention and more formal attention to the far-right than popular newspapers.

Previous research suggested two differences in substantial attention between quality and popular newspapers. The first difference is that the popular press tends to limit its focus to sensational aspects of the far-right, such as internal power struggles, shocking quotes from party leaders, violence and legal conflicts (Ohlemacher, 1996: 156, 158; Plasser & Ulram, 2003: 27-29); Steward, Mazzoleni & Horsfield, 2003: 225). Quality papers, in contrast, are relatively more interested in the background of far-right politics and why people support these parties and activists (Steward, Mazzolenie & Horsfield, 2003: 225). The second difference is the higher level of attention for crime and immigration issues in popular newspapers that leads to a focus on only two far-right standpoints, xenophobic/exclusionist and law and order standpoints (Ohlemacher, 1996: 156; Steward, Mazzoleni & Horsfield, 2003: 225, Walgrave & de Swert, 2004: 489). These two differences suggest that, overall, quality newspapers pay more attention to a more diverse range of substantial attention issues.

H2 Quality newspapers pay more attention to (a more diverse range of) substantial attention aspects than popular newspapers.

Following the same line of argument we expect popular newspapers to limit their focus to de-legitimatising attitudes of non-far-right actors. Their focus on the far-right itself is on
the extreme aspects, because of the deviant character that is unlikely to be approved by the political establishment. Quality papers, however, are expected to pay more attention to support attention in general, as well as to the individual kinds of support attention.

**H3** Quality newspapers pay more attention to (a more diverse range of) support attention aspects than popular newspapers.

### Media Attention to the Far-Right in Left and Right Leaning Newspapers

In all three national contexts the media systems developed within the borders of what Hallin and Mancini call the democratic-corporatist model, which, among other features, included political parallelism in the press (2004: 178). This means newspapers were often affiliated to political parties. This parallelism has declined over recent decades, at least in the formal sense. Former partisan papers, or their successors, can still be characterised along left-right lines (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 180). In countries like Germany and Belgium the high level of professionalism of journalists does not automatically mean ‘neutral’ journalism. They tend to stress particular values as important in their publications. They concluded on the basis of various studies that a certain degree of ‘politicisation’ of newspapers is still likely to be present, although others, like Schönbach Stürzenbecher & Schneider (1998) state that there “has been a convergence in journalism in the Western Democratic countries.” If the persistence thesis on ‘political parallelism’, or rather ‘polarisation between left and right newspapers thesis’ is correct, we can expect to find differences in the coverage of the far-right between left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers. Left-leaning newspapers would then have more reason to use actively the strategies as described by Van Donselaar et al. (1998) to create a certain image of the far-right, than right-wing oriented newspapers would do. This, then would lead to three new hypotheses:

**H4** Left-oriented newspapers pay more volume attention and more formal attention than right-wing oriented newspapers.

**H5** Left-oriented newspapers pay more attention to substantial attention aspects than right-wing oriented newspapers.

**H6** Left-oriented newspapers pay more attention to support attention aspects than right-oriented newspapers.

### Contextual Variation

Besides the historical dimension of comparison and that between newspaper types, this study also investigates media attention for the far-right cross-culturally. Three national contexts have been included, the Netherlands, Germany and Flanders (see for a detailed argument chapter 2). Despite a range of similar circumstances the far-right has had very different levels of electoral success in these contexts. In this study it is therefore interesting to compare the media’s contents and thus the media’s roles herein. Has the far-right in the Netherlands indeed been ignored, while receiving attention in Flanders? Did the German press continue to present a negative media image of the far-right, while the Dutch media abandoned it after the demise of the last generation of far-right parties at the turn of the millennium? Does the cultural-political context matter for the media attention to the far-right?
Do Dutch newspaper report differently on similar far-right actors than do German or Flemish newspapers? In other words, is the political-cultural context relevant for the way newspapers report on the far-right? In chapter six I will compare the media attention in these three political and cultural contexts as a final step to improve our understanding of significance of the media attention to the far-right. The fourth and last research question therefore is: What differences are there in the media attention to the far-right between Dutch, German and Flemish newspapers?

1.6 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The model of the four aspects of media attention to the far-right enables us to investigate the media image of the far-right in a systematic way. This study provides an answer to the principle question ‘how did Dutch, German and Flemish newspapers pay attention to the far-right between 1986 and 2004’. Moreover, by uncovering trends and patterns in the media attention to the far-right we can draw up an empirically based theory that shows how and why the portrayal of this exceptional party family in the newspapers of the northwest of Europe is a changing image. With that, this study also delivers materials for future research that are more capable of interpreting the relationship between media attention to the far-right and far-right political success within its political-cultural context.

1.7 OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
In the next chapter we will elaborate on the design of the study, the measurement of the four aspects of media attention to the far-right and the methods and techniques used in the analysis. The heart of the book consists of three case studies. We applied the model of media attention to the far-right on newspaper coverage of the far-right in newspapers from three countries. For each of these national contexts, the Netherlands, Germany and Flanders (the Dutch speaking region of Belgium) we conducted a case study. In the last chapter, we compare the outcomes of these national studies in a cross-national analysis and use the outcomes of the study to theorise on the mechanisms we found in the media attention to the far-right.
CHAPTER TWO
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER TWO  
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The main purpose of this chapter is to explain how the questions that have been brought forward in section 1.5 have been researched. The empirical phase of this study can be divided into three parts. For each of these three parts the design and methodology will be discussed separately. The main part of the study concentrates exclusively on the contents of the newspaper coverage, only in the last chapter the outcome of these analyses is confronted with the secondary data. In what follows the methodology of the systematic-quantitative content analysis, that is the core of the research, is discussed in section 2.2. In section 2.3 we then discuss the additional content analysis method (framing) that has been used to triangulate, as well as to complete, the outcomes of the systematic-quantitative content analysis with analyses of a closer and different reading of the newspaper coverage of the far-right. In section 2.4 the procedure and analytical construct in which the newspaper coverage data has been related to the voting data will be explained.

2.1 SYSTEMATIC-QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS

From the research questions logically follows that the empirical research for this study concerns the contents of newspaper coverage of the far-right. Because of the descriptive character of the research questions concerning this content, the comparative research design and the amount of material, the choice for a systematic-quantitative content analysis is a logical method. It enables the researcher to perform a precise and effective analysis of a large corpus. This method is a frequently used and positively evaluated research tradition for the analysis of contents of texts, and especially mass media (Wester & van Sel, 2006: 124). “Quantitative content analysis is the systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have been assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules, and the analysis of relationships involving those values using statistical methods, in order to describe the communication, draw inferences about its meaning, or infer from the communication to its context, both of production and consumption (Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 1998: 20).” This is precisely the form of content analysis that features in this study (as opposed to various other, often more qualitative, forms, see Wester & Pleijter, 2005; Neuendorf, 2002).

Newspaper articles are ‘natural’ data in the sense that they are analysed exactly as they occur in society (in contrast to survey data that are indirectly, or artificially acquired). Newspaper articles, in contrast to transcribed interviews or answers to survey questions, are part of social reality (Wester 1996: 199-200). Texts, such as newspaper articles on the far-right are “products with a meaning structure that refers to the social context in which the texts have been produced (Wester, 2006: 18)”.


8 My translation.
The content analysis as is executed in this study is a direct analysis of social reality. Its purpose is to describe systematically the characteristics of the content of newspaper coverage of the far-right with the aid of a carefully developed, constructed and tested instrument. Therefore constant items are used, that – to be accurate – have been operationalised in specific ways for the diverse temporal and local relevant contexts.

2.1.1 THE CONTENT ANALYSIS INSTRUMENT
The first step in the operationalisation of the theoretical framework developed in 1.4.3 is to work out indicators of the three aspects of media content relevant for this study. From these indicators the next step in the operationalisation is the listing of the recording units pertaining to these indicators and from there on the phrasing/wording of these recording units into questions and instructions that together form the instrument. This systematically carried out process, which should guard the construct validity of the instrument (Merten, 1995: 317), is described in this section. The codebook can be found in appendix 2.2.

FROM THEORETICAL CONCEPTS TO CODING ITEMS
In the theoretical framework, three relevant aspect of the contents of newspaper coverage of the far-right are identified and conceptualised (1.4.3). Here the way in which these have been translated into indicators and then into the concrete items in the codebook is elaborated. A schematic overview of the operationalisation is presented in Figure 2.1.

VOLUME ATTENTION
In order to calculate the volume attention we simply recorded the title and date of publication of the newspaper (Items 1-3)

FORMAL ATTENTION
The first indicator of formal attention is the size of the article. As the form in which the articles was available varied greatly (copies of original articles, prints of microfilm, photographs of original articles and text-only offprints of Lexis Nexis and Mediargus archives), we needed a measurement that fitted all of these formats. Part of the Lexis Nexis and Mediargus offprints provided exact word counts. Therefore we took the exact or estimated amount of words as the operationalisation of size of the article (item 7 estimated, and item 7a exact amount). We categorised the estimated amount of words as follows: short articles (< 150 words), medium length articles (151 – 400 words), long articles (401 – 800 words) and extra long articles (>800 words).

A second indicator of formal attention was the position of the article in the newspaper. Front page articles form the ‘main headlines of the day’. Hence we distinguished between front page articles and those appearing elsewhere. Page numbers were not always provided, especially those of Telegraaf and Het Laatste Nieuws offprints from Lexis Nexis and Mediargus. A third indicator of formal attention focused on the prominence of the far-right within an article as well as whether the far-right featured in the headline of the article. A second indicator in this area is the prominence within the article, therefore we recorded whether the far-right featured as a main issue or as a character in the news story.
2. Design and methodology

Substantial attention
Substantial attention indicators form the largest part of the codebook. Here the most significant differences between the version used for the Dutch newspapers and the final version are to be found. All points where the Dutch version differed are indicated. As we have seen in Chapter 1, substantial attention consists of four dimensions, of which representation is the first.

For the representation of far-right actors we coded two characteristics. Item 11 is the actual representation indicator. It checks whether a far-right actor is only mentioned and described in the passive voice, or if the far-right actor is described in the active voice, in other words if it was quoted or paraphrased. The name of the far-right actor (party name, name of organisation, or other description of the actor) is to be found in item 12. In the codebook we distinguished between paraphrases and quotes in active representation. This distinction might be problematic in terms of validity. Research has shown that journalists’ presentation of their sources is not always 100% accurate, but and can deviate for stylistic reasons (Rennen, 2000: 298-299). Citations might not always be citations, for example. Therefore we limited the categories of representation in the analysis into passive and active. Despite the stylistic decisions of journalists, this remains a relevant and valid distinction.

A second substantial dimension is the situated role. Coders could code six different roles in which the far-right actor was portrayed (items 13-18). The first situated role is ‘role in elections’. All electoral situations, such as campaigns, polls, outcomes and negotiations for a new government were coded as ‘role in elections’. The second is ‘role in political actuality’. This refers to all situations in which the far-right played a role in a debate about a policy issue, actuality, or parliamentary debate. This role refers to the prime task of MPs and other politicians. The third role is ‘role in legal conflict’. All situations in which far-right actors engaged in law enforcement, court cases, convictions, etc. were coded as ‘role in legal conflict’. Next, we distinguished three different ‘extra-parliamentary activity roles’ (for the Dutch case only a general extra-parliamentary role). All social movement activity, rallies, violent confrontations with opponents and far-right violence (against minorities, or general) were coded in this role. Last, we distinguished two kinds of situations within the far-right, or within far-right formations: in normal situations and in negative situations. This distinction was made because we know from the literature that the far-right has a long history of internal conflict, which has been coded as ‘roles in negative situations’.

Stigmatising associations are the third dimension of substantial attention. It was recorded via one item in the codebook. It simply asked if the far-right actor was associated with any reference to Nazis, racist violence, or any symbol of Nazism (Item 32).

The last dimension of substantial attention measures the attention to far-right standpoints. We recorded all references and mention of the far-right standpoints as they have been identified in section 1.2. That means we recorded attention to anti-progressive standpoints, anti-democratic standpoints, anti-establishment/populist standpoints, nationalist standpoints, xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints, law and order standpoints and standpoints in favour of traditional values.
SUPPORT ATTENTION
The two dimensions of support attention, as described in section 1.4.3, were recorded as follows. First we recorded if there were any non-far-right actors (NFRA) with an explicit favourable attitude towards the far-right, for example when a spokesman utters support, or agreement with a far-right standpoint (item 19). In item 20 we identified the non-far-right actor. We then recorded any NFRA with unfavourable attitudes (item 21) and their identities (item 22). The last indicator of support attention was designed to record any debate among NFRAs about strategies towards the far-right. At times such debates were intensive in all of the three national contexts, especially in Flanders and Germany, each in its own specific form. Attention to such debate was recorded as a binary variable (item 23).

FIGURE 2.1  SCHEMATIC OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE FOUR ASPECTS OF MEDIA ATTENTION FOR THE FAR-RIGHT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTENTION ASPECT</th>
<th>INDICATORS</th>
<th>CATEGORIES (OTHER THAN YES/NO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Volume attention</td>
<td>Absolute number of articles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average number of articles per day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Formal attention</td>
<td>Size of the article</td>
<td>Short (&lt;= 150 words)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium (151 – 400 words)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Long (401 – 800 words)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Extra long (&gt; 800 words)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Front page appearance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Headline appearance of the far-right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prominence of far-right actors in the article</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Substantial</td>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>Active representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Passive representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Situated roles</td>
<td>In elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In political actuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In legal conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In extra-parliamentary violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In extra-parliamentary confrontations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In extra-parliamentary peaceful situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In normal internal situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In negative internal situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stigmatising associations</td>
<td>Anti-democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-progressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Populist/anti-establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Xenophobic/exclusionist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Law &amp; Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional Value protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Support attention</td>
<td>Attitudes of non-far-right actors towards the far-right</td>
<td>Exclusively favourable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusively unfavourable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Both favourable and unfavourable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attention to debates on how to deal with the far-right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Design and methodology

2.1.2 CODING INSTRUCTIONS
A last aspect of the operationalisation that is discussed here are the coding instructions. These are crucial for both the validity and reliability of the recording and coding work because they instruct the coder very precisely how to ‘read’ or interpret the raw data in relation of the research questions. The coding instructions define the coder’s room for interpretation and thus make the contents analysis systematic (Wester en Selm, 2006: 133).

The general instructions included two important issues. First the order of recording steps, and second the instruction to ‘stay as close as possible to the text’ of both the document and the codebook. No individual interpretation or background information may be used to code the newspaper coverage of the far-right, compelling the coders to act in accordance with the directions given in the individual instructions that come with every item. Each item in the codebook includes definitions of the central concepts used in it (for example ‘ethnic group’, ‘conservative political party’, or ‘short article’). To further explain the items, descriptions and examples of how the items may appear in newspapers are given, so the coder can recognise them more easily (for example the topic of illegal aliens may appear as ‘sans papiers’). To further systemise the content analysis all items are measured with carefully constructed pre-defined categories so the coding consists exclusively of numeric values (Riffe, Lacy & Fico 1998: 25), and items are measured on nominal and ordinal scales.

2.1.3 INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT
A reliable and valid content analysis instrument without flaws is not something that comes about overnight. From the first outlines to the final version a period of almost a year went by and the design process passed through three phases, initial design, testing and retesting and the finalisation of the instrument. The original design was laid out on the basis of the theoretical framework and the explorative study of a significant amount of newspaper coverage of the far-right from all three national contexts and various points in time (between 1986-2004) and the feedback of some experts on parts of the instrument, or, on occasion, even individual items. A feasible version was then taken for the second phase of testing and retesting (using the examples of Wester en Selm, 2006: 134; Gerbner, 1972: 167-168). This testing phase was largely carried out in the context of a course on media analysis for communication science students at the Department of Communication of the KU Leuven. In a series of group and individual sessions 25 coders were trained in using the codebook. Every session ended with an extensive evaluation of the coding work, with special attention to the phrasing of the items, their measurement and the coding instructions. Especially in the early stages this resulted in major revisions of the instrument. In later stages the adaptations were more in the nature of fine-tuning. The test and retest phase was rounded off with a major coding session in which the coders coded 550 articles from Flemish newspapers. This session was evaluated both in writing by the coders and by a (construct) reliability test that revealed seven problematic items (Scott’s $\pi < .67$), that were then all revised, or taken out of the instrument. The concept instrument – as a product of the test and retest phase, a very different instrument than its preliminary form – was then fine-tuned by five different coders, using data from various timeslots, newspapers and national contexts.
The coders that assisted the development of the instrument were not involved in the actual coding, as the consensus developed by them during the development process cannot be replicated by new coders (Krippendorff 2004a: 131). However, the final stage of the development took place during the training of the coders for the actual data gathering, as the instructions were adapted to reach further consensus among the coders. An evaluation of the codebook after the recording of the Dutch data led to a last alteration of the codebook used in the German and Flemish studies. This last version differed in structure from the Dutch one and some items were deleted. One item was divided in three new ones. The operationalisation above and the codebook in Appendix 2.2 are the latest and final version.

2.2 SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION
The corpus on which the research was carried out had to be constructed along clear and strict standards. In some instances that meant that a statistical procedure was performed to obtain a sound sample (Krippendorff 2004a: 122). For the aim of this study this method of sampling is not very suitable, because the research period is quite long, while the theoretically relevant newspaper articles are expected to be concentrated in certain short periods within the total research period. Therefore a theoretically and empirically informed sampling method (also known as a purposive sample, cf Wester 1995b) is more effective and contributes to the construct and external validity of the study (Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 1998: 144). In this section the process of narrowing down the sample is described.

2.2.1 NATIONAL CONTEXTS
The research is limited to three national contexts that are the largest level of comparison. These three national contexts are Flanders (the Dutch speaking region of Belgium), Germany and the Netherlands. These three countries have not been picked randomly, but each represents a significantly distinctive political background and history of far-right activity. The Netherlands and Flanders are extreme cases on various grounds.

Whereas the Vlaams Blok, the only far-right party in this electoral region9, has grown into a irrefutable power factor in the period under scrutiny, the Dutch far-right has remained a shadowy marginal phenomenon, at least until May 2002. A second contrast between these two contexts is that the party system in Flanders contrasts sharply with that in the Netherlands (Coffé 2005, Ten Napel 1999). While the Netherlands has a rather loosely organised party system, in Belgium parties are first organised along the lines of language, and then on both sides of the language border along religious and socio-economic divides, and is a case of ‘extreme multi-partyism’ (De Winter & Dumont 1999: 184). The fact that Vlaams Blok is part of a significant Flemish nationalist tradition (that is much broader and widely shared among the Flemish population than the rather radical nationalism of the party itself) sets the Flemish social, cultural and historical context apart from the Dutch, where the far-right does not have roots in any kind of broader ideological and cultural tradition.

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9 The Belgian political system is organised along language borders as a federal state. Both the French speaking and Dutch speaking part of the country have their own political parties that take part in the federal parliament and government. The region around the capital Brussels is the third region in this federal system. Here both the Walloon and Flemish parties are represented (see De Winter & Dumont 1999).
In voting percentages, Germany takes a middle position for the greatest part of the research period. The German party system differs from the Dutch and Belgian systems, firstly because of its electoral threshold that has so far kept far-right parties out of the Bundestag (national parliament). While its party system in general is quite similar to the Dutch, organised along similar religious and socio-economic lines, the reunification of former West- and East-Germany caused a change in the party system for two reasons. First, the former communist party PDS was included and second, the traditional West-German parties (including the far-right) gained a new electoral potential, but also faced new socio-political problems (see Jefery, 1999: 113). In respect of cultural, social and historical contexts Germany, of course, stands out. Firstly because of its emotionally charged history of national-socialism and the devastating consequences of it – in fact the sole reason for all political, social and scientific worries about the contemporary far-right in general. This historical background has far reaching consequences for German politics, as well as political, cultural and social life (see for example Koopmans, 2001; Ignazi, 2006: 62). Secondly because of the reunification that occurred during the research period, a Germany came into being with two economic, political and social backgrounds, with all the accompanying problems to be anticipated, challenging political parties, including the far-right. These three neighbouring countries were selected because their different contexts meant that considerable differences in the newspaper coverage could be expected and therefore fruitful comparisons possible.

2.2.2 NEWSPAPER SELECTION
The choice of newspaper titles from these countries was not very easy. National newspapers are relatively easy to access, something that is much more difficult with regional newspapers. The latter were eventually excluded because it was impossible to select regional newspapers that were representative for all regional newspapers in the country. The newspapers themselves were not the problem, but the strong contextual regional differences would cause too powerful interfering factors for the cross-national analysis. For Flanders, and probably the Netherlands, it would have been possible to select a newspaper from reasonably comparable regions. In both these countries the greatest support for the far-right is concentrated in large harbour cities (Antwerp, Rotterdam). In Germany this is not the case, and far-right support is concentrated in a number of very different regions (for example Bavaria and Saxony) (see Lubbers, 2001: 84). Because of these sampling problems it was decided to focus on national newspapers. In each country it was possible to select a large popular newspaper, as well as two so called ‘quality’ newspapers, each representing a different major political position in the political spectrum. All newspapers have a significant readership among the population. The three Flemish titles are DE MORGEN (progressive/socialist, or left-leaning), DE STANDAARD (conservative, or right-leaning) and HET LAATSTE NIEUWS (popular and right-leaning). These represent the different factions of the Flemish newspaper scene (Ward 2004: 26) For Germany BILD (popular and right-leaning), DIE SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (progressive, or left-leaning) and FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (conservative, or right-leaning) were selected.(Ward, 2004: 68). The Dutch selection consists of DE VOLKSKRANT (progressive/liberal, or left-leaning), NRC HANDELSBLAD (conservative/liberal, or right-leaning) and DE TELEGRAAF (popular and right-leaning) (Ward 2005: 126). See for circulation details appendix 2.1.
2.2.3 RESEARCH PERIOD
The research period reaches from 1986 to 2004. The year 1986 was chosen as a starting point because that year roughly marks a point in the history of the far-right in all three countries when the far-right was in a similar position of low voting percentages and starting to grow (again) (Mudde 1998: 49, 132, 189). In this period, many far-right parties reshaped their programmes following the example of the French Front Nationale with its ‘nouvelle droite’, meaning a shift away from fascism as a cultural source and towards anti-immigrant politics, which often caused more radical and more explicit xenophobic and exclusionist standpoints (Ignazi, 2006: 22). The period extends to 2004 because that is the election year closest to the start of this study and it includes the interesting new developments on the far-right of the political spectrum that occurred in all three countries during the first years of the decennium. In 2004 the Vlaams Blok reached a historic twenty-five percent of the Flemish votes in the regional elections, and the period of 2001-2003 featured the rapid rise and (relative) fall of new right populist parties in both the Netherlands and Germany.

2.2.4 NEWS CONCENTRATION IN ELECTION PERIODS
Because the relationship between newspaper coverage of the far-right and voting behaviour is the central issue of this study the selection of newspaper articles was concentrated around elections. The selected periods consist of two months preceding national parliamentary and European parliamentary elections and the month directly after the elections. In this way it was possible to cover the entire campaign period, as well as the reactions to and effects of the electoral results. This total period was expected to contain the most intensive coverage of the far-right, and is the most likely to include changes in the newspaper coverage of the far-right because changes in the political situation, or relevant events are most likely to occur around elections. Drawing the samples from complete intense periods also avoids the danger of the bias of fragmentation that is the risk of a-select drawn samples (Wester & van Selm, 2006: 128). According to Kops a selective sample based on theoretical and empirical knowledge, such as the corpus in this study is often more efficient (Kops, 1977: 166). In this study the coverage of each newspaper in each research period forms one case (smallest unit of comparison). In total the study includes 81 different cases (see Fig 2.2).

The actual corpus (selection of newspaper articles) consists of all articles in these cases. A selection instrument that was developed on the basis of the theoretical and historical understanding of the far-right, as it is worked out in section 1.2 and 1.3, has been used to gather all relevant newspaper articles. The selection instrument consists of a list of keywords that is an operationalisation of that sociogenesis, and in practice consists of a series of names of far-right political parties, organisations and politicians and a list of thematic keywords representing synonyms for far-right parties and symbolic references. The keyword list is adjusted for each time period as well as for each national context. This means that major changes in actors representing the far-right and forms in which the ideological issues are

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10 I am aware of the fact that on several occasions outside of the electoral periods important ‘news moments’ have occurred, such as the intensively covered attacks on migrant homes in Germany during the early nineties. Our corpus is not intended to cover all moments of change; it is not set out as historically complete, but yes to identify relevant factors.
expressed have been taken in account. Also context specific issues asked for country specific operationalisation of the sociogenesis at points. After the original construction of the keyword list it was tested and adjusted according to a sampling protocol developed for this purpose, described in detail elsewhere (Schafrad, Wester & Scheepers, 2006: 465). See for the protocol Appendix 2.4.

**Figure 2.2 Overview of election years in this study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Flanders</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>The Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>National European*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>National</td>
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<td>1991</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>National European*</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>National</td>
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<td>National</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>National European**</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>European</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>European</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In these years the selection periods of both elections partly overlap.
** In this year the National and European elections were held on the same day and therefore the selection periods overlap completely.

2.2.5 DATA SOURCES

The newspaper articles were drawn from two kinds of data sources. As far as possible they were drawn from the electronic data sources Lexis-Nexis Academic and Mediargus. The articles unavailable from these sources (all BILD articles and the eighties to mid-nineties cases of the other newspapers) were taken from paper and microfiches editions of the newspapers from libraries. The above sampling protocol included measures to deal with the specific characteristics of these electronic data sources (ibid). The total corpus consists of 5,292 articles on the far-right.

The data collection from different sources demanded a carefully set-up organisation. In addition, the usefulness of the electronic datasets had never been tested. So in order to be able to construct a valid corpus (internal validity) the aforementioned data collection protocol was developed. In a pre-test the characteristics of the data sources (and the quality of the data that can be obtained from them) were examined critically. Although the electronic data sources turned out to be not unproblematic and caused loss or obfuscation of formal information on the articles (see Schafrad, Wester & Scheepers, 2006: 460), the two data sources Lexis Nexis Acadmedic and Mediargus were found useful for data collection in this study,
especially since they proved to produce a 100% coverage of relevant articles published. Based on the results of this pre-test a protocol for the data collection from the various resources was drawn up and used for the data collection for this study (Ibid, 466; Appendix 2.4). With the application of such a protocol very accurate and replicable data collection is made possible.

After the data collection we found great differences in the amount of articles per election year, ranging from 19 (Dutch, 1999) to 802 in the following Dutch election year 2002. Therefore we decided to draw a random sample from all election years that produced more than 200 articles per country. The limit of 200 was chosen in order to keep the chance of fragmentation of news stories to a minimum. We applied Morris’ formula for random samples of small populations\(^{11}\) to decide the minimum size of the sample and then drew a sample 10% larger than this minimum size.

2.3 RECORDING
With an instrument and a corpus in hand the recording process could commence. The actual coding however requires its own preparation, which mainly consists of two things, the selection of coders and their training. This section reports on this preparation as well as on the coding process and organisation.

There are practical as well as methodological reasons to use multiple coders in the recording process. The practical reason is simple; it enables the researcher to code more articles within a limited amount of time than if he had to do it alone, just as survey researchers use interviewers. The important methodological reason here is that for each of the three national contexts coders from these specific national and cultural contexts were used to code the articles of the respective newspapers; Dutch coders dealt with the Dutch, and coders of German origin coded the German newspaper articles. For the Flemish newspapers we used the same coders who received extra training in order to learn about the political and cultural context of these newspaper articles. Political knowledge is an important factor for reliable coding of political news (Peter & Lauf, 2002). In this way a cultural bias has been excluded from the recording process. Native coders are more familiar with the newspapers, the specific contexts and peculiarities of the far-right in their own country, than even a well-informed and experienced researcher from outside. Using native coders limits the risk of misinterpretation (Tennekes, 1999: 61, 153). For content analysis research the importance of the familiarity of the coders with the data is also emphasised by content analysis methodologists (Wester 1995a: 145; Peter & Lauf, 2002). Coders were selected from participants of a number of MA level courses in content analysis at the Radboud University Nijmegen. Various aspects of this study have been integrated in these courses, as a general topic with which to work, to test the instrument, or to train students in coder skills. Students who successfully completed these courses were selected to become coders for this study and received a coder training.

\(^{11}\) http://uregina.ca/~morrisev/Sociology/Sampling%20from%20small%20populations.htm. We added 10% to the calculated minimum size to secure a sufficient sample size in case of missing values and other fall out of data.
2. Design and methodology

2.3.1 CODER TRAINING
The official coder training thus started after the courses, when most coders were no new-comers to the topic, instrument and material of the study. Unlike some other authors, I separate the role of coders and their training in the development and testing of the instrument and their role in the coding process here (Krippendorff, 2004a: 129-130; Wester, 2006: 11-12). The goal of the coders’ involvement in both phases of the study is different. In the previous phase the purpose of their involvement, or ‘coder training’ is to increase the face validity and reliability of the instrument. The coder training before the actual recording is to increase the inter-coder reliability. Small groups of coders (3-5 at the time) then received a training that consisted of 4-5 meetings and was divided in three parts; First a short but to-the-point introduction of the research topic and instrument, then the main training, consisting of several sessions of collective coding, in which the main goal was to develop and practise a collective interpretation and use of the instrument. Coders were to develop a common reference frame and in the training sessions their interpretation flexibility was limited in a structured manner (Wester, 2006: 12). Coders and researcher were to come to agreement on the utilisation of the instrument while applying the instrument to material that the coders were later to code ‘for real’. Instances where coders suggested different codes were discussed, taking the instructions in the codebook as a definitive guide. A constant emphasis of this principle (together with very carefully formulated instruction) has been one of the most important elements of the coder training because coders initially tend to jump to conclusions in the coding process, drawing from their (coding) experience, hence the importance of emphasising the guiding function of the instructions. Coders must learn to distance themselves from their frame of reference (Wester & van Selm, 2006: 134). Some concepts in the codebook needed specific attention because their meaning was not always clear to the coders. Three sessions of training were usually sufficient to familiarise the coders with all the ins-and-outs of the codebook and the basic rule of strictly following the instructions in the codebook. A last part of the coder instruction was then, to inform the coders on the organisational aspects of the recording process, the data input programme InData12.

2.3.2 CODING ORGANISATION
The coding of all data was carried out in phases. For each national context there was a separate group of native coders (see above). After the codebook was finalised the coding started with the Dutch newspapers. Each coder, in principle, had an exclusive set of material to code independently and was instructed to code individually. On average coders could code 5-10 articles an hour. In order to have an as direct possible relation between the raw material and the final dataset, the coders typed their codings directly into the computer using the data input programme InData. This programme has been specifically developed for that purpose (Aerts, 2000). InData enables clear data input, without the need of the often used extra step of coding sheets that might cause extra errors (Wester, 2006: 13). Beneficial points of using InData (Aerts, 2000) are that it does not allow input errors. It only allows the input of predefined values and is provided with routing schemes. Coders reported back after having coded about a hundred articles and discussed problematic cases with the author. For each of the national contexts one or two coder instruction updates were given during the process of coding.

2.3.3 RELIABILITY MEASUREMENT

The reliability of the content analysis is an issue especially at two stages in the research process. First with the construction of the research instrument and later during the recording process (Wester & van Selm, 2006: 137). For both situations it is possible to apply a statistical test of reliability (of instrument and coders), of which the results and following measures have been described above. Here the applied methods will be explained and the found levels of reliability are reported.

Content analysis handbooks all discuss the importance and various techniques of intercoder reliability tests (see Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 1998; Krippendorff, 2004a; Neuendorf, 2002; Wester & van Selm, 2006). However, serious reliability tests are lacking in many content analysis reports (Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken, 2002: 599). Besides the scant attention to this serious methodological issue, it is also a complicated issue because there are many techniques about which there is little agreement among researchers on their value. In the assessment of reliability tests by Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken a division is made between tests that are too liberal, such as percentage agreement tests and the ‘Holsti test’ and stricter measures, which, however, they evaluate as ‘too conservative’. It is therefore recommended that researchers choose carefully techniques that are appropriate to their situation and can best use multiple techniques (Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken, 2002: 600). With multiple techniques at hand the researcher can deal with the disadvantages of each technique, if he develops clear decision rules.

ISSUES IN TESTING RELIABILITY

Both Neuendorf (2002: 149-151) and Lombard, Snyder-Duch and Bracken (2002) discuss these advantages and disadvantages. ‘Liberal’ techniques such as percent agreement are accurate, but ignore chance bias, while the ‘conservative’ techniques such as Scott’s $\pi$ and Krippendorff’s alpha are sometimes too strict. Especially in cases of unequal distributions and small samples these techniques may produce extremely low values, while the percent agreement is high (Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken, 2004: 436; see Nuyten, 2007: 47 for a similar conclusion). In order to deal with both disadvantages we applied both types of techniques to calculate the level of intercoder reliability and developed a decision making standard to interpret the calculated levels of agreement.

As a first measure of reliability we used Holsti’s method to measure agreement between the norm coder and the other coders (Neuendorf, 2002: 149). A range of techniques was available to calculate reliability controlling for the impact of chance agreement. Cohen’s Kappa is often recommended and is the only technique that is included in the standard menu of SPSS. However, Krippendorff states that it is actually a correlation measure and not a reliability measure, because it is based on the Chi-square formula (Krippendorff, 2004b: 419). Chi-square tests themselves are considered inappropriate by others as well (Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken 2002: 602). A technique that is appropriate in this study, because tests involve only two coders and the measurement level is nominal or ordinal, is Scott’s $\pi$ (Scott, 1954; Krippendorff, 2004a: 245; Wester & van Selm, 2006: 139). It is relatively easy to use and it calculates chance for every case. Scott’s $\pi$ is used
as the ‘conservative’ technique in this study. In Appendix 2.3 we provide the SPSS matrix that was used to calculate the levels of reliability.

DEVELOPING DECISION RULES
Both techniques produce levels between .00 and 1.00. As there is no uniform standard to decide which are appropriate levels, a full and clear report is the best one can do according to Neuendorf (2002: 144; Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken, 2002: 593). In our opinion that includes decision rules with convincing arguments. Both authors state that a coefficient of .90 or higher is always unproblematic, coefficients of .80 are reasonable. Below that there is great diffusion. We take that for liberal techniques a coefficient of .80 is required and follow Krippendorff in that a coefficient of .67 or higher is acceptable and .80 is preferred for conservative techniques (Krippendorff, 2004a: 241-2). As stated above it may happen that only one of the requirements is met for a certain variable when we calculate both. In that case the liberal measure should at least be .80 to reconsider the sufficiency of the reliability.

The following problematic situations may underlie insufficient scores on the reliability measures:

- Too much disagreement between coders (both coefficients are below the limit);
- Unequal distribution in the cross table;
- Unequal distribution in the cross table combined with a small sample (both last problems manifest large (> .30) differences between the Holsti and \( \pi \) coefficient).

In the first situation this may be reason to not use the variable in the analysis. In the other two situations the context may be taken into consideration. This situation occurs mostly for variables that are seldom found in the coded material (in this study for example ‘anti-democratic standpoints’). Due to its absence in the vast majority of the materials coders may ignore its presence when it does occur. The recorded level of attention for ‘undemocratic standpoints’ is then always an under-representation of the real level of attention. Therefore we do not instantly remove these variables from the analysis but treat them with care. Differences in levels of attention must be of substantial size before interpreted as significant, but global trends can be interpreted without problems. In Figure 2.3 the exact decision rules are presented.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holsti</th>
<th>IT</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt;.90</td>
<td>&gt;.90</td>
<td>Very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;.90</td>
<td>&gt;.80</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;.80</td>
<td>&gt;.67</td>
<td>Sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;.80</td>
<td>&lt;.67</td>
<td>Insufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;.80</td>
<td>&gt;.67</td>
<td>Sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;.90</td>
<td>&lt;.67</td>
<td>Sufficient/Reconsider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;.80</td>
<td>&lt;.67</td>
<td>Reconsider</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RELIABILITY SAMPLE AND METHOD USED
Below, we report the outcomes of reliability tests of the data used in the analysis. For each of the three case studies we drew a reliability sample of all material coded of about ten percent of the full sample. The samples were randomised for coder, election year and newspaper title and then compared to the norm coder. In the table below we report the interpretations based on the measurements and decision rules that have been explained above. In Appendix 2.3 we report all exact reliability values of the two techniques.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Dutch</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Flemish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General and formal attention</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper title</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>very high</td>
<td>very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week day</td>
<td>very high</td>
<td>very high</td>
<td>very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>very high</td>
<td>insufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front page appearance</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headline appearance</td>
<td>very high</td>
<td>very high</td>
<td>very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prominence</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Substantial attention variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>insufficient</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in elections</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>very high</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in political actuality</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in legal conflict</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>very high</td>
<td>very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in extra-parliamentary situations</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in internal situations</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive and negative roles</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigmatising associations</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standpoints general</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-progressive standpoints</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-democratic standpoints</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populist/anti-establishment standpoints</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist standpoints</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>very high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law &amp; order standpoints</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditionalist standpoints</td>
<td>very high</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
<td>very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support attention</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NERA favourable attitudes</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NERA unfavourable attitudes</td>
<td>insufficient</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate about dealing with the far-right</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>sufficient*</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) after reconsideration
2. Design and methodology

EVALUATION
In table 2.1 we can see that besides the variables that needed reconsideration due to unequal distribution, for almost all variables we found sufficient or even high or very high reliability coefficients. The reliability in the Dutch case is relatively more problematic. This was reason to adjust the codebook (see section 2.2.3). This resulted in very satisfactory levels of reliability for the German and Flemish data.

Three variables where found to have an insufficient level of reliability; Representation in the Dutch case, NFRA unfavourable attitudes in the Dutch case and Size in the Flemish case. Representation in the Dutch case is a serious issue for interpretation. We did not remove it, in order to have some idea of a trend, but do not draw any conclusions, based on it. For the unfavourable attitudes the problem lies in the distinction between NFRA:s that were made in the version of the codebook that was applied in the Dutch case study. Of the original variables some had very high coefficients, some low. Trends for both groups of NFRA:s were similar, therefore we decided not to exclude unfavourable attitudes, but again to be extremely modest in their interpretation. For Size in the Flemish case we found that here coders had difficulties judging whether an article was just below or above 400 words (Size M or L). No conclusions were drawn based on that difference. Differences in size were analysed looking at the distribution over S, M (and L) or XL. In this way the low reliability on behalf of one category did not influence the conclusions.

For all variables with a Holsti coefficient of >.90 and a π <.67 we found this was due to the third identified problem, that of an unequal distribution combined with a small sample and therefore interpreted them as sufficient after reconsideration of the cross table and characteristics of the variable itself. For those variables that had to be reconsidered (Holsti >.80, π <.67) we came to the same conclusion for most of these variables except for NFRA favourable attitudes in the Dutch case, where the low coefficients had the exact same cause as for the variable NFRA unfavourable attitudes, therefore they were treated in a similar way.
CHAPTER 3

A Rigid Media Image

Progressive Nuance of

The Dutch Press
CHAPTER 3
THE DUTCH PRESS: PROGRESSIVE NUANCE OF A RIGID MEDIA IMAGE

3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this first case study we will provide answers to research questions from section 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 regarding the media attention to the far-right and the variation in this media attention between election years and between newspapers. In this analysis, we use the model of four aspects of media attention as was presented in section 1.4.3.

THE FAR-RIGHT IN THE DUTCH CONTEXT
As in each of the three case studies, the Dutch context has a number of peculiarities. The first is that the Dutch far-right movement has seen many splinter parties and non-party organisations that have come and gone over the years. There is and was a lack of continuity, although some of the main personalities on the more extreme side of the political family have a long track record (i.e. Van Donselaar & Rodrigues, 2008: 59). Most of the Dutch far-right parties never succeeded in being elected to any representative body. Among those that have, the most important parties are centrum partij (CP, 1980-1986), centrum-democraten (CD, 1986-2002), centrum partij’86 (CP’86, 1986-1998), nederlandse volksunie (NVU, 1971-), nederlands blok (NB, 1993-?), lijst pim fortuyn (LPF, 2002-2007), conservatieven.nl (2002-2003?) en nieuw rechts (NR, 2003-2007).

In 1982 the CP obtained the first far-right seat in Dutch parliament since the demise of the boerenpartij in the early seventies. The MP, Hans Janmaat, was to be the face of the far-right in the Netherlands until the turn of the century. In 1986 the party split and did not succeed in keeping its seat in parliament. One of the issues of contention, besides struggles over leadership, was the new ideological course some of the leaders wanted to take, following the successful example of the front nationale in France, with its ‘nouvelle droite’ (Ignazi, 2006). The period between 1986 and 1989, without parliamentary representation, is known as the first period of electoral marginality (Sheepers, Eisinga & Lammers, 1993: 364). In 1989, Janmaat returned to parliament with his CD. The far-right embarked a new period of electoral growth, which lasted until shortly before the next elections in 1994. In the local elections, two months before the nationals, the far-right (CD, CP’86 and NB) obtained no less than 88 seats in local councils. In the national election CD managed to obtain three seats in Dutch parliament. Meanwhile, the far-right received a great deal of opposition from anti-racism organisations, as well as undercover journalists who revealed a series of scandals concerning CD personnel and representatives (Rennen, 1994; Lucardi, 1998; Witte, 1998; Mudde, 2000). In the following period of electoral growth...
failure and marginal stability (1994-2001) little happened, although CP’86 was dissolved by court order after a conviction for racism. None of the parties returned to parliament in 1998. A new period of electoral growth started when a new player entered the field, Pim Fortuyn and his LPF. Fortuyn’s sociogenesis was completely different and lacked any bonds with traditional far-right organisations or personalities. Nevertheless, his ideology was much the same (including exclusionism, nationalism, law and order and anti-establishment and populist standpoints) (Pels, 2003; Van Donslaar & Rodrigues, 2003). The aspect of sociogenesis that LPF did have in common with its predecessors was its electorate of lower educated, secular men (Van der Brug, 2003: 96). Fortuyn obtained no less than 27 seats in parliament, a unique event in Dutch parliamentary history. Even more so, because Fortuyn was murdered only 9 days before the election. Despite the fact that his LPF became part of the coalition government, its popularity decreased rapidly in the following years, not only because of the lack of a charismatic leader, but also because of a series of scandals and quarrels within the party. At the European Parliamentary elections of 2004, LPF obtained 2.5% of the votes, not enough to send a MP to Brussels. Other far-right parties (nnp, conservatieven.nl, nr) have hardly played a significant role since the foundation of LPF.

Drawing from a variety of previous research as well as from broadly expressed statements of (often far-right) politicians and public opinion makers we can draw up two preliminary hypotheses concerning the content. The first preliminary hypothesis is that the media purposely ignored the far-right (Van Donselaar, 1998; Fennema & Van der Brug, 2006: 68, and for example nrc handelsblad, May 9th 1998). This means that we should expect very little coverage of the far-right, especially far-right parliamentary conduct, and what there is limited in scope. The second is that the media gave the far-right an exaggeratedly negative image, making ungrounded suggestions. Something that Fortuyn, as well as some researchers, referred to as ‘demonising’ (De Kort and d’Haenens, 2005: 140, Ignazi, 2006: 167; de volkskrant, March 23rd 2002). According to this preliminary hypothesis we should find that the majority of coverage of the far-right is very negative, even exaggeratedly negative. If these hypotheses hold, our first research question therefore simply is: how did Dutch newspapers cover the far-right?

LONGITUDINAL VARIATION
As the electoral history of the Dutch far-right is full of ups-and-downs and contains multiple key events, some variation in media attention can be expected. Therefore the second question we answer in this chapter is whether there were any changes in the media attention to the Dutch far-right between 1986 and 2004? Our main interest in the longitudinal variation therefore, is whether this variation developed in a particular direction.

QUALITY AND POPULAR NEWSPAPERS
Drawing from the work of Steward, Mazzoleni & Horsfield (2003) we postulated three hypotheses about quality and popular newspapers in Chapter 1. Here we will test these hypotheses for the Dutch case, looking at differences between the popular de telegraaf and quality papers de volkskrant and nrc handelsblad. Tailored to the Dutch case the three hypotheses are:
3. The Dutch press: progressive nuance of a rigid media image

H1. DE VOLSKRANT and NRC HANDELSBLAD pay more volume and formal attention to the far-right than DE TELEGRAAF.
H2. DE VOLSKRANT and NRC HANDELSBLAD pay more attention to (a more diverse range of) substantial attention aspects than DE TELEGRAAF.
H3. DE VOLSKRANT and NRC HANDELSBLAD pay more attention to support attention aspects than DE TELEGRAAF.

LEFT-LEANING AND RIGHT-LEANING NEWSPAPERS
Although the period of polarisation in Dutch society is over, newspapers still carry traces of political orientation. As we have seen in Chapter 1, Hallin and Mancini (2003) state that this continued politicisation is still reflected in the contents of the newspapers. In order to test this thesis, we developed three hypotheses that distinguish media attention of left-leaning newspapers from that of right-leaning newspapers. These have been tailored to the Dutch case as follows:

H4. DE VOLSKRANT paid more attention to volume and formal attention than NRC HANDELSBLAD and DE TELEGRAAF.
H5. DE VOLSKRANT paid more substantial attention to the far-right than NRC HANDELSBLAD and DE TELEGRAAF.
H6. DE VOLSKRANT paid more support attention to the far-right than NRC HANDELSBLAD and DE TELEGRAAF.

SAMPLE
Concerning the data collection, it turned out that in the Dutch newspapers the amount of coverage around the so called ‘second order elections’ (Reif & Schmitt, 1980) was so small that these periods cannot be treated as separate data collection periods, except for the European Parliament elections of 2004. Therefore the EP election year of 1999 has been excluded from the analysis and the material collected around the EP elections of 1989 and 1994 has been added to the cases of the national parliamentary elections of the same year (the data collection periods already partially overlapped, see also Table 3.1). Generally only statistically significant differences between election years, or between newspapers are reported in this chapter.14

3.2 RESULTS
3.2.1 VOLUME ATTENTION
Volume attention was measured as the average number of articles per day and was calculated as follows. For each election year we calculated the number of news days based on

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14 To test the significance of differences between categories a Chi-square test has been used with an alpha level of $p < 0.05$. For 2x2 tables and in situations where the expected cell count was lower than 5 in more than 20% of the cells, Fisher’s Exact Test was calculated (using the Monte Carlo option in SPSS), which corrects for too small expected cell counts (Siegel and Castellan 1988: 103, 123). To test the significance of differences between specific groups (for example two election years, or two newspapers, as referred to in the text above the table) we also used a Mann-Whitney test. Only signficantly tested differences are reported in the text. In tables with both significant and insignificant differences, variables with significant variation are marked with an asterisk(*).
13 week periods, except for 1989 and 1994 (18 and 19 weeks). In cases where we used random samples for further analyses, the actual number of news articles in the population had to be estimated, based on the proportions in the sample. The actual number of news articles was then divided by the number of days. A T-test was used to test the significance of the mean differences between election years and between newspapers at .05 level.

Overall, the Dutch newspapers printed one article per day that at least mentions the far-right in one way or another. Throughout the research period the volume attention fluctuated quite considerably. In some of the electorally more successful years it was above average, but in other ‘success’ years it decreased greatly, compared to the previous year, as in 1989. In 1999 there was so little media attention to the far-right, that we had to exclude that year from further analysis.

### Table 3.1 Average number of articles per day*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>VK</th>
<th>NRC</th>
<th>Tel</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989**</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994**</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>95</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999***</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>3.93</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>86</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>0.28</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>814</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>2034</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
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<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) The differences between years and between newspapers have been tested, \( p < 0.05 \). The differences discussed in the text are all significant.

**) TK + EP is 18 (105 news days in 1989) or 19 (111 news days in 1994) weeks instead of 13.

***) In further analysis the election year 1999 is excluded because of its sample being too small.

There are significant differences between newspapers, especially between **DE VOLKSKRANT** and **NRC HANDELSBLAD** on one side, and the popular paper **DE TELEGRAAF** on the other, which is not surprising since the latter has less news content in general (Scholten & Ruigrok 2006: 8). Its average number of articles on the far-right is only half of the average number in **DE VOLKSKRANT** and **NRC HANDELSBLAD**.
3.2.2 FORMAL ATTENTION
Visibility is the central idea behind the formal aspect of attention to the far-right. Formal attention was measured as the size of articles, front page appearance, headline appearance and prominence of the far-right in articles.

SIZE OF ARTICLES
The second variable measuring formal attention is the size of the article. Well over 50% of the newspaper coverage on the far-right are longer articles (400 or more words), while 14% are short reports (less than 150 words) (Table 3.2). This means the far-right is subject not only to ‘short news’ type of sections in newspapers. In the eighties the percentage of long articles was less than 40%, but from 1998 on it rose rapidly to sometimes more than 60% (61% in 1998 and 63% in 2004). The trend of the share of short reports has a reversed tapering, going down from 23% in 1986 to a mere 6% in 2004.

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<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S (&lt; 150 words)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M (150-400 words)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L (&gt; 400 words)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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As Appendix 3.1 shows, de Volkskrant and NRC Handelsblad both printed significantly more long articles on the far-right than de Telegraaf (56% and 58% vs 37%). De Telegraaf printed mostly medium length articles on the far-right, at 45% that was often 15% more than both other newspapers. It also printed slightly more short articles on the far-right (TEL 18%, vs VK 13% and NRC 12%).

POSITION OF THE ARTICLE IN THE NEWSPAPER
The next aspect of formal attention is the position of the article in the newspaper, measured as the percentage of the coverage of the far-right published on the front page (see Fig. 3.1). Only 11% of the coverage of the far-right can be found on the front page of newspapers, a figure that was fairly stable over the years. In the nineties it was slightly less (8% in 1994, 9% in 1998, while in 1989 it was at its highest with 17%). This did not differ between newspapers.15

PROBABILITY OF THE FAR-RIGHT IN THE COVERAGE
The fourth aspect of formal attention that has been measured is the prominence of the far-right in the coverage. Figure 3.2 below shows that until 1994, in over two-thirds of the coverage that includes far-right actors, the far-right had a prominent role. When the far-right was in the papers, it was usually a central figure in the news story. From the next election year on, the percentage dropped significantly.

15 In the electronic source from which we obtained coverage from recent years there is no information on page numbers of Telegraaf articles. Therefore Telegraaf coverage could not be included in this analysis.
This can be interpreted as a sign that the far-right has subordinate roles in articles about other issues as well. Until 1994 the far-right only appeared in the papers if they had a prominent role in news stories, while thereafter they appeared in the papers in minor situations as well.

**Figure 3.1** FRONT PAGE AND HEADLINE APPEARANCE AND PROMINENCE (IN PERCENTAGES)

In *De Volkskrant* and *De Telegraaf* more than half of the articles featured the far-right in a prominent way, while for *NRC Handelsblad* the figure is 43% (see Appendix 3.2).

**Far-right in the headlines**

The last aspect of formal attention is the percentage of the coverage mentioning the far-right in the headlines, which means it immediately draws the attention of the reader to the political colour of a central actor in the coverage. This variable works chiefly as an additional variable to the previous one. Figure 3.1 shows, as expected, almost the same trend as table 3, although the percentage of coverage with the far-right in the headlines was higher than that of far-right prominence in 1986 and 1989. Until the mid-nineties over two-third of the coverage featured the far-right in the headlines; after this the share dropped to 17% in 2004.

In *De Volkskrant* articles on the far-right had the far-right in their headlines more often (54%) than both other newspapers (*Tel* 44%, *NRC* 40%).

**3.2.3 Substantial attention**

Next the substantial attention in the coverage was considered. With substantial attention the focus lies on far-right actors and far-right ideologies. Substantial attention has been operationalised via four dimensions. First the representation of the far-right actor(s), second the role in which the far-right actor(s) feature, third explicit far-right stigmatising (Van Donse-laar, 1998: 52) and fourth the presence of far-right ideological standpoints in the coverage.
3. The Dutch press: progressive nuance of a rigid media image

**Representation of Far-Right Actors**

Far-right representation is the first aspect of substantial attention that has been measured. For every election year, the level of representation was divided into three categories, passive representation (far-right actor only named or mentioned in the article), active representation (far-right actor paraphrased or cited in the article) and no representation. Fig 3.2 shows the distribution of representation over these categories in all election years. In almost half of the corpus (46%) far-right actors were passively represented. In 53% far-right actors were actively represented, which implies that the far-right served (for readers) as a visible journalist resource. In one percent of the articles the far-right was only addressed in general, without naming one or more far-right actors. The division between passive and active representation steadily changed throughout the research period. The share of active representation rose from 27% to 71%. Only in 1994, 2003 and 2004 was there more active than passive representation in the coverage. Between newspapers there were no differences in representation (appendix 3.3).

**Election News and Situated Roles of the Far-Right**

The data were collected in an extended period around election day. Therefore an overview is given of the percentage of coverage wherein the far-right had a role in the elections (possibly besides other roles) in Table 3.3, before we describe the attention to situated roles in which the far-right featured. As we expected, a relatively large share of the coverage deals with the elections, or is in fact election news. 57% of all coverage is about the far-right in elections. The percentage varies over the years between 30% in 2004 and 82% in 1989.

**Table 3.3** Percentage of coverage with far-right in roles in elections

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<td>77</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1314</td>
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<tr>
<td>In elections</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in elections</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>100</td>
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</table>
Generally, roles in elections gained relatively most attention in *De Volkskrant* (61%) and least in *NRC Handelsblad* (53%). Attention to these roles in *De Telegraaf* is 57% (see Appendix 3.4.)

Other roles of the far-right, as featured in the newspaper coverage, have been analysed as well. When we look at Table 3.4 it is interesting to note that the coverage dealt as much with far-right-actors in legal conflict (15%) and extra-parliamentary roles (13%) as in ‘normal’ (parliamentary) roles in political actuality (18%). Only 4% of the coverage contained the far-right in normal internal roles (meaning party conferences, leadership elections, or other party events), while negative internal roles (internal dispute, quarrel, party splits) are present in 10% of the coverage.

In years when there was far-right representation in parliament (especially 1994, 2003-2004), the share of articles on the far-right in political actuality, as expected, was greater. In 1994 when Centrumdemocraten obtained three seats in parliament (and 77 local council seats) there was an increase to 13%, and in 2003 and 2004 when LPF actively participated in parliamentary routine it was even higher (27% and even 55% respectively). In fact, the high percentage for ‘a role in political actuality’ in 2004 combined with the low percentage of coverage about the far-right electoral roles in that year may indicate tendency of ‘normalisation’ of the far-right (Van der Brug, Fennema & Tilly 2005: 546).

Table 3.4 shows that until the late nineties the far-right featured relatively frequently in legal conflicts (18% in 1998, 35% in 1986). In the 2000s that figure dropped below 10%. A similar pattern can be found for the far-right in extra-parliamentary roles (rallies, petitions, but also racist violence). It was at its peak in 1986, with 41%, concerning a great deal of confrontation in the form of anti-fascist rallies against the newly chosen Centrum Partij council members in various cities.

Attention to far-right actors in normal internal situations was continuously about 5% of the coverage, with a dip to almost nothing in 1998 (1%) and 2002 (3%). Newspapers paid much more attention to negative internal situations, peaking at 21% of the coverage in 1994. Here too, there was a divide between the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, with an exception for 2003 (those early elections were held after the coalition break-up due to internal conflicts in LPF). The decrease of the attention to internal conflicts started in 1998, the first election year after the peak year of 1994 (dropped from 21% to 7%).

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<td>77</td>
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<td>96</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In political actuality</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>In legal conflict</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In extra-parliamentary activity</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In normal internal situations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In negative internal situations</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some of the roles of the far-right variables are handled differently by each of the three newspapers in one or more years (see appendix 3.4). In the three newspapers roles in extra-parliamentary activity and in internal affairs did not feature differently in any significant way. Concerning roles in political actuality there is a difference between de Volkskrant on one side and NRC Handelsblad and de Telegraaf on the other side. VK paid much less attention to the far-right in roles in political actuality than the other two papers (VK 9%, NRC 23% and Tel 20%). The other intriguing difference is between VK and NRC on one side and Tel on the other side and concerns the far-right in legal conflict. Both quality papers (VK 17%, NRC 16%) paid more attention to these roles than the popular newspaper (11%).

The trends described above become clearer on a somewhat aggregated level. Therefore we recoded the specific roles into two groups, one that we assume portrays the far-right positively as legitimate ‘normal democratic’ parties (role in political actuality and positive internal) and one that emphasises their negative, illegitimate side (in legal conflict and negative internal)\textsuperscript{16}. This dichotomy makes visible the level to which the far-right is (de-)legitimised through the roles in which far-right actors feature (see Van der Brug, Fennema & Tilly 2005). In Figure 3.3, it is shown that the share of negative roles was high in the 80s and 90s, especially in 1994, and then decreased sharply, while the share of articles with the far-right in positive roles increased sharply after 1998 marking a break, or turn-around after the demise of the dominant far-right parties of the eighties and nineties.

\section*{Figure 3.3} The far-right in positive and negative roles

\begin{center}
\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure33.png}
\caption{The far-right in positive and negative roles}
\end{figure}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{16} The other roles, in elections and in extra-parliamentary roles, are excluded from this dichotomy because they either do not have a clear status, or can clearly have both positive and negative connotations (depending on the situation). On top of that it is not clear if extra-parliamentary politics are part of what Van der Brug et al mean with ‘normal democratic parties’.
STIGMATISING THE FAR-RIGHT
Stigmatising associations with the Nazis or extremist or violent groups are the third aspect of substantial attention in this study. The presence of such associations point the reader in a negative direction when considering the far-right.

These associations are present in about one-fifth of the coverage (Table 12). Throughout the research period, the percentage grew from 31% in 1989 to about half of the coverage in 1989 (55%) and 1994 (47%) and then decreased to 38% in the relatively quiet year 1998. In absolute numbers 1994 was the peak, while 2003 and 2004 featured much fewer articles with stigmatising associations than the yearly average of 34-40 articles. With the entry of the populist right the percentage dropped very considerably. The policy might be similar, but the image clearly changed. All three dailies contained similar percentages of such associations, there were no between-newspaper differences found (see Appendix 3.5).

**FIGURE 3.4 PERCENTAGE OF COVERAGE INCLUDING STIGMATISING ASSOCIATIONS**

![Bar chart showing percentage of coverage including stigmatising associations from 1986 to 2004.]

FAR-RIGHT IDEOLOGICAL STANDPOINTS
An important final aspect of substantial attention is the presence of genuine far-right ideological standpoints. Seven of them were formulated in Chapter 1, based on the scientific consensus on central far-right ideological standpoints (Mudde, 1998; Ignazi, 2006). The presence of each of these seven was checked in the coverage, but a first indicator of the attention to far-right ideology is the total share of the coverage which contains any of these standpoints, and how much of the coverage does not contain any far-right standpoint at all. These figures are presented in appendix 3.6. About 33% of all coverage included one or more of the far-right ideological standpoints, in most years roughly varying between 20 and 30%. The exceptions were 1989 (36%) and especially 1994 (54%). In these years, the attention to far-right ideologies was above average. For the rest of the research period there was not much difference between the years, or it could be that the relatively low percentage in 1986 might have suggested less attention to far-right standpoints in the preceding period.
Looking at the attention to specific ideological standpoints reveals a more subtle variation in the news coverage. Not all seven central aspects of far-right ideology received the same amount of attention. In Table 3.5 the variation between ideological standpoints over the years is presented. Anti-progressive, anti-democratic and traditionalist standpoints hardly featured in the coverage at all. The four other ideological standpoints can be ranked as follows: The most prominent featured ideological standpoints were those containing xenophobic or exclusionist sentiments; 27% of the coverage of the far-right contained such standpoints; 9% of the coverage contained harsh law and order standpoints; almost equally prevalent were anti-establishment (or populist) standpoints (5%) and nationalistic standpoints (4%). The most controversial standpoints also received most attention in the newspaper coverage.

Anti-democratic standpoints featured in a small portion of the coverage in the 80s and 90s, as well as in 2004. The anti-establishment and populist far-right standpoints only gained attention from 1998 onwards. Nationalist standpoints were found in the coverage throughout the research period, but mainly in 1989-1998 (7-10%). As one would expect, by far the most prominent standpoints were the xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints. The peak in the attention to these was also in the period 1989-1998 (>30%), but attention to these standpoints remained on a high level throughout the entire 18 year research period. Harsh law and order standpoints gained more and more attention from 1994 on (4%), and became almost as prominent as xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints in 2003 (16%) and 2004 (13%).

As we can see in Table 3.5, in 1998, the attention to far-right standpoints was most wide-spread across the seven standpoints. Other years with a significant attention to a relatively wide spectrum of far-right ideological standpoints are 1994, 2002 and 2004. The year of least diversity of far-right ideological standpoints is 1986.

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<td>77</td>
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<td>96</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1314</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-progressive</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-democratic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-establishment/populist*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobic or Exclusionist*</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Law &amp; Order*</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

*) differences significant at p < 0.05

There are very few differences between the three newspapers concerning the attention paid to these seven far-right ideological standpoints. There are only two exceptions. The only exception to the neglect of anti-progressive standpoints was DE VOLSKRANT. DE TELEGRAAF paid twice as much attention to law and order standpoints (16%) than DE
volkskrant (8%) and nrc handelsblad (6%). The difference between extra attention to xenophobic and exclusionist standpoints in de volkskrant (30%), as shown in Appendix 3.7, is only significant compared to de telegraaf (23%).

3.2.4 SUPPORT ATTENTION TO THE FAR-RIGHT
The fourth aspect of media attention to the far-right is that of support attention. It refers to the degree that the far-right and their standpoints are (de-)legitimated by non-far-right actors. This dimension of newspaper contents is measured in two ways. First we look at the relative attention to favourable and unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right or their ideological standpoints. A second indicator is the attention to public debate and among non-far-right actors about the way one should deal with the far-right.

NON-FAR-RIGHT ACTORS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FAR-RIGHT
The first measure, as said, is the extent to which far-right actors are confronted with favourable or unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors (NFRA). In half of the coverage these attitudes were not present at all (51%, see Table 3.6). The remaining half contained mainly exclusively negative attitudes towards the far-right, or far-right standpoints (34%).

When we look at the developments throughout the research period, three periods can be distinguished, as one can see in the table. The first period from 1986 to 1994 was characterised by a dominant and (almost) exclusive presence of NFRA with unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right (35-65%). The coverage contained almost no favourable NFRA attitudes in that period. Although this situation was at its most extreme in 1986, and there was some opening for alternative voices in 1994, the dominance of unfavourable attitudes and the marginality of favourable attitudes towards the far-right remained throughout the whole period.

In the second period (1998-2003) the share of the coverage that contained favourable NFRA attitudes started to break out of its marginal position. Exclusive unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right were still the most frequent and remained a majority (still 28% as compared to 12% for exclusively favourable attitudes in 2003). However, the share of articles that include favourable attitudes towards the far-right increased in this period from 10% to 17% (‘exclusively favourable’ and ‘both favourable and unfavourable’ combined). They were no longer an exception. The share of coverage with exclusively unfavourable attitudes in 2002 and 2003 was greater than in 1998, with a peak of 36% in 2002, meaning Fortuyn had a great deal of negative response in the press.

The third period contains only one election year in this study. In 2004 the share of exclusively unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right almost halved compared to 2003 (from 28% to 15%), while the share of the coverage including exclusively favourable attitudes towards the far-right almost doubled from 12 to 21%. The share of articles with both favourable and unfavourable attitudes increased even more sharply and peaked with 19% in that year. This shift means a turn-around of the situation in the previous 17 years.
3. The Dutch press: progressive nuance of a rigid media image

### Table 3.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>338</td>
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<td>1315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No NFRA attitudes</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive favourable attitudes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive unfavourable attitudes</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both fav. and unfav. attitudes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between newspapers there are modes, but also significant differences. De Volkskrant paid least attention to favourable attitudes (7%) and most to unfavourable attitudes (38%). De Telegraaf paid most attention to favourable attitudes (15%). NRC contained most articles with both favourable and unfavourable attitudes in them (8%), twice as much as the other two newspapers (VK 4%, Tel 3%, see Appendix 3.8).

### Dealing with the far-right as a topic in the coverage

In general, the far-right is not considered as a ‘normal democratic party’. Moreover among politicians and political debaters, civic organisations as well as activists there is a debate going on about how to fight the far-right in the most effective way. Such debates, whatever the strategy under discussion (from criminalisation, to a so called ‘cordon sanitaire’ or even draconian measures, or the opposite - inclusion in the ‘normal political community’), indicate that the far-right receives separate treatment, even if the outcome of such a debate is to include them in the normal political community, because neither socialist, liberal nor confessional parties are subject to such debates (Van Donselaar and Rodrigues, 2006; Jacobs & Swyngedouw, 2002). Therefore coverage that pays attention to such debates is also an indicator that the far-right receives a ‘different treatment’, or that there is controversy about them among non-far-right actors. Overall a mere 7% of the coverage paid attention to debates on how to deal with the far-right. In the Dutch newspapers this issue received decreasing attention (Figure 3.5). Whereas it was a relatively relevant issue in 1986 (27%), after the mid-nineties it ceased to be so. It was not totally absent, but with an attention figure of about 5% after 1994, it cannot be said to be a ‘hot issue’ in the news coverage. There were no significant between-newspaper differences (Appendix 3.9).
3.3 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

In this section we will provide answers to the three research questions. While doing that, we will also discuss the value of the preliminary hypotheses that we engaged and used to sharpen our focal point. Following this, we will first give some general conclusions about media attention to the far-right in Dutch newspapers (RQ1), then look at longitudinal variation (RQ2) and close with the expected differences between types of newspapers (RQ3).

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The fact that we found between a few dozens to hundreds of news articles on the far-right in each election year means that the far-right was not neglected in the coverage. Even more significantly, in most of this coverage the far-right is often a prominent actor in headline or body text. In practically all of these articles there were one or more far-right actors, who are actively represented in fifty percent of the total coverage. The following aspects of substantial attention deepen this analysis more thoroughly. One of the first intriguing findings is that far-right actors featured as much in roles in legal conflict as in political actuality, which is the normal every-day role of a political party. Furthermore, stigmatising associations have been used in a quarter of all coverage. Together this is not exactly an image of what Van der Brug, Fennema & Tilly call a ‘normal party’ (2005: 564). Of all ideological standpoints, as described in the literature, only half of them received more than incidental coverage and only xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints receive a relatively high level of attention. When finally, we look at the fourth aspect of media attention, support attention, half of the coverage contained some attitude towards the far-right. The vast majority of these attitudes is unfavourable. Together with very specific aspects of substantial attention, this creates a media image of a controversial outsider. This rather negative media image is not automatically the result of overemphasising certain aspects of the far-right, or even what some have called ‘demonising the far-right’. In order to make such statements, we would first need an account of far-right activity and compare that to what was reported in the news.
Still, it is clear that we have found that media focused their attention on certain recognisable aspects of the far-right. This focus results in a media image that sets the far-right apart from ‘normal parties’ by emphasising its controversial characteristics, hence this media image can be described as that of ‘the controversial outsider’. In the following section we take a closer look at the development of that media image.

LONGITUDINAL VARIATION
First of all, the volume attention fluctuated greatly. There were two periods of increased attention, 1994 and the “long election year 2002-2003 (Brants & Van Praag, 2005)”, both peaks were simultaneous with a rise in electoral popularity. In 1994, most attention went to Hans Janmaat and his CD, with the numerous incidents in and around the party. In 2002, Fortuyn continuously drew media attention. Media attention was at an all-time high, and continued to be so, also due to the disastrous participation of the LPF in the coalition government, which fell before the end of the year and led to new elections in January, 2003 (see Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003). With an exception of the election year 2002, formal attention decreased steadily throughout the research period.

In terms of substantial and support attention, we see a double edged pattern. On one side there are tendencies that suggest increasingly more open and diverse media attention to the far-right. There was increasing attention to the far-right in roles in political actuality (and decreasing attention to roles in legal conflict). A greater diversity of far-right standpoints received attention in more than 5% of the coverage after 1998. Not only xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints, but also law and order standpoints and anti-establishment or populist standpoints came more to the fore. Last but not least, next to the serious attention to unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right, more and more attention was given to favourable attitudes to the far-right from 1998 on.

On the other side of the coin, attention to controversial roles and stigmatising associations may have decreased in the second half of the research period, but did not become exceptional. Together with the unfavourable attitudes of NFRA, they remained important aspects of the media attention to the far-right.

All together, this means that media attention to the far-right did change significantly since 1986. In 1986 it was relatively limited and almost exclusively focused on negative aspects of the far-right. During the nineties there was increasing diversity in media attention, something that continued in the new century. However, the media image of the controversial outsider continued to be used, at least until 2003. The arrival of Fortuyn did not cause an immediate change of media attention to the far-right, other than in volume. Some aspects that were in a process of change already, changed faster. However, Fortuyn also was the focal point for strong counter-reactions, which is reflected in the coverage, as the aspects of media attention that contribute to the controversial outsider image received increased attention as well. It was not until 2004, that these aspects suddenly received much less attention, while the diversity tendency continued. Therefore, it seems that the media image of the far-right in 2004 can no longer be characterised just as that of the controversial outsider.
QUALITY AND POPULAR NEWSPAPERS
In the introduction of this chapter, we distinguished De Volkskrant and NRC Handelsblad as quality newspapers and De Telegraaf as a popular newspaper. Based on previous research, we formulated three hypotheses about the differences in media attention to the far-right in the quality papers and the popular paper in our Dutch case study. Here we consider our findings on newspaper differences to see if these hypotheses hold.

Hypothesis 1 stated that VK and NRC were expected to pay both more volume and formal attention to the far-right, than TEL. Indeed, Dutch quality newspapers paid significantly more volume attention to the far-right, than the popular TEL did. Concerning formal attention, we did not find a clear distinction between quality and popular papers. As we explained in section 3.2, due to missing data we cannot interpret the findings on front page appearance here. Of the other two variables, headline appearance and prominence, one does support the hypothesis (headline appearance) and one does not (prominence). In conclusion, hypothesis 1 was supported on 2 out of three variables. In terms of volume attention it is confirmed, in terms of formal attention, it found mixed support.

Hypothesis 2 stated that VK and NRC were expected to pay more attention to (a wider range) of substantial attention aspects than TEL. In the analysis we focused this hypothesis on the range of roles (H2a), the range of far-right standpoints (2b). In terms of attention to roles in which the far-right featured, we found one significant difference relevant in terms of hypothesis 2. VK and NRC did indeed pay more attention to the far-right in legal conflict, than TEL did. All other differences were insignificant. Together with this one significant difference they do not refute hypothesis 2a, but they do not form convincing support for it either. In terms of attention to far-right standpoints, we did find some differences, but these seem to express the individual characteristics of the newspapers first. Here too, the differences found are no direct refutation of hypothesis 2b, but form no support for it either.

The third hypothesis concerned support attention. As, contrary to the German and Flemish cases, the indicator of attention to debate on how to deal with the far-right is not directly related to one particular issue, we did not expect to find particular differences on that indicator. Therefore, we looked only at the attention to favourable and unfavourable attitudes of NFRA towards the far-right. We counted slightly more reported attitudes in the quality newspapers. Unfavourable attitudes featured slightly more in VK and favourable attitudes in TEL. This means that the hypothesis formulated was too general. Specific attitudes turned out to feature in particular newspapers. Hypothesis 3 has to be refuted for the Dutch case.

LEFT-LEANING AND RIGHT-LEANING NEWSPAPERS
The second dimension of comparing newspapers was along the lines of political leaning. As we expected, more attention was given to critical aspects of the far-right in the ideologically most distant newspaper, De Volkskrant, based on the ideas of Hallin & Mancini (2003). Again we formulated three general hypotheses to test this general expectation.
In order to test these hypotheses in a valid way, differences found between the two quality newspapers are taken as more crucial, to be able to make statements about political differences, because we need to distinguish quality – popular differences from left-leaning – right-leaning differences.

Hypothesis 4 expected more volume and formal attention in the left-leaning VK than in the right-leaning two newspapers. Differences turned out to be relatively small. Concerning volume attention, hypothesis 4 found some support, but the difference between VK and NRC is too small for convincing support. In terms of formal attention there is support, again on one indicator, which again is not enough. Hypothesis 4 therefore, found only weak support in the Dutch case.

The fifth hypothesis that expected more substantial attention in VK can be split into three parts. The first concerns roles of the far-right. Here there were few differences, but one very particular one, namely that VK paid least attention to the far-right in its ‘natural habitat’ as a political party, in political actuality. This finding refutes H5a, but is a relevant difference between left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers. H5b concerns stigmatising associations. These were expected more in the left-leaning VK, which also occurred in the corpus, but the differences were very small. Last, H5c expected more attention to far-right standpoints in the left-leaning VK. Here we did find a clear difference on some standpoints that indeed distinguish VK from NRC and Tel. It was the only newspaper that reported anti-progressive standpoints. It paid slightly more attention to xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints than NRC, and significantly more than Tel. However, attention to law & order standpoints featured most in Tel. Apparently there is a significant difference between the left-leaning VK and the right-leaning two, but not in the simple opposition of more or less attention to standpoints, but for specific standpoints, where the left-leaning newspaper seems to emphasis the traditional or ‘typical’ far-right standpoints, and the right-leaning newspapers emphasis the more conservative or populist standpoints.

The final hypothesis, H6, expected more attention to NFRA attitudes in the left-leaning newspaper than in the right-leaning ones. Here we found a similar difference as in H5c. The left-leaning VK paid most attention to unfavourable attitudes, while the right-leaning NRC paid least attention to unfavourable attitudes and the right-leaning Tel paid twice as much attention to favourable attitudes than the other two. This again, does not exactly support H6, but does suggest a significant difference in emphasis between left- and right-leaning newspapers.

DISCUSSION
In this chapter we have shown that with the possible exception of 1986, newspapers did not practice a minimal attention policy. Whether it is a conscious policy or not, throughout most of the research period the coverage is narrowly focussed on negative aspects. Janmaat’s accusation that he and his party have been ignored by the media is unjust, but the media attention was relatively negative for most of the research period (in general,
journalists did not have to ‘dig deep’ to find newsworthy negative facts around especially CD and CP’86). In general, the media attention can best be described as producing a image of controversial outsiders; this image was one dimensional in 1986 and became more nuanced during the nineties and first years of the new century. Differences between newspapers were relatively small. Individually, they did not produce very different media images. In emphasises, there were some differences, both between quality and popular newspapers as well as between left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers. As this case study was carried out on no more than three titles, we need to see if these differences, and their slight degree are representative for the various types of newspapers, or rather are individual differences, in the following chapters.
Chapter 4

DEALING WITH THE

THE GERMAN PRESS

DEVILOF THE PAST
CHAPTER 4
THE GERMAN PRESS: DEALING WITH THE ‘DEVIL OF THE PAST’

4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we will investigate the coverage of the far-right in German newspapers. In doing so we will provide answers to the research questions discussed in section 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 regarding longitudinal variation concerning the contents of coverage of the far-right in the German newspapers, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Bild and the differences between these three newspapers. For this purpose we apply the same model of media attention as we did in the previous chapter and that was explained in section 1.4.3.

THE FAR-RIGHT IN THE GERMAN CONTEXT
The burden of the past is omnipresent in the recent history of the German far-right. After WWII, Germany did not have a consistent party representing the far-right (unlike the other former fascist state Italy, see Ignazi, 2006). In 1964 however, the National Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National Democratic Party of Germany) was founded and had some small electoral successes in the second half of the sixties, after which its support declined. In 1971 Gerhard Frey, owner and publisher of a number of far-right newspapers founded the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People’s Union), a far-right organisation that was initially not meant to be a political party and drew most of its members from the readers of Frey’s publications.

Twelve years later, in 1983, a few anti-communist members of the southern conservative party CSU split from their party in protest to its relation with the DDR and started their own party, the Republikaner (REP, Republicans), modelled on Reagan’s new right (Ignazi, 2006: 32). When in 1985, Franz Schonhüber became the party leader, the Republikaner radicalised, for which the ‘nouvelle droite’ of the French Front National once again was the inspiration (Ignazi, 2006). In competition with this new party the DVU and NPD collaborated in the elections of 1987 and in the Landeswhal (state elections) of 1987 the DVU gained the first far-right seat in a state parliament, in Bremen, in twenty years (Mudde 1998: 96, Ignazi 2006: 69).

Since the mid-eighties these three legal far-right parties have been active in Germany, and of these the REP is most active (and successful) in the two southern states, and has also developed into the most populist of them all. The NPD is the most radical party adhering to the German National-Socialist tradition. After the German unification the NPD concentrated mostly on the eastern states, and is the weakest of all three (Ignazi, 2006: 71). By then its collaboration with the DVU was transformed into a hostile relationship, due to

Deckert’s take-over of the party leadership of the NPD (Mudde, 1998: 95). The DVU remained a ‘one man’ project and failed to build a party structure, despite its relatively large membership, and often did not even take part in elections. “The DVU is first and foremost the instrument of a wealthy German businessman who one day decided to add a political party to his strange blend of nationalist business (Mudde, 1998:119).”

The German far-right parties never achieved great successes and their popularity is often located in particular parts of the country, as we can see from Lubbers’ and Scheepers’ study. The highest peaks were in 1989 and in the years 1992-3 (2001: 435), especially the European Parliament elections of 1989. The most far-right states were Bavaria and Baden-Württemburg in the south. In the last elections the NPD was fairly successful in the eastern state Saxony with 9.2% of the votes. These regional differences are also noticed by Kitchelt (1997: 220), who explains the lack of success of German far-right political parties by pointing out that they cleave too much to their tradition and refuse to incorporate two important features of the post-industrial far-right, namely the advocacy of the free market and a strong populist anti-statist appeal (ibid: 238)19. The latter is something the former judge ‘Richter Gnadenlos’ Roland Schill did. He participated successfully in the Hamburg city council elections of September 2001, with a programme similar to that of the Dutch Pim Fortuyn, with an emphasis on immigration and security (Faas, 2001). However, while his Dutch counterpart continued his victory – even after his murder – in the national elections, Schill failed to do so in the Bundestag elections of 2002. We may add that an effective obstacle against far-right electoral success is the five percent threshold in the German electoral system.

The German far-right seems to take place outside of parliaments more than the far-right in its two small neighbouring countries. In 1992-1993, a series of brutal attacks on asylum seekers and other immigrant families, resulting in several deaths, took place. The reactions of both state and public were not very strong (Koopmans, 2001), and since then the level of far-right violence has stayed rather high. Especially in the eastern part of the country far-right subcultures and violence became part of public life (Ignazi, 2006: 82). The reactions to this violence from both the public as well as the state are not very homogenous. They range from direct or indirect approval to the dramatisation and enlargement of far-right incidents of violence. A double standard seems to be apparent. According to Koopmans, anti-Semitism and straight-forward neo-Nazism have a much stronger meaning in Germany than anywhere else. Racist violence against immigrants is often taken less seriously than elsewhere: public legitimisation of racist violence is not unusual (Koopmans, 2001: 71-72). The reactions from the side of government as well as those in the public debate therefore greatly depend on who is the victim of the racist attack. While some of the racist violence is not taken very seriously, public opinion is quick to judge organisations, parties and groups that (only) seem to sympathise with the dark parts of the German past as if they are involved in this racist violence (Art, 2007).

18 http://www.election.de/
19 Not all authors agree with Kitchelt’s emphasis on the free market advocacy as a key element of the new far-right (see Cole 2005). Another explanation might be found in the numerous internal conflicts and lack of a stable party structure that are extensively described by various authors. Its continuing linkage to the national-socialist past is also considered a barrier to a breakthrough (Ignazi 2003: 82).
LONGITUDINAL CHANGE
Our research period runs from 1987 to 2004. We took 1987 as a starting point because it is the first election year after the mid-eighties reformation of the far-right (Mudde, 1998). Varying electoral results (with 1989 as a peak of success for the far-right republikaner) and several events (such as the 1994 wave of far-right violence) probably had a temporary influence on the way the newspapers covered the far-right. Here, we are concerned firstly with the question whether more permanent changes have occurred during the research period, as this seems to be the case in other contexts (Walgrave & de Swert, 2004; Chapter 3). There are no indications for particular patterns of change for expectations in particular directions. So we take this research question as an open question: what changes occurred in the newspaper attention to the far-right between 1987 and 2004?

QUALITY AND POPULAR NEWSPAPERS
A problem in most studies on media coverage of the far-right in German speaking countries is that they are limited to one specific kind of newspaper, usually the popular press. Hence an empirical comparison is often lacking. Here, we will compare quality and popular newspapers empirically, based on the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 1 (1.5.2).

H 1 The quality newspapers SDZ and FAZ pay more volume and formal attention to the far-right than popular newspaper BILD.
H 2 SDZ and FAZ pay more attention to (a more diverse range of) substantial attention aspects than BILD.
H 3 SDZ and FAZ pay more attention to (a more diverse range of) support attention aspects than BILD.

LEFT-LEANING AND RIGHT-LEANING NEWSPAPERS
German newspapers are not related to political parties, nor do they endorse particular parties in their electoral commentary, however they do have political leanings (Semetko & Schönbach, 2003). This enables us to ask similar questions about differences between left- and right-leaning newspapers in the German context, as we did in the other two case studies, and reformulate hypotheses 4-6 from chapter 1 (1.5.2) to apply them to the German contexts. We assumed that left- and right-leaning newspaper report differently on the far-right, due to their differences in ideological distance from the far-right. This means that the left-leaning SDZ would focus more on the far-right and especially its controversial characteristics in order to criticise them, or warn the public against them (Donselaar, 1998).

H 4 The left-leaning SDZ paid more volume and formal attention to the far-right than the right-leaning FAZ and BILD.
H 5 SDZ paid more substantial attention to the far-right than FAZ and BILD.
H 6 SDZ paid more support attention to the far-right than FAZ and BILD.
4.2 RESULTS
In this section the results of the content analysis of the German newspapers are presented. The way the German newspapers portray the far-right is unfolded in four steps. First, we will look at the volume attention, then the formal attention, or visibility of the far-right in the news. Substantial attention, or the way far-right actors and standpoints are covered is the third step. Last, we will look at the coverage of non-far-right actors’ attitudes towards the far-right, which we have called support attention. For every indicator we will first present the general picture, then describe the longitudinal variation in the portrayal and conclude with possible differences between the three newspapers.

4.2.1 VOLUME ATTENTION
Volume attention is the ‘volume’ of attention to the far-right and was measured as the average number of articles on the far-right per day.

The first table includes the total amount of articles in each newspaper each year. It does not only show a first indicator of formal attention, but also shows the distribution of the researched material over the nine election years and the three newspapers. For each election year we calculated the number of news days based on 13 week periods. In the election years where we used random samples for the further analyses, the actual number of news articles in the population had to be estimated based on the proportions in the sample. The actual number of news articles was then divided by the number of days. A t-test was used to test the significance of the mean differences between election years and between newspapers at .05 level.

A little more than half of the complete corpus is from SDZ, 40% is from FAZ and the remaining 7% is from BILD (see table 4.1). During the periods of data collection, an average of about one article per day per newspaper covered the far-right. The lowest level of attention was found in 1987 (0.19 a/d), whereas the Bundestag elections of 1994 showed the highest level of attention with 2.11 articles per day. In 1989 (0.89 a/d), both election periods in 1994 (1.95 and 2.11 a/d) and 1998 (1.44 a/d) the average number of articles per day is relatively high, while in 1987 (0.19 a/d), 1990 (0.29) and 2004 (0.51) it is relatively low. This does not coincide with second order, European Parliament, elections as one might expect. Second order elections are expected to draw fewer voters to the ballot box and generate less media attention than first order elections, such as national parliamentary elections (see conclusion chapter 3 and, Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Wilke & Reinemann 2007, p. 318).
4. German press: ‘Dealing with the devil of the past’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>FAZ</th>
<th>SDZ</th>
<th>BILD</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 EP</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 EP</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 EP</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>113</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corpus</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1998</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are enormous differences between newspapers. Both broadsheet papers report regularly on the far-right, while it is barely mentioned in BILD. This is not unexpected though, considering the characteristics of the newspapers. Nevertheless, the size of the difference, and especially the sometimes almost complete absence of the far-right in BILD, remains surprising. The distribution between newspapers followed the general average over the years. Generally, SDZ contained the highest average number of articles on the far-right per day, closely followed by FAZ. BILD contains sometimes ten times fewer articles than both broadsheet papers. Some minor exceptions to the general distribution are the very low average of FAZ in 1990, its higher average than SDZ in 1994 (European Parliament) and its slightly higher average than SDZ in 2004.

4.2.2 FORMAL ATTENTION
Visibility is the central idea behind the four formal aspects of media attention to the far-right. We measured this visibility of the far-right in the newspapers by looking at the size of the articles, front page appearance, headline appearance and prominence of the far-right in the body text of the articles.

SIZE OF THE ARTICLES
The size of the article is the first measure of formal attention. The measurement for the German newspapers is divided in four categories, instead of three, dividing the category
of the longest articles (>400 words) into two new categories (401-800 words and >800 words). The last column of table 4.2 shows that short news as well as medium and long news articles each form about 30% of the coverage. 15% of the coverage consists of longer, often in depth, background articles (XL). The table shows a shift from mainly short news (S, 60%) to medium and long news articles between 1987-1994. From 1994 onwards the distribution over the four size categories remains roughly the same.

**Table 4.2 Size of the articles (in percentages)**

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<td>S (&lt;150 words)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>L (401-800)</td>
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<td>XL (&gt;800)</td>
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Most of the **bild** coverage is very short (51% S, 30% M), while the other two newspaper published significantly more medium (FAZ 29%, SDZ 32%) and long (FAZ 26%, SDZ 29%) articles (see Appendix 4.1). A good 23% of the FAZ coverage is over 800 words long, whereas 11% of SDZ coverage is of that size, and only 2% of the **bild** articles is that long. Over time these differences remain quite constant, although the percentage of short articles in **bild** is even higher in some years (e.g. 88% in 1998). Between 1987 – 1990 there are no significant differences between the newspapers.

**Front Page**

The following aspect of formal attention is the position of an article in the newspaper, measured as the percentage of the coverage of the far-right published on the front page. A mere 8% of the coverage of the far-right appeared on the front pages. In 1987 the figure is only 2%, while in the for the REP successful year 1989 a peak was reached of 18% (see figure 4.1). In 1990 the front page value of the far-right dropped again to 5% and went up a little, to 8%, a level at which it more or less remained until 2004. If the far-right does appear in the columns of **bild**, it apparently is considered front page news more often (24 %), than in FAZ (11%) and SDZ (4%), see Appendix 4.2. These distributions remained roughly the same between 1994 and 1999. Before and after that period there are hardly any differences between the newspapers, which generally means that the percentages are at, or below, the general figure of 8%.

**Headline Appearance and Prominence**

The third aspect of formal attention that we measured is the prominence of the far-right in the coverage. The fifth indicator is the percentage of the coverage that contains the far-right in its headlines. In 66% of the coverage of the far-right it featured in a prominent role. The far-right featured in the headlines in 46% of the coverage. Figure 4.1 below shows that the longitudinal trends for prominence and headline appearance follow a similar line, coming from a relatively high level in 1987, reaching a peak in 1989 (promi-
nence 83%, headline appearance 76%) and then levelling out at 15% to 20% lower than the 1987 level (respectively 69% and 62% of the coverage). The only exception may be the percentage of the coverage with a prominent role for the far-right in 1998 that shows a second peak at 76%. In the 2000s it returns to the level of early and mid-nineties.

**Figure 4.1** Percentage of far-right coverage on front page, with prominent far-right actors and far-right in the headlines

Between FAZ and SDZ there is little difference in the share of their coverage with the far-right in a prominent role (62% and 68%). In the BILD coverage this is 80%, significantly more. Between the election years, there are only significant differences in 1994 and 2004 with similar proportions as the general picture, except that SDZ coverage suddenly peaks in 2004 with 78% prominence, coming close to the 83% prominence of the far-right in the BILD coverage (Appendix 4.2).

For headline appearance, a similar difference between the three newspapers exists as for front page appearance. 73% of the BILD coverage has far-right references or names in the headlines. However, 53% of SDZ coverage and 29% of FAZ coverage did so too. In most election years the proportions are similar. In 1987 and 1990 there are scarcely any differences, and in 1989 SDZ has most headline appearance of the far-right with 86% of its coverage of the far-right (Appendix 4.2).

**4.2.3 **Substantial Attention

The substantial attention in the coverage was considered next. Substantial attention referred to the portrayal of far-right actors and far-right ideologies. Substantial attention has been operationalised into four main variables, first, the representation of the far-right actor(s), second, the role in which the far-right actor(s) feature, third, stigmatising associations and fourth, the presence of far-right ideological standpoints in the coverage.
**REPRESENTATION**

Far-right representation is the first aspect of substantial attention that has been measured. For every election year, the level of representation was divided into two categories, passive representation (far-right actor only named or mentioned in the article), active representation (far-right actor paraphrased or cited in the article). Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of representation over these categories in all election years. In 62% of the coverage there is only passive representation of far-right actors, which means their own opinion is not covered by these articles. 21% of the coverage contains active representation. An unexpectedly high percentage of the coverage on the far-right did not contain any representation of far-right actors (16%) (Appendix 4.3). In these articles the far-right only features as a general phenomenon without mentioning a far-right actor by name. As one can see in Figure 4.2, the share of coverage without representation is especially large in 1998 (34%). Most of this coverage is about ‘far-right incidents’ (“rechtsextreme Vorfälle”) - as they are often called in the coverage - in the German army. A number of incidents showed that in many ranks of the army and at the military academy there were active far-right sympathies came to public attention that year. It is quite remarkable that precisely this issue was widely reported without mentioning names of either the far-right army personnel, or the organisations of which they were members. The passive representation of far-right actors over the years did not change much. In all years a majority of the coverage, about 60%, contained passive representation of far-right actors. The share of coverage with active representation varied much more. It was as high as 32% in 1989 and as low as 14% in 2004. There is no clear pattern of increasing or decreasing active representation. A high level of active representation did not relate to a certain kind of election, electoral success, extensive coverage, or over representation of certain parties.

**Figure 4.2** Representation of far-right actors (in percentages)

[Bar chart showing the distribution of passive and active representation over the years 1987 to 2004.]

Appendix 4.4 shows a significantly higher percentage of **BILD** coverage with active representation (35%, vs 18% **FAZ** and 23% **SDZ**). While passive representation was equally present in all three newspapers, the percentage of the coverage without any specific far-
right actor is much higher in FAZ and SDZ (both 17%), as expected. In some election years such differences are even greater (e.g. 1994 EP, 2002).

ELECTION NEWS AND SITUATED ROLES OF THE FAR-RIGHT
The data were collected in an extended period around election day. Therefore an overview is given of the percentage of coverage in which the far-right has a role in the elections (possibly besides other roles), before we analyse the different roles in which the far-right featured in the coverage (Table 4.3). A little more than a third of the coverage showed far-right actor(s) in a role in the elections (34%). In the late eighties the percentage was relatively high, peaking in 1990 with 63%. After 1990 it dropped to less than half of that, with an all-time low in 2004 (16%), with a temporary increase in 1999 (45%). Again, the low percentages cannot be explained with the second order elections argument. No differences between newspapers were found here.

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<td>Role in elections</td>
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<td>61</td>
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<td>No role in elections</td>
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In table 4.4 we present the relative amount of coverage in which the far-right featured in other roles than election related ones. A far-right actor can feature in more than one role. Hence each row in the table should be read as if it was a single table. The far-right featured most in legal conflict (17%) and in extra-parliamentary violence (14%).

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<td>In political actuality</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<td>In extra-parliamentary violence</td>
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<td>In extra-parliamentary confrontation</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>In extra-parliamentary peaceful situations</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>In normal internal situations</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>In negative internal situations</td>
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<td>18</td>
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This means the far-right was portrayed relatively often in situations in which they were suspected of violation of the law (often in cases of racism) as well as in situations in which far-right actors used violence, for example, against immigrants or buildings that
host asylum seekers. In the 1994 EP election period, all newspapers paid a great deal of attention to the court case of the four local neo-Nazis who were suspected (and finally sentenced in 1995) of the infamous assault with Molotov cocktails on an immigrants’ home in Solingen resulting in five deaths. In many of these cases, the far-right actors featured in both roles because they were suspected of racist violence in court. Most notably, far-right actors only featured in roles in political actuality in 5% of the coverage. The main reason was their absence in the national parliament. In 8% of the coverage, the far-right featured in peaceful extra-parliamentary activity and in 9% in normal internal situations such as party conferences.

Over time, there were a number of changes in the attention to the far-right in certain roles. The role in political actuality is fairly constant, except in the short period (2002) in which Schill was member of the Hamburg government and presented himself as a candidate for the Bundestag (16%). His controversial speech in the Bundestag on August 29th 2002 was widely covered. The role in legal conflict was relatively high in 1987 (36%), then decreased to 5% in 1989. In 2002 (26%) and 2004 (32%) the percentage increased significantly again. Attention to the far-right as actors of extra-parliamentary violence is fairly stable. Exceptions are 1989 (6%) and 1990 (8%). The long stretched peak during mid-nineties (18 – 15 – 18%) might have started with the infamous ‘Solingen’ court case. In 2004 the attention to far-right violence increased slightly again (13%). Coverage of the far-right in direct confrontation with their opponents (often anti-fascist activists) is relatively high in 1987 (10%), but is fairly constantly below 5% from 1990 onwards. Peaceful extra-parliamentary activity of the far-right generally received a little more attention, although in the early nineties it was equally low. In 1998 it increased sharply to 19% of the coverage. Extra-parliamentary activity of the far-right in general was covered most intensively in 1998 (40%), whereas attention to the far-right in electoral and political actuality (both parliamentary) roles was at an all-time low in that year (20%). Attention to the developments within far-right (party) organisations was at its peak in 1989 (17%). Negative roles within far-right organisations peaked in 1990 (18%), while in that year there was relatively little attention to other roles. After that, the attention to the far-right in this role decreased to a low percentage of the coverage.

It is no surprise that BILD paid relatively more attention to the far-right in aggressive roles, such as roles in extra-parliamentary violence (25% vs FAZ 12% and SDZ 14%). More surprising is that it also covered the far-right in political actuality (13%) more than FAZ (6%) and SDZ (4%). The unexpected high percentage of roles in political actuality turns out to be concentrated in 2002, which is probably due to the high interest of BILD in the activities of Roland Schill. In two years, there were also significant differences concerning the far-right in legal conflict. In 1994 EP BILD paid extraordinary attention to the Solingen court case (44% vs 7% FAZ, and 21% SDZ). In 1998 FAZ covered the legal case against the NPD more intensively (23%, vs SDZ 10% and BILD 11%). See appendix 4.5.
THE FAR-RIGHT IN POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ROLES

We recoded these roles into the dichotomy ‘positive roles’ and ‘negative roles’ (in terms of positive or negative portrayal aspects). Electoral roles were left out of this re-categorisation because a positive or negative label cannot be clearly attributed to that role. A role in political actuality is attributed as a positive role. This role can be considered the main function of a political party, or movement (see also chapter 2). However, it is not very common that far-right parties who are represented in parliament are covered in this role (Fennema & van der Brug 2006, Schafraad, Wester and Scheepers, 2009). For about half of the coverage no role was coded, or a positive or negative label could not be attributed. This figure is quite stable throughout the research period. Figure 4.3 shows that the other half of the coverage featured the far-right less in positive roles (17%), than in negative roles (33%). There is no exception to this distribution throughout the research period, but the balance changed throughout the 18 years. In 1987, 45% of the coverage featured the far-right in negative roles, while only 12% featured them in positive roles. In 1989, when the Republikaner did very well in the EP elections, the balance is almost equal - 22% in negative roles, 18% in positive ones. From 1990 until 1998 the balance is again negative. In 1999, 10 years after the 1989 deuce, the share of the coverage featuring the far-right in positive roles (19%) is again not much smaller than the share featuring them in negative ones (23%). In 2002 and 2004 the negative balance increased again to a considerable difference of 41% of the coverage featuring the far-right in negative roles and only 10% featuring them in positive roles.

FIGURE 4.3 THE FAR-RIGHT IN POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE ROLES (IN PERCENTAGES)

All newspaper coverage showed an equal percentage of far-right actors in positive roles at 17%. BILD, however, paid significantly more attention to the far-right in negative roles than the other two newspapers with 45% vs 31% FAZ and 32% SDZ (see appendix 4.6).
STIGMATISING THE FAR-RIGHT
Stigmatising associations with the Nazis or extremism were the third aspect of substantial attention in this study. We assumed that the presence of such associations points the reader in a negative direction when considering the far-right. It was expected that stigmatisation disqualifies the far-right actor as a normal democratic political party, or full member of the democratic party system. In order to calculate stigmatising associations we excluded all cases involving far-right violent groups and organisations from the analysis. A significant majority of the coverage contained stigmatisation of the far-right actor (52%). Without this correction, the calculated percentage would be 10% higher. The corrected trend for stigmatising associations is presented in Fig. 4.4).

**Figure 4.4 PERCENTAGE OF THE COVERAGE INCLUDING STIGMATISATION OF FAR-RIGHT ACTORS**

Coverage including any far-right extra-parliamentary actor (such as neo-Nazis, or activist groups such as Wiking Jugend or Skinheads Sächsische Schweiz) was left out of the analysis. This graph might underestimate a little, but it excludes the chance of taking representation of extra-parliamentary actors for stigmatising associations.

Over time, there is a small peak in 1989 (48%), and then again in the mid-nineties, reaching its top in 1998 (71%). A new increase of stigmatising associations seems to have started in 2004.

Interestingly, BILD coverage contained relatively few stigmatising associations, whereas 51% of FAZ and 55% of SDZ coverage did; only 31% of BILD coverage contained such associations (see Appendix 4.7).

**FAR-RIGHT IDEOLOGICAL STANDPOINTS**
An important last aspect of substantial attention is the presence of genuine far-right ideological standpoints. Seven standpoints were formulated in Chapter 1, based on the scientific consensus on central far-right ideological standpoints (Kitschelt 1997, Mudde...
1998, Ignazi 2006). The presence of each of these standpoints was checked in the coverage. A first indicator of the attention to far-right ideology is the total share of the coverage which contained any of these standpoints, and how much of it did not. In 38% of the coverage one or more of the far-right standpoints was present (see appendix 4.8). This level remained throughout the research period, although there are three election years in which it dropped below 25%, before it returned to the average percentage in the following year. These years with relatively little coverage including far-right standpoints are, 1987 (24%), 1990 (22%), 1999 (25%).

In Table 4.5 the presence of the seven far-right standpoints is shown. Not all far-right standpoints received the same amount of attention in the German press. Some, such as anti-progressive standpoints (1%), law & order standpoints (1%) and standpoints emphasising traditional values (2%) hardly featured in the coverage. Most prominent were xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints (28%) and the related nationalist standpoints (11%). Anti-establishment or populist standpoints (4%) and anti-democratic standpoints (5%) did not receive much attention, but were generally present in each time frame.

Between 1987 and 2004 we cannot detect an increase in the amount of far-right standpoints that featured in the coverage. For some of the far-right standpoints the attention did vary over the years. Anti-establishment or populist standpoints came to the fore in 1989 and in the election period of the 1994 Bundestag elections. Attention to nationalist standpoints never dropped to a very low level, except in 2002 (2%), while it peaked in 1989 at 22%. Xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints are present continuously in about 20-30% of the coverage, except in 1987 (12%) and peaking during the elections period of the European parliament in 1994 (36%). Coverage of other far-right standpoints remained low in the entire research period, except for three small peaks of coverage with anti-democratic standpoints in (again) 1989, 1994 (EP) and 2004 (all at 7%).

**Table 4.5** Presence of far-right ideological standpoints (in percentages)

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<td>Nationalist*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xenophobic or Exclusionist*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>Traditional Values</td>
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* ) p < 0.05
Most far-right standpoints present featured equally in the three newspapers. There are some differences, though. First, BILD coverage contained fewer articles that mention anti-democratic and anti-establishment/populist standpoints than FAZ and SDZ. BILD contained almost none, whereas about 5% of the FAZ and SDZ coverage contained these standpoints. On the other hand, BILD was the only newspaper that contained law & order standpoints in its coverage with 4% (see Appendix 4.9). Although all coverage contained a great deal of xenophobic and exclusionist standpoints (between 26% and 35%), in BILD coverage these were mentioned most with 35%.

4.2.3 SUPPORT ATTENTION
The fourth aspect of media attention to the far-right is that of support attention. It refers to the degree to which the far-right and their standpoints are (de-)legitimated by non-far-right actors. This dimension of newspaper contents is measured in two ways. First, we look at the relative amount of coverage that contains exclusively favourable or unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right or their ideological standpoints. A second indicator is the attention to the public debate about the way one should deal with the far-right.

NON-FAR-RIGHT ACTORS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FAR-RIGHT
The first measure is, as said, the extent to which far-right actors are confronted with positive or negative attitudes of non-far-right actors. Exactly half of the coverage contained explicit non-far-right actors' attitudes towards the far-right, or far-right standpoints. Almost all of these attitudes are unfavourable to the far-right (46%) (see Table 4.6). Far-right actors did not receive much approval in the coverage, hence their isolation seemed severe.

Table 4.6 shows that the share of favourable attitudes as well as the share of the coverage that contained both favourable and unfavourable attitudes were practically negligible in all election years. This does not mean nothing has changed. The percentage of the coverage containing exclusively unfavourable attitudes fluctuated quite considerably. It peaked three times in the research period. Firstly in 1989 (+24% to 62%), then there was a longer period from the EP election in 1994 until 1998 (+20% to 50%) with a high percentage of the coverage containing exclusively unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right, and lastly in 2004 it peaked again with 51% of the coverage (+11%). Surprisingly there are no between newspaper differences (see Appendix 4.10).

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</table>
DEALING WITH THE FAR-RIGHT AS A TOPIC IN THE COVERAGE

In general, the far-right is not considered to be a ‘normal democratic party’. Moreover, among politicians and political debaters, civic organisations as well as activists there is a debate going on about the most effective way to fight the far-right. Such debates, whatever strategy is under discussion (from criminalisation, to a so called ‘cordon sanitaire’ or even draconian measures, or the opposite, inclusion in the ‘normal political community’), indicate that the far-right received a separate treatment, even if the outcome of such a debate is to include them in the normal political community, because neither socialist, liberal or confessional parties are subject to such debates (Jacobs & Swyngedouw, 2002; Van Donselaar and Rodrigues, 2006). Therefore, coverage that pays attention to such debates is also an indicator that the far-right receives a ‘different treatment’, or that there is controversy about them among non-far-right actors. Thirteen percent of the coverage contained such debates, which means it is an issue among non-far-right actors that appeared in the newspapers from time to time. Often, this coverage was bound to political or legal agendas, for example when the newspapers discussed the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of the attempt to ban the NPD in 2002. As shown in Figure 4.5, there was relatively more coverage of such debates in the REPUBLIKANER success year 1989 (19%) and the EP election period of 1994 (21%). Except for 1990, the debate was always on the media agenda. Here too, there were no significant differences found between newspapers (see Appendix 4.11).

FIGURE 4.5  PERCENTAGE OF COVERAGE CONTAINING DEBATE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE FAR-RIGHT

4.3  CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Following the logic of the four aspects of media attention, we unravelled the contents of German newspapers in order to see how the media covered the far-right between 1987 and 2004. In this section we summarise these results and see what general picture they provide, which patterns of coverage can be indicated and to what extent there is a difference between the coverage of quality newspapers FAZ and SDZ and the popular tabloid BILD as well as between the left-leaning SDZ and the right-leaning FAZ and BILD.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In general terms, volume and formal attention are not inconsiderable, compared to Dutch newspapers. As the far-right did not have any representation in the Bundestag during the entire research period and a maximum of six seats in the European Parliament (1989-1994), the far-right was far from ignored. In election years with major events involving the far-right, volume attention is significantly higher. This was the case, for example, in the electoral success year of 1989 and in the aftermath of the wave of far-right assaults in 1994 and 1998. Generally, news about the far-right is not hidden in a corner of, say, page 17. Forty percent of its coverage contained 400 or more words and on both visibility indicators the score was relatively high as well. The far-right was the main topic in two thirds of the coverage in which it featured and reached the headlines in almost half of the corpus.

Substantial attention was measured with five sets of indicators. A remarkably high percentage of far-right coverage did not contain far-right actors at all. In some cases, we were able to identify certain news events that were almost entirely covered in this way, such as the ‘scandal’ of the so-called ‘extreme-right events’ in the German army. However, there was considerable coverage without far-right actors in most other years as well, without particular events to which to refer. Almost two thirds of the coverage only contained passive representation (much higher than in our Dutch study), while the share of references to far-right sources or quotes was much lower. This division remained almost stable throughout the research period. The far-right was portrayed in numerous other situations than just the expected electoral roles. Especially roles in legal conflict and extra-parliamentary violence drew a great deal of media attention. The domination of these two roles in the coverage means that portrayal of the far-right is often in an unusually extreme setting for a political movement (whether a political party or extra-parliamentary organisation). The presence of stigmatising associations in the coverage was simply very high. Not surprisingly, the far-right standpoints which were found most frequently in the coverage were nationalist standpoints and xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints. More interestingly, very little coverage mentioning other standpoints was found, i.e. anti-democratic standpoints, anti-establishment and populist standpoints. The remaining far-right standpoints were virtually absent from the coverage, even law and order standpoints in 2002, which means Schill (‘Richter Gnadels’) did not succeed in putting crime-fighting on the national political agenda.

The last aspect of media attention, support attention, showed a clear picture. Hardly any favourable attitudes of non-far-right actors were found, while 46% of the coverage contained unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right. This figure did not change much during the 18 year research period. The far-right received scarcely any support or acknowledgement from third parties within the pages of the press.

Concerning research question 1, this study shows a general picture of a limited focus on stereotype aspects of the far-right, roles in legal conflict and extra-parliamentary violence, nationalist and especially xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints, a numerous
stigmatising associations, only unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors and a low level of active representation. All together this suggests a German press that deals with the far-right as if it is a ‘devil from the past’. The far-right is covered with and from a distance. Even though the far-right is not ignored in itself, the coverage is, as the Belgians would have it, to be described as a ‘cordon sanitaire in the press’. The far-right was not excluded from the media, but reported on in an exclusory fashion. The German culture of contrition (Art, 2007: 338) materialized in the ‘controversial outsider’ media image of the far-right.

LONGITUDINAL PATTERNS
In answer to research question 2, we found no trends that gradually developed in a certain direction. Instead, there seems to be little difference between the far-right coverage in 1987 and 2004. As we concluded above, during the entire research period the coverage of the far-right was almost exclusively focused on the unfavourable aspects of the far-right. Far-right actors in ‘unnatural’ roles for political actors (violent behaviour, accused in court) drew much more media attention than their ‘normal’ political performance did. This was not only so in 1987 and 2004, but throughout the entire research period and thus looks like a consistent ‘cordon sanitaire’ in the press. The absence of development towards a different media image, does not mean there was no fluctuation at all in the levels of attention that different aspects received.

Besides a growing volume, the most relevant variance in the coverage consists of two different patterns that both strengthen our conclusion. These patterns concern two combinations of indicators of substantial and support attention that develop simultaneously (see Figure 7 and 8). The first pattern concerns stigmatising associations, nationalist standpoints, xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints and exclusive unfavourable NFRA attitudes. The fact that precisely these four indicators peaked together means that nationalist and xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints in relation to far-right actors brings about stigmatising associations and provokes explicit unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right from non-far-right actors. In other words, the far-right often made the news with their nationalist and xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints. Non-far-right actors, using stigmatising associations, dissociate themselves from the far-right in these same articles. The majority of the newspaper coverage of the far-right reconfirmed the stigmatised image of the far-right, often including delegitimising attitudes of non-far-right actors. This happened especially around newsworthy events with ‘media event’ potential, as seems the case in, for example, 1989, 1994 (both EP and BT elections) and 2002.

The second pattern, which consisted of two related indicators, namely ‘roles in legal conflict’ and ‘roles in extra-parliamentary violence’, occurred quite clearly in the mid nineties (1994 EP, BT and 1998) and on a smaller scale in 2002-2004 (note that it did not occur in 1989). In 1994, a significant amount of attention was given to the Solingen court case, which had become a key-event (Green, McFalls & Smith, 2001: 496)20.

20 We analysed which media events the coverage is about in each of the peak years, based on the titles of the articles.
Most coverage with roles in legal conflict and extra-parliamentary violence in the first peak concerns single articles on smaller but similar events. Apparently, one exemplifying event made a whole series of smaller events more newsworthy. In 2002 there was one media event that helps to explain the increase of the share of coverage with the far-right in a role in legal conflict, namely the attempt in court to prohibit the NPD. Events that contain the exemplary aspects of the unacceptability of the far-right cause an overemphasis of media attention on similar events and issues in the newspapers.

In more general terms this means that at times when there are events that provide the tools to emphasise, for example, the violent character of the far-right, or the immorality of their standpoints, these patterns peaked. In fact they serve as amplifiers of the already existing media image of the far-right. Apparently, certain events draw so much newspaper attention, that this puts these unfavourable aspects of the far-right under the magnifying glass and so reconfirms the image of an undemocratic outsiders’ movement (see Ohlemacher, 1996 and Brosius & Esser, 1996 for a similar argument about the media hype around the early nineties wave of racist violence in Germany).

DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN NEWSPAPERS
The three newspapers in our German study have quite distinctive characteristics. One just has to look at their front pages to realise this. We have tried to see past these structural differences between the newspapers and look at the differences in attention to the far-right between the three dailies. The structural differences leave their mark especially in the volume attention. Interesting therefore, is the extent to which there are differences beyond the volume attention aspects. We do so by testing our six hypotheses, as postulated in the introductory section of this chapter.

QUALITY AND POPULAR NEWSPAPERS
We expected (H1) the difference in the level of volume and formal attention between FAZ and SDZ on one side and BILD on the other due to the general difference in focus on political news between quality and popular newspapers. In terms of volume attention, the hypothesis is confirmed. FAZ (794) and SDZ (1100) contained 8 to 10 times more
articles than BILD (105). However, in terms of formal attention the situation is the exact opposite. Whenever BILD paid attention to the far-right, it was more visible with higher percentages of front page coverage, headline appearance and prominence of far-right actors in the coverage. H1 is confirmed, only for the first part.

Hypothesis 2 expected SDZ and FAZ to pay more attention to (a wider range of) substantial attention aspects than BILD. However, we did not find a univocal image concerning substantial attention. Relatively, BILD paid more attention to the far-right in roles of political actuality and extra-parliamentary violence than SDZ and FAZ which is contrary to our expectations. On the other hand SDZ and FAZ did include many more stigmatising associations and a wider range of far-right standpoints than BILD. Hypothesis two thus received mixed support, which actually means it may be better specified for each aspect of substantial attention. BILD turned out to pay attention to very specific substantial aspects of the far-right and ignore others. As we did not find any differences between the three newspapers concerning support attention, there is no support for hypothesis 3 in the German case.

**LEFT-LEANING AND RIGHT-LEANING NEWSPAPERS**

In order to test our general expectation that due to the greater ideological distance, the left-leaning SDZ would have paid more attention to the far-right than right-leaning FAZ and BILD, in order to delegitimise it, as well as to test Hallin and Mancini’s statement of remaining politicisation of the press, we tested hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 as postulated in section 4.1.

We expected the SDZ to pay more volume and formal attention to the far-right. Table 4.1 showed, that indeed SDZ paid far more volume attention to the far-right than both other German newspapers. However, in terms of formal attention this is not the case. So hypothesis 4 is only supported concerning volume attention.

Especially on aspects of substantial attention a difference would be expected. However, SDZ did not pay more attention to any situated role, or far-right standpoint than the other two newspapers. The difference between FAZ and SDZ on stigmatising associations is not significant. This means that hypothesis 5 has to be rejected all together for the German case.

As the German newspapers were found to be extremely univocal concerning support attention, hypothesis 6, which expected more support attention in SDZ, has to be rejected as well.

In conclusion, this means that the theoretical expectation of significant differences between left- and right-leaning newspapers has not been confirmed in the German case. In part, this may be due to the general attitude of rejection towards the far-right in Germany (Art, 2007), which was reflected in the newspapers (especially in support attention).
AN ABOMINABLE IMAGE
AN IMPLICIT ATTRACTION OF
THE FLEMISH PRESS: THE FLEMISH PRESS:
CHAPTER 5
CHAPTER 5
THE FLEMISH PRESS: AN IMPLICIT ATTRIBUTION OF AN ABOMINABLE IMAGE

5.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we discuss the results of the analysis of Flemish newspaper coverage of the far-right. In doing so, we will provide answers to the research questions discussed in Chapter 1 regarding longitudinal variation in the coverage of the far-right in Flemish newspapers, De Morgen, De Standaard and Het Laatste Nieuws and the differences between these three newspapers. For this purpose we apply the same model of media attention as we did in previous chapters and as was explained in section 1.4.3.

THE FAR-RIGHT IN THE FLEMISH CONTEXT
The relationship between the federal state and the regions is of paramount importance in Belgian politics. ‘Flemish-mindedness’ (or Flemish nationalism) is an ideological position widely shared beyond the left-right spectrum in Flanders. Many Flemish parties are sympathetic to the idea of transferring jurisdiction from the federal to the regional level. In its most extreme form, this would mean separation of Flanders and abolishment of the Belgian state: this is the position of Vlaams Blok (VB) on the matter. By way of comparison, the francophone Front National does not have a similar regionalist standpoint, as it continues to support the Belgian state (Coffé, 2005: 68; Ignazi, 2006: 138).

The roots of the Flemish far-right ideology lie in the Flemish nationalist movement, which developed rapidly in the early 20th century as a countermovement against the “pronounced subordination of Flanders” within the Belgium state (Ignazi, 2006: 124). Many of the militant nationalists, united in the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (vNV, Flemish national alliance), collaborated with the nazi government of occupation during WWII. After the war, militant nationalists founded the Vlaamse Militanten Orde (VMO, Flemish Militant Order), an activist organisation, outlawed in 1981. In reaction to the state reforms enshrined in the so-called ‘Egmont pact’ in 1979, Flemish militants launched the far-right party Vlaams Blok (VB) that in the beginning was an elitist nationalist party. Inspired by the success of the French Front National, the VB radicalised; its anti-immigration standpoint became its main issue in 1987 (Van den Brink, 1999: 10; Ignazi, 2006: 131). It took four years before the VB experienced its first real electoral success, shocking the Belgian media and political circles by getting 17.7% of the votes in the local elections in Antwerp, the biggest city of Flanders. The party succeeded in activating a new, social-cultural dichotomy in the political landscape. From 1991 onwards, the VB became an undeniably significant actor on the Flemish political scene.

Up to the end of the research period in 2004, Vlaams Blok has been the only relevant far-right party in Flanders since it was founded in 1979. On top of that, it has close ties with the most significant extra-parliamentary far-right organisations, such as the Nationalist Student Association (NSV) and Voorpost (radical nationalist movement). This means that Vlaams Blok had a monopoly of the far-right of the political spectrum.
The party really started to grow as soon as it could activate a new—social-cultural—dichotomy in the political landscape, after the first successes of the green party Agalev (Coffé, 2005:116; Ignazi, 2006: 34). From 1991 on, Vlaams Blok became a significant party in the Flemish political landscape. It was one of the first European far-right parties that succeeded in growing and also consolidating its electoral successes (Coffé, 2004; Lubbers, Scheepers & Billiet, 2000). While it had two seats in the national parliament in 1987, it rose to 11.6 percent of the Belgian votes at the 2003 national parliamentary elections, and caused renewed consternation when it collected 24.2 percent of the votes in the regional Flemish elections a year later (regional elections held on the same day as those for the European Parliament).

The other Flemish parties reacted to VB’s consecutive successes in two ways. Party chairs agreed not to cooperate with VB at any political level (Jacobs & Swyngedouw, 2002: 214). This agreement was reaffirmed twice, once, after VB published its second ‘70 issues plan’ in 1996 and again in 2000, just before the local elections (Coffé, 2005b: 165-166). This agreement became known as ‘Cordon sanitaire’ and has been increasingly contested, both because critics say it did not halt the party’s success and because it is an ‘undemocratic measure’. Second, in a reaction to the far-right similar to that in other countries, other parties also slowly but surely moved to the right. The Flemish liberals, for instance, changed their position on the issue of voting rights for migrants with non-EU passports in municipal elections, but without hampering VB’s growth (Jacobs & Swyngedouw, 2002: 216).

LONGITUDINAL VARIATION
As we have seen, media attention to the far-right in the Netherlands has changed significantly between 1986 and 2004. These changes occurred only partly simultaneously with electoral changes (Schafrad, Scheepers & Wester, in press). A longitudinal change in media attention to the far-right in Flemish newspapers is not unlikely, but its direction, consequently, might be quite unpredictable, despite the continuous electoral growth of Vlaams Blok between 1987-2004. In addition to our main research question about the characteristics of the media attention, we will investigate what changes in the newspaper coverage of the far-right occurred between 1987 and 2004?

QUALITY AND POPULAR NEWSPAPERS
In chapter 1, we formulated three hypotheses concerning the differences in formal, substantial and support attention between quality newspapers and popular newspapers based on research on the particular role of popular newspapers (Schafrad, Scheepers & Wester, 2008; Steward, Mazzoleni and Horsfield, 2003; Plasser & Ulram, 2003). In terms of the Flemish context the hypotheses to be tested are:

H 1 DE MORGEN and DE STANDAARD pay more volume- and formal attention to the far-right than HET LAATSTE NIEUWS.
H 2 DE MORGEN and DE STANDAARD pay more attention to (a more diverse range of) substantial attention aspects than HET LAATSTE NIEUWS.
H 3 DE MORGEN and DE STANDAARD pay more attention to (a more diverse range of) support attention aspects than HET LAATSTE NIEUWS.
LEFT- AND RIGHT-LEANING NEWSPAPERS
In Belgium, the media system has certain strong characteristics of the so called Polarised Pluralist model, which means its newspapers are relatively more partisan and ideologically polarised than in the other two contexts (Hallin and Mancini, 2005: 70, 181). In a study by Van Kempen (2007: 310), the measure for press-party parallelism gives an average score, close to the Dutch press, but higher than the Walloon and German press. Although dependency of political parties has decreased, the partisan roots of DE MORGEN (DM), DE STANZAARD (DS) and HET LAATSTE NIEUWS (HLN) are still apparent (de bent, 2001). DM was the successor of the social-democratic party papers which went out of business in 1978. DS has a long centre-right (Catholic) history, which is especially manifest in the national news. it has always displayed sympathy with Flemish-nationalism (ibid, 261-262). HLN is an explicitly liberal newspaper, but is mostly focused on regional news and human interest, not unlike the Dutch DE TELEGRAAF.

Differences between left- and right-leaning, or progressive and conservative/liberal newspapers are the second kind of variation between newspapers that will be investigated. This means differences in the aspects of the far-right, to which DM and DS/HLN pay attention. Following this line of reasoning it is not unlikely that DM put more emphasis on the controversial aspects of the far-right and thus paid more attention to the far-right in roles in legal conflict and extra-parliamentary violence, as well as to its xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints and to unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors, and used more stigmatising associations than both right-leaning newspapers (DS and HLN). According to media-system theory, DM is ideologically further removed from the far-right, than DS and HLN are, and thus is readier to counter the far-right.

H 4 DE MORGEN paid more volume and formal attention to the far-right than DE STANZAARD and HET LAATSTE NIEUWS.
H 5 DE MORGEN paid more substantial attention to the far-right than DE STANZAARD and HET LAATSTE NIEUWS.
H 6 DE MORGEN paid more attention to support attention aspects than DE STANZAARD and HET LAATSTE NIEUWS.

5.2 RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of the content analysis of the Flemish newspapers. The way Flemish newspapers portrayed the far-right is unfolded in four steps. First we look at the volume attention. Second, we consider formal attention, the visibility aspects at the level of the articles. Substantial attention, or the way far-right actors and standpoints are covered is the third step. Last, we will look at how non-far-right actors' attitudes towards the far-right featured in the coverage - support attention. For every indicator we will first present the general picture, then describe the longitudinal variation and conclude with possible differences between newspapers.
5.2.1 VOLUME ATTENTION
A first indicator of media attention to the far-right is logically the number of articles found in this period, in other words, the attention volume.

Table 5.1: Volume of attention per year and newspaper (frequencies and average number of articles per day)

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<th>DS</th>
<th>HLN</th>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>1989 EP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>1.48</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<td>x per day</td>
<td>1.33</td>
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<td>0.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999 (EP)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>152</td>
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<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>2.03</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>211</td>
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<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>2.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>1023</td>
<td>751</td>
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<td></td>
<td>x per day</td>
<td>1.72</td>
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<td>1.25</td>
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In total we found 2,805 relevant articles in three newspapers, divided over eight election years (1.56 article per day per newspaper). In 1987 the volume of attention to the far-right was still quite small. The volume rose in the following election years, especially in 1991 and again in 1999. Both these years are exceptional election years and have become known as such in Belgium’s electoral history (see Swyngedouw, 2003: 547). The parliamentary elections of 1991 became known as ‘Black Sunday’ (Zwarte Zondag) because the far-right party vlaams blok had its final breakthrough, reaching 10% of the Flemish votes. In 1991 the average number of articles a day more than doubled compared to 1989 (from 0.56 to 1.15). In 1999, Flemish citizens voted for the European parliament, national parliament and regional parliaments. These elections therefore became known as ‘the mother of all elections’ (Moeder aller verkiezingen). In 1999 the attention volume doubled again (from 1.01 to 2.38). Both key elections, however, did not only generate extra news in one year, but were the start of a trend of increasing volume in the following election years.
In the eighties there was little difference between the volume of attention between the three newspapers. This changed in the early nineties, when quality papers de morgen and de standaard intensified the volume of attention to the far-right (and especially vlaams blok). Starting in 1999, het laatste nieuws also increased its volume of attention. The differences between newspapers then became significantly smaller again. The total volume of attention of de morgen and de standaard is almost equal, while het laatste nieuws’ volume is about 25% smaller.

5.2.2 Formal attention
Visibility is the central idea behind the formal aspects of media attention to the far-right. Formal attention was measured by looking at the size of the articles, front page appearance, headline appearance of the far-right and prominence of the far-right in the articles.

Size of the articles
The largest part, 40%, of the coverage consists of medium length articles (150-400 words). 28% of all articles contain up to 800 words. Short articles (short news, < 150 words) are 22% of the complete sample and long articles (> 800 words) make up 11%.

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*) sizes in number of words

Between 1987 and 1995 the share of short articles decreased from 27% to 16%. Between 1999 and 2004 it levelled out between 20-25%. The percentage of medium length articles increased throughout the whole period, until 1995 at the expense of short articles, after that at the expense of long articles. The share of this ‘long’ category rose until 1994, and decreased sharply in 1999 (from 40% to 25%). The share of articles longer than 800 words fluctuated between 6 and 16%.

The most usual length of articles in de morgen and de standaard were medium and long (appendix 5.1). This is in great contrast with het laatste nieuws, where almost half of the coverage consisted of short articles, followed by medium length articles. Less than 15% of the het laatste nieuws coverage was longer than 400 words. Before 1991 these differences did not exist. In the eighties the length of the articles in de morgen and de standaard was divided similarly to het laatste nieuws, with mostly short or medium length articles.
Seven percent of the coverage was printed on the front pages of the newspapers. This figure remained quite constant, except for the years 1991 and 1994, when the percentage increased to 10 and 11 percent (see Fig 1). No significant differences between newspaper were found (Appendix 5.1).

Almost 40% of the articles had a clear far-right reference in the headline, usually the name of a party or party leader. In 1991 and 1994 this was almost 60%, while it was lowest in 1999 (33%) and 2003 (24%) (see Fig 5.1). There were no significant differences between newspapers.

A little over half of the coverage contained far-right actors in a prominent role in the article. In 1989 (71%) and 1994 (64%) this percentage was significantly higher, while it was lowest in 2003 (34%). Prominence and headline appearance evolved simultaneously through time (Fig. 5.1).

In some years prominence differed between newspapers. Overall prominence is lowest in *de standaard* (46%, dm and hln both 55%). In 1999 (38%) and 2003 (22%) prominence was extremely low in *de standaard*, while it remained at the same level in *de morgen* and increased slightly in *het laatste nieuws* (to 62% in 1999). These differences suggest that *de standaard* included the far-right more in regular political news than *de morgen* and *het laatste nieuws*, as in DS, the far-right featured not prominently relatively often, but as one of the many actors in other political news (Appendix 5.2).
5.2.3 SUBSTANTIAL ATTENTION
Next, we considered substantial attention. It refers to the portrayal of far-right actors and far-right ideologies. Substantial attention was measured using four main indicators. The first of this is the representation of far-right actors in the news, second, the role in which far-right actors featured, third, explicit far-right stigmatising and fourth, the presence of far-right ideological standpoints.

REPRESENTATION
Far-right representation is the first aspect of substantial attention that has been measured. For every election year, the level of representation was divided in two categories: passive representation (far-right actors only named or mentioned in the article) and active representation (far-right actors paraphrased or cited in the article). The first category means that the far-right has not been used as a source, and is only mentioned. In the case of active representation, the far-right has been used as a source, made explicit by way of paraphrasing or citation. In 55% of the coverage the far-right actor(s) was represented passively. In 42% there were paraphrases or quotes, and the far-right thus was represented actively. Interestingly, almost all of the coverage contained one or more far-right actors; only 3% of the coverage did not contain any far-right actor. Most actively represented far-right actors were party officials of vlaams blok, not only its main figurehead Philip Dewinter, but also other MP’s.

In the eighties there was more active representation, while in the early nineties it decreased to a level under the average of 42%. In 1995 it is 51% again and from 1999 on it is exactly on the average level of 42%.

FIGURE 5.2 REPRESENTATION OF FAR-RIGHT ACTORS (IN PERCENTAGES)
Overall, there were no between newspaper differences (Appendix 5.3). Only in 2003 there was a one-off difference between the three newspapers. While in de Standaard, passive and active representation were on about the same levels as in the overall figure, de Morgen contained significantly more passive representation (72% = +17) and Het Laatste Nieuws, more active representation (58% = +16), compared to 1999.

**Election News and Situated Roles of the Far-Right**

The data were collected over an extended period around election days (in Belgium always Sundays). Therefore an overview is given of the percentage of the coverage wherein the far-right has a role in the elections (possibly besides other roles), before we analyse the different roles in which the far-right featured in the coverage (Table 4). Around 68% of the coverage showed far-right actor(s) in a role in the elections, which means less than a third of the coverage of the far-right did not have anything to do with elections (Table 5.3). This is twice as much as in the German newspapers.

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This figure was quite stable throughout the years. The only real exception was 1994, when the attention to the far-right in electoral situations dropped to half of that year’s coverage. In the year after, 1995, the figure was a little higher than the average (79%). This means that a significant majority of the news involving the far-right dealt with electoral issues. Remarkable is that in the years of multiple elections (for three or more levels of representation), there was no increase in attention to the far-right in electoral roles. ‘Super election years’ 1999 and 2004 are normal years in that respect.

In Table 5.4, we present the percentages of the coverage in which the far-right featured in other roles. A far-right actor can feature in more than one role. Hence each row in the table should be read as if it was a single table. Besides the dominant focus on electoral roles (see above), the far-right featured most frequently in legal conflict roles (13%). In several election years, the far-right clashed with the authorities, chiefly about their party programme, but also on violent and criminal activities, for example of Vlaams Blok members. The coverage contained the far-right in political actuality (11%) almost as much. This involved parliamentary debates, or public reactions to social events outside the electoral context. The far-right was covered in all other roles in between with three to six percent of the coverage.
Over time, there are some interesting developments in the attention to particular roles in which the far-right is portrayed. In 1987 and 1989, when the Belgian far-right was still a one or two person fraction in parliaments on both sides of the language border, the attention to their role in political actuality was quite high (16% and 13%). From the moment of their electoral breakthrough in 1991, however, the percentage shrank far under 10% and remained relatively low until a sudden peak in 2003 (23%). In 2004 it was back under the 10 percent level. The far-right featured in legal conflict in less than 10% of the coverage in most election years, except in 1994 – 1995 (22%) and in 2004 (25%). In 2004 this is probably due to the lawsuit against Vlaams Blok, which ended with a conviction for racist offences. The wave of far-right violence in Germany (1991-1994) did not go unnoticed in the Flemish press, which at least partly explains the peak of roles in extra-parliamentary violence in 1991 (13%) and 1994 (17%). Around the elections of 1989, when the far-right seemed to become increasingly popular, newspapers paid a great deal of attention to the counter movement and thus the far-right in extra-parliamentary confrontation, i.e. rallies (15 %). The year 1989 is also the only election year in which there was a little above average attention to the far-right in peaceful extra-parliamentary roles. There was little variety in the attention to both internal roles.

The most interesting differences between newspapers are the following. Het Laatste Nieuws (17%) covered the far-right three times as much in roles in political actuality than De Morgen (6%) did, while De Standaard had a middle position (12%). the only exception is in 1987 when De Standaard featured the far-right in political actuality most (27%). De Morgen, on the other hand, paid significantly more attention to the far-right in legal conflict (16% vs De Standaard 12% and Het Laatste Nieuws 11%) and extra-parliamentary violence (8% vs De Standaard 4% and Het Laatste Nieuws 4%) than the other two papers, see appendix 5.2. De Morgen also paid most attention to the far-right in internal roles, both positive and negative internal roles. De Standaard did not differ much from De Morgen, but Het Laatste Nieuws paid significantly less attention to these roles.

Possibly due to the inclusion of local editions in the Mediarchus archive, which are not always recognisable as such.
Over the years, differences between newspapers changed somewhat. In years of increased attention to the far-right in legal conflict, this is the case in all three papers (1994, 2004). In other years, it is consistently *De Morgen* that paid significantly more attention to this role, especially in 1987 and 1995. From the 90s on, most attention to the far-right in extra-parliamentary violence was in *De Morgen* and least in *De Standaard*. Especially in 1991 and 1994 this role peaked in *De Morgen*. Later on there is less difference in the attention to this role between the three newspapers. In 1989 *De Morgen* also paid more attention to the other extra-parliamentary roles of the far-right (Appendix 5.4).

**The far-right in positive and negative roles**

As far as possible, the eight distinct roles were re-coded into the bipolar categories of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ roles. Electoral roles were left out of this re-categorisation, because a positive or negative label cannot be attributed to that role (see chapter 2). Only 28 percent of the Flemish coverage could be re-coded this way. All other articles did not contain any role, or (and this is the majority) contained exclusively electoral roles and thus have not been included in the re-categorisation. A small majority then, contained the far-right exclusively in positive roles (16%), while only 12% portrayed the far-right in negative roles. Throughout the years this dominance switched a number of times as one can see in Figure 5.3. In the Flemish press this is almost completely due to two roles, one positive (in political actuality) and one negative (in legal conflict). While positive roles are present more in 1987, the early- to mid-nineties show a higher level of negative roles and in 1999 came a new period with a dominant presence of positive roles, with an extraordinary peak in 2003. In 2004 again a change occurred, but the imbalance was slight that year.

**Figure 5.3** The far-right in positive or negative roles (in percentages)
There is a clear difference between de morgen and the other two newspapers (appendix 5.5). de morgen covered the far-right significantly less in positive roles and more in negative roles. Interestingly, this difference lies between the left-leaning de morgen and the right-leaning other two and not between quality and popular press (see Appendix 5.3).

**STIGMATISING THE FAR-RIGHT**

The third aspect of substantial attention was the relative amount of the coverage that included stigmatising associations with the Nazis or (violent) extremism. We assumed that the presence of these stigmatising associations would disqualify far-right parties as ‘normal democratic’ parties, or full members of the democratic party system. A mere 27% of the coverage in Flemish newspapers contained stigmatising associations, which is not very high considering the many controversies in recent vlaams blok history. Flemish newspapers do have an alternative way to express the ‘gap’ between the far-right, and specifically vlaams blok and the other parties, which has not been included in this measure because it is too specific. Flemish newspapers often referred to ‘the democratic parties’ meaning all parties except the far-right vlaams blok. Without even mentioning the latter, it automatically constitutes a black and white opposition between the ‘democratic parties’ and the ‘undemocratic’ vlaams blok, as the following quote shows: “...The leaders of the democratic parties took notice of the [vlaams blok-PS] decree. [...]”22 The use of this implicit opposition has a similar disqualifying meaning as the stigmatising associations that we have included in our measurement. The levels in Figure 5.4 can therefore be read as an underestimation of the presence of stigmatisation.

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22 “...De leiders van de democratische partijen ‘namen akte’ van het arrest.” De Morgen, April 22nd 2004. The article discussed reaction to the decree that declared Vlaams Blok systematically urged discrimination.
From 1987 to 1989 the level rose sharply, then dropped in 1991 and peaked with nearly every other article (50%) in 1994. After that year, the percentage of the coverage including stigmatising associations dropped every year until it reached its lowest point in 2003 with 17%. In 2004 it rose by 5%. In the mid nineties the term ‘extreme right’ was often used as a synonym for the names of far-right parties, which clearly shows in the graph.

This latter qualification was especially used in De Morgen. Throughout the complete research period, De Morgen contained significantly more stigmatising associations than both De Standaard and Het Laatste Nieuws (appendix 5.6). Except in 1987 and 2004, Het Laatste Nieuws contained the least stigmatising associations. This means we found a significant difference between left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers, and a smaller, but in some years significant, difference between quality and popular newspapers.

**Far-right ideological standpoints**
The last aspect of substantial attention is the presence of genuine far-right ideological standpoints. Seven standpoints were formulated based on the scientific consensus on central features of far-right ideology (Kitchelt, 1997; Mudde, 1998; Ignazi, 2006). The presence of each of these standpoints was checked in the coverage. In 45% of the coverage, one or more of the seven far-right standpoints were mentioned (see appendix 5.4). In 1989, 1991 and 1994 it rose to about 60%, thereafter it decreased again. It was at its lowest point in 2003 with a mere 34%. This means that two-thirds of the news reports on the far-right did not contain any of the far-right standpoints that year. De Morgen paid most attention to standpoints (55%), while De Standaard was close to the average with 45% and only 33% of Het Laatste Nieuws coverage contained far-right standpoints (Appendix 5.7).

In Table 5.5 the presence of the seven far-right standpoints is shown. One standpoint stood out, xenophobic and exclusionist standpoints that were present in 30% of the coverage. Nationalist standpoints were also frequently mentioned in relation to far-right actors (16%). As these two issues are also the most prominent issues of Belgium’s largest far-right party VB, this is not unexpected (see Ignazi, 2006: 132). Anti-establishment (or populist) standpoints featured in 8% of the coverage. Law and order standpoints, as well as standpoints protecting traditional values, featured in about 5% of the coverage. Anti-democratic standpoints were present in 3% of the articles. Anti-progressive standpoints are the only standpoints of the list of seven which were virtually absent.

Over time, a general trend is the growing diversity of standpoints that received. Especially from 1991 on, the diversity is greater than in the eighties. Trends for the individual standpoints differ quite considerably. Anti-progressive standpoints only featured in the coverage in 1994 and 1995. Before the 90s there was no attention to anti-establishment/populist standpoints, but from 1991 the attention to these standpoints was fairly constant at around 8% with a small peak in 1995 (13%). Nationalist standpoints were present quite prominently in the coverage between 1987 (32%) and 1995 (21%).
5. The Flemish Press: an implicit attribution of an abominable image

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After that, these standpoints became significantly less visible: from 1999 on less than 13% contained nationalist standpoints. The attention to xenophobic and exclusionist standpoints was always by far the highest, although there was some variation over the years. In 1991 there was a peak of no less than 51% and a decrease to 20% in 2003, directly followed by a new increase to 35% in 2004. Law and order standpoints only became somewhat more visible in 1999 and 2003 (both 7%). In all other years the attention to these standpoints remained at or below 5%. Traditional values are present quite prominently in 1987 (10%) and 1989 (11%), but then apparently became increasingly insignificant and featured in about 4% of the coverage in all of the following years. Newspapers paid significantly less attention to the third ideological ‘pillar’ of VB, conservative family values, than to the first two, their exclusionist and nationalist standpoints.

Anti-progressive, law and order and traditional value standpoints featured equally in the three newspapers (see Appendix 5.8). Anti-democratic standpoints and xenophobic/exclusionist standpoint received most attention in \textit{de morgen} and least in \textit{het laatste nieuws}. \textit{de standaard} paid most attention to anti-establishment/populist standpoints (10%) and nationalist standpoints (21%). Here also, \textit{het laatste nieuws} gave least attention.

5.2.4 SUPPORT ATTENTION

The fourth aspect of media attention, support attention, refers to the degree to which the far-right and their standpoints are (de-)legitimated by non-far-right actors. It is measured in two ways. First, we look at the relative amount of coverage that contained exclusively favourable or unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right or their ideological standpoints. A second indicator is the attention to discussion in the public debate and among non-far-right actors about the way one should deal with the far-right.

NON-FAR-RIGHT ACTORS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FAR-RIGHT

A much as 46% of the coverage mentioned non-far-right actor’s attitudes towards the far-right. A large majority of these articles contained exclusively unfavourable attitudes (35%). Only 4% contained exclusively favourable attitudes and 7% contained both favourable and unfavourable attitudes. Throughout the years, the ratio did not change a
great deal, although the share of articles that do include favourable attitudes increased between 1987 and 2004 from 2 to 15%, especially after the breakthrough year 1991 (Table 5.6). But also the share with exclusively unfavourable attitudes increased from 22% in 1987 to 40% in 2004. Still the representation of non-far-right actors’ attitudes is less univocal(-ly unfavourable) in 2004 than it was in 1987.

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There are no significant differences between DE STANDAARD and HET LAATSTE NIEUWS. DE MORGEN (Appendix 5.9), however, paid more attention to non-far-right attitudes in general (53% vs DS 43% and HLN 40%). All of this extra attention went to unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors (see Appendix 5.6). In 1987 and 1989 this same distribution was even clearer. In the following years the between newspaper differences were small. In 2004 DE MORGEN contained significantly more articles with both favourable and unfavourable attitudes (14%, vs DS 11% and HLN 8%), along its ‘usual’ greater attention to unfavourable attitudes.

DEALING WITH THE FAR-RIGHT AS A TOPIC IN THE COVERAGE

This last indicator is especially interesting in the Flemish press because of the ‘cordon sanitaire’. Besides the occasional discussion about legal measures against VLAAMS BLOK (which came into effect in 2004), the ‘cordon sanitaire’ is probably the most discussed way of dealing with the far-right, especially in the weeks after VLAAMS BLOK made new electoral progress (see Damen, 2001). In 10% of the coverage, strategies towards the far-right were a topic in the coverage. In 1987 it was completely absent as a topic. Between 1989 and 1995, it was present in between 5 and 10% of the coverage. From then on, the dealing with the far-right became an increasingly important topic each year. The topic reached its attention peak in 2004 with 16% (see Fig. 5.6).

There was no significant difference in the attention to debate on how to deal with the far-right between DE MORGEN (12%) and DE STANDAARD (10%), though HET LAATSTE NIEUWS did pay significantly less attention to this kind of debates (7%) (appendix 5.10). In 1991, in contrast to both other papers DE STANDAARD did not pay attention to dealing with the far-right as a topic in its coverage. In 1999 and 2004, HLN paid significantly less attention to such debate than did DE MORGEN and DE STANDAARD. In both these papers, attention to this debate increased from 1995 on.
5. The Flemish Press: an implicit attribution of an abominable image

5.3 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this section we gather all relevant results and discuss their inter-relationship in the light of our research questions. Again, we follow the order of first the general outcomes, then longitudinal patterns and the hypotheses on longitudinal changes and finally the differences between newspapers and the hypotheses on differences between quality and popular newspapers, as well as between leftist and rightist newspapers.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Flanders has had a relatively large far-right party during the entire research period and scarcely any other independent far-right actors. The first of these two characteristics explains the large attention volume. Together, they explain why there is relatively much attention to the far-right in roles in elections and in political actuality, and at the same time little attention to the far-right in extra-parliamentary roles (although there is no correlation between attention to these roles and far-right voting, see Chapter 6). If we compare the main standpoints of VLAAMS BLOK with the far-right standpoint that received most attention, there is a great deal of similarity. As with other far-right parties, there is, of course, a great deal of attention to their xenophobia and exclusionism, but also the Flemish-nationalist and anti-establishment standpoints, and even their ‘third leg’\(^{23}\) of protection of traditional values, received considerable attention in the Flemish newspapers. A clear majority of the non-far-right actors’ attitudes towards the far-right in the coverage was unfavourable, while at the same time the colonisation of far-right standpoints by other parties also showed in the fact that favourable attitudes were present in about ten percent of the coverage.

\(^{23}\) Political scientists pointed out that Vlaams Blok draws three different groups of voters. The traditional group of Flemish-nationalists, people that vote Vlaams Blok because of their exclusionist standpoints and conservatives that are attracted to their standpoints protecting traditional values, such as the family, anti-abortion standpoints and against gay marriage. Each of these ‘wings’ in the parties has its own face: the Flemish-nationalists have Gerolf Annemans; the exclusionists have Phillip Dewinter and the traditionalists have Alexandra Colen (see Van den Brink, 1999).
LONGITUDINAL PATTERNS AND CHANGES
In 2004 we found ten times as many newspaper articles on the far-right as in 1987. Especially in 1991 and 1999 there was an enormous increase (+100%) of volume attention. However, formal attention aspects did not increase significantly in 1991 and beyond. Front page attention remained constant and headline appearance and prominence went up and down.

Surprisingly, before the electoral breakthrough of VB in 1991, the far-right was actively represented more often than after. We found a sudden decrease in 1991. Next, the share of active representation remained more or less the same. Attention to the far-right in roles in elections did not rise significantly and roles in political actuality decreased, even though the party’s activity in various parliaments increased. Particular events, such as the wave of far-right violence in Germany (1994) and the lawsuit against VLAAMS BLOK (2004) explain the fluctuations in attention to most other roles of far-right actors.

Anti-establishment/populist standpoints started to gain attention from 1991 on. The ‘cordon sanitaire’ apparently gave significant input to the anti-establishment rhetoric of VB, which was recorded in the media. The attention to the original main standpoint of VB (radical Flemish-nationalism) decreased, while that to their new ‘core business’ of xenophobia and exclusionism rose until 1994. In spite of what could be expected based on Walgrave & de Swert’ study (2004), attention to law and order standpoints did not increase.

In 1994, all three categories of non-far-right actors’ attitudes received increasing attention. Attention to unfavourable attitudes increased most. An increase in the attention to debate on how to deal with the far-right increased in 1994, then fell back in 1995 and rose continuously until 2004. With the exception of 1995, the general trend here is that the debate grew with the electoral popularity of VB.

TWO MECHANISMS
The Flemish case is exceptional in the sense that their electoral popularity grew continuously between 1987 and 2004 (for either parliament, as well as on the local and regional levels). Therefore, it was a logical step to specify our longitudinal question in accordance with this fact: did media attention rise simultaneously with the electoral popularity of the far-right in Flanders? On the level of the four aspects of media attention to the far-right we found two different patterns.

First we found that in general, neither formal attention nor substantial attention increased at all. There is no statistical relationship between any of these two aspects of media attention to the far-right and electoral results. Second we found that both volume attention and support attention did increase between 1987 and 2004. As we have seen above, volume attention increased sharply while the electoral popularity of VLAAMS BLOK grew. More interestingly, support attention increased as well, although not as much as volume attention.

This means we have two mechanisms at work: the first mechanism is that although the popularity of the far-right increased, substantial attention did not. The increased presence
of Vlaams Blok in parliaments did not cause more attention to roles in political actuality, relatively more quotes of far-right politicians, or more attention to a more diverse range of far-right standpoints. This means the media image of the far-right did not change and kept its emphasis on the particular far-right characteristics of undemocratic party behaviour, exclusionist standpoints, etc.

Instead, when the far-right electorate continued growing, newspapers turned to non-far-right actors, often politicians of other parties, to record their unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right and their debates on how to deal with the far-right (often in terms of the ‘cordon sanitaire’). Attention that indicates emphasis on the deviant and ‘undemocratic’ media image of the far-right increased greatly. This means the second mechanism is that volume and support attention did increase significantly simultaneously with the electoral growth of the far-right. Especially those support attention aspects that emphasis the unfavourable judgements of the far-right by other political parties remained dominant and doubled in size. Although substantial attention to the far-right in roles of violence and stigmatisation decreased, the undemocratic image of the far-right has been strengthened by the deligitimising attitudes of non-far-right actors.

In conclusion, we can state that the media image of the far-right did not change over the years, despite the fact that the far-right became increasingly more successful and received increasing media attention (volume). What did change, is that explicit emphasis on the unacceptable aspects of the far-right (roles in extra-parliamentary violence, undemocratic standpoints, extreme nationalism, and the use of stigmatising associations) decreased and a more subtle way of explicating the deviant characteristics of the far-right gained more attention - unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors towards the far-right. Over time, one and the same media image was portrayed first in a relatively harsh way and later in a relatively subtle manner.

Differences between quality and popular newspapers
Looking at differences between quality and popular newspapers, it is remarkable that the popular newspaper HLN did not pay so much less volume attention to the far-right than quality papers DM and DS. Still, it is a significant difference, as is the difference in the size of the articles, which is generally bigger in quality papers. However, the newspapers did not differ on the other formal attention indicators, while a larger formal attention was expected for quality newspapers. There is mixed support for hypothesis 1.

Attention to sensational roles (in legal conflict, in extra-parliamentary violence) is lower in HLN, than in the other two newspapers, while concerning the other roles there are hardly any significant differences. Hypothesis 2 expected a more diverse attention to situated roles in quality papers DM and DS. Our results do not support this hypothesis here. Concerning the expected focus on xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints in HLN and the more diverse standpoint attention in DM and DS we did find support for hypothesis 2.

The last hypothesis (H3) expected more support attention in the quality newspapers DM and DS than in HLN. For non-far-right actors’ attitudes we did not find such a difference. For the
level of attention to debate on how to deal with the far-right we did find a significant difference between the quality newspapers and the popular HLN, which does support hypothesis 3. The quality newspapers’ support attention is thus more diverse than that of the popular HLN. Especially in the last couple of election years the attention to this debate rose significantly in the quality papers, while it did not increase in HLN. Apparently, this, in Belgium very serious, debate is more of an issue for quality newspapers, than for popular newspapers.

Quality newspapers DM and DS differed significantly from the popular paper HLN. The volume of their attention is larger and the variety of far-right standpoints that they paid attention to is bigger as well. However, we found only mixed support for our three hypotheses. Unlike German and Austrian popular newspapers (Plasser & Ulram, 2003; Art, 2007; Schaafraad, Scheepers & Wester, 2008), HLN was not totally focused on the far-right in sensational roles. Such a singular focus on sensational aspects is apparently reserved for the most popular among the popular newspapers, the tabloids. HLN does not fall into this category.

BETWEEN LEFT-LEANING AND RIGHT-LEANING NEWSPAPERS
In order to test Hallin & Mancini’s argument that despite the decrease of partisanship of the press in Democratic-Corporatist media systems, media are still politicised, we expected to find clear differences between left- and right-leaning newspapers. DE MORGEN is the most left-leaning, or progressive newspaper in our study. Therefore, hypothesis 4 expected it to pay most volume and formal attention to the far-right. As the differences with DE STANDAARD are marginal and those with HET LAATSTE NIEUWS significant, but not devastating, hypothesis 4 finds only weak support in the data.

The fifth hypothesis expected DE MORGEN to pay most attention to substantial attention. We found that DE MORGEN paid most attention to the ‘controversial’ aspects of the far-right, such as roles in legal conflict and extra-parliamentary violence, as well as using the most stigmatising associations. All of these indicators show strong support for this hypothesis.

DE MORGEN generally paid more attention to non-far-right actors’ attitudes towards the far-right. There were especially more articles with exclusively unfavourable attitudes in DE MORGEN. Favourable attitudes towards the far-right featured slightly more in DE STANDAARD and HET LAATSTE NIEUWS, although this last difference is not significant. All together this means we found quite strong support for hypothesis 6.

The literature about the general characteristics of the Belgian media system and newspapers generated our expectation of finding significant differences between the left-leaning DE MORGEN and the traditionally right-leaning DE STANDAARD and HET LAATSTE NIEUWS (De Bent, 2001; Hallin & Mancini, 2005; Van Kempen, 2007). Of all our hypotheses we found the strongest support for just these hypotheses. There is a very clear difference between attention to the far-right in the left-leaning DE MORGEN and the right-leaning DE STANDAARD and HET LAATSTE NIEUWS. Our study of Flemish newspapers does supports Hallin & Mancini’s argument about the remaining political flavour of newspapers in contemporary Democratic-Corporatist media systems.

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Chapter 6

Attention to the Far Right

Theorising Newspaper

Summary and Discussion
CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION: THEORISING NEWSPAPER ATTENTION TO THE FAR-RIGHT

In the previous three chapters we answered our research questions within three distinct national contexts. In this last chapter we have four objectives left to fulfil, as we change our perspective from a national to a cross-national perspective. First we compare the outcomes of the three case studies both on their general conclusions and longitudinal conclusions. This part serves to answer RQ 1 (how do media pay attention to the far-right?), RQ 2 (are there any changes in the media attention to the far-right between 1986-2004?) in a cross-cultural perspective and RQ 4 (what cross-national differences are there in the media attention to the far-right?). The second objective of this chapter then is to investigate how cross-national patterns in media attention relate to developments in the political contexts. Is the way media pay attention to the far-right an autonomous process or does it reflect reality? A third objective is to place the comparison of different types of newspapers in a cross-national perspective as well, and answer the combined RQ3 and RQ4 (are there any differences in the attention to the far-right in different types of newspapers?). We tested six hypotheses about these differences on national levels in previous chapters and now retest them on a cross-national level. As our last endeavour in this last chapter, we will take the model of media attention that we have developed for this study and review it critically.

6.1 SUMMARY AND CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSES

6.1.1 MEDIA ATTENTION TO THE FAR-RIGHT IN THREE COUNTRIES: THE CONTROVERSIAL OUTSIDER

In this section we summarise the findings on media attention to the far-right in each of the three national contexts, the Netherlands, Germany and Flanders and point out their similarities and differences. In accordance with the previous chapters, we will first look at each of the four aspects of media attention to the far-right in general, followed by longitudinal developments. In this section we provide an answer to the first and last research questions; (RQ1) How do media pay attention to the far-right? (RQ4) What differences are there in the media attention to the far-right between Dutch, German and Flemish newspapers?

VOLUME ATTENTION AND FORMAL ATTENTION
Generally, newspapers published one article per day that at least mentioned the far-right; in Flemish newspapers this was systematically more than in German and Dutch newspapers. A large majority of the coverage existed of medium or long articles. In all countries, an equal amount of articles was printed on the front page of the newspaper (9%). The far-right featured in the headlines of 44% of this coverage, while it was the prominent actor in 55%. German papers deviated from this description to a limited extent.
They contained relatively more short articles and the far-right featured prominently more often. This means that when the far-right featured in German newspapers, it was mostly as the central subject in the article.

**SUBSTANTIAL ATTENTION**

**REPRESENTATION**
In more than half of all coverage, the far-right was only passively represented, in 39% it was actively represented and in the remaining part, no far-right actor was mentioned. That last category means the far-right remained an abstract entity ‘without a face’. In a majority of all coverage, the far-right was object rather than subject. In German papers, the absence of a far-right actor occurred most often (16%). Active representation was found most frequently in Dutch newspapers (53%). German papers especially contained very little active representation (21%). This means the German far-right remained most abstract in the coverage, keeping the far-right most explicitly in that object position. The Flemish papers held a middle position close to the general average.

**SITUATED ROLES**
On average, the far-right featured in an electoral role in a little more than half of the coverage: in Flanders (68%) this was considerably more and in Germany significantly less (34%), which makes sense, because the Flemish far-right has become a significant electoral factor, while the German far-right, on occasion, was hardly capable of campaigning. Generally, attention to roles in political actuality was found in 11% of the coverage, the least in Germany (5%), the most in the Netherlands (18%). As Flanders (Belgium) had most far-right MPs of all three countries, one would have expected the highest percentage of coverage with attention to the far-right in political actuality in Flemish newspapers. Nevertheless, Dutch newspapers paid much more attention to the far-right in this role than Flemish ones.

The far-right featured in roles in legal conflict in 15% of the coverage, almost equal in all countries (significantly more than in political actuality). A court of law is an unusual habitat for a political party, which seems reason enough to report on it on every single occasion. The far-right featured in extra-parliamentary roles regularly (17%), most frequently in Germany, which is not surprising since the German extra-parliamentary far-right is larger and more active than the Dutch or Flemish. Both roles in normal and negative internal situations are present in 5% of the coverage, most negatively in the Netherlands, which is not strange due to the enormous amount of incidents and active strategies of some journalist to bring these things to the fore (Rensen, 1994; Van Donselaar et al., 1998). The high or low levels of attention to some specific roles can be explained by specific circumstances (i.e. electoral roles in Flanders, or negative internal situations in the Dutch newspapers).

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24 Data on membership of extra-parliamentary far-right organisations, and data on reported far-right violence incidents (Van Donslaar, 1998, 2006; Verfassungsschutz, 1994, 2002; Centrum voor Gelijke Kansen, 2008).
6. Summary and discussion: theorising newspaper attention to the far-right

The variation between some other roles is rather curious, for example the particular low attention to roles in political actuality and high levels of attention to roles in extra-parliamentary violence. There seems to be an emphasis on outsider roles, controversial ones even, and little interest in more obvious roles for political parties, which emphasises the outsider image (in terms of roles) of the far-right even more.

**Stigmatising associations**

In 34% of the coverage we found stigmatising associations. This means the reader was frequently reminded that far-right parties are morally unacceptable entities: they functioned as symbolic disqualifiers. In Germany this occurred even more often, in 52% of the coverage of far-right parties. The frequent use of stigmatising associations aided the formation of a media image as a controversial outsider.

**Standpoints**

In general, Flemish newspapers paid more attention to far-right standpoints than Dutch and German newspapers did. Most prominent far-right standpoints were xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints. This most well-known standpoint of the far-right featured in 28% of all coverage and was equally newsworthy in all countries. Nationalist standpoints featured in 10% of all newspaper articles, with significant variation between the three contexts, least in Dutch papers (4%), 11% in German papers and most in Flemish papers (16%). This last figure was not unexpected, due to the Flemish nationalist (regionalist) tradition. Law and order standpoints featured a little more frequently, most in Dutch newspapers (9%). Populist/anti-establishment standpoint received a little more attention as well, 6% on average, 8% in Flemish newspapers. All other far-right standpoints, such as anti-progressive, anti-democratic standpoints and standpoints in favour of traditional values, received very little attention. Although the emphasis on xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints is not surprising, it does emphasise the controversial nature of the far-right more than attention to most other far-right standpoints would.

**Support attention**

Non-far-right actors’ attitudes were present in nearly half of all coverage, equally in all countries. The kind of NFRA attitudes was not equally distributed across countries. In all three countries, unfavourable attitudes were the dominant ones in the coverage. In the German press these featured most often (48%). In Dutch and Flemish newspapers this percentage was 40 and 42%, still a significant minority. Sixteen percent of the Dutch coverage contained favourable attitudes towards the far-right, while only 3% of the German did. Flemish newspapers have a middle position (11%). Overall, the overwhelming amount of unfavourable attitudes again stressed the outsider image of the far-right. Even in the Dutch newspapers, the imbalance between unfavourable and favourable attitudes is still rather strong. In 10% of all coverage, debate among NFRA actors about the way to deal with the far-right was featured, a little less in the Dutch press (7%) and most in the German press (13%).
SUMMARY
In general the media image of the far-right in the newspapers is not particularly positive. Across the board, the media attention to the far-right cultivated a media image that can best be labelled as that of a controversial outsider. This media image is expressed most clearly in the German newspapers and is most nuanced in the Dutch press. The most important differences between the three contexts then, are the following. Numerically, the Flemish newspapers paid most attention to the far-right. Two-thirds of the Flemish coverage contains the far-right in electoral roles, much more than Dutch or German coverage, whereas the Dutch paid relatively more attention to roles in political actuality and the German in extra-parliamentary roles. Differences in attention to far-right standpoints were relatively small. The xenophobic and exclusionist standpoints were by far the most prevalent. In German newspapers we found far more stigmatising associations than in Dutch and Flemish ones. In Dutch newspapers we found most favourable non-far-right actors’ attitudes and in German newspapers most unfavourable attitudes.

6.1.2 CROSS-NATIONAL TRENDS IN MEDIA ATTENTION TO THE FAR-RIGHT
Although in all three countries the image of a controversial outsider prevails, there are significant differences in the way this image is presented. The next step is to explore the media attention longitudinally (RQ2) and cross-nationally (RQ4). Has the media image of the controversial outsider always been there? If it changed, how did it change? And did these processes differ between national contexts, or were they part of cross-national trends?

The first elections after 1985 were chosen as a starting point for this study because in all three countries this era is seen a ‘new start’ for the far-right in Western Europe (Mudde, 1998). Often inspired by the ‘nouvelle droite’ of the French FRONT NATIONAL, parties such as VLAAMS BLOK, CENTRUM DEMOCRATEN and REPUBLIKANER changed their programme – centralising exclusionist standpoints – and adapted their strategies to convince voters (Ignazi, 2006: 23). These parties were not instantly successful at the next elections, but in some cases the first sign of progress was made, either on national or local electoral levels. It is intriguing that newspapers in all three countries reported in a very similar way in these first election years (1986 and 1987). There was limited (volume) attention to the far-right, with little room for the far-right to present their own side of the story, a great deal of stigmatising (both substantial attention) and exclusively unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors (support attention). In the Dutch press a large part of the attention was actually devoted to rallies of opponents of the far-right. In Germany there was suddenly a media hype around the unexpected electoral success of the REPUBLIKANER at the EP elections in 1989. BILD literally wondered if people had voted Nazis into the European parliament. Other newspapers expressed similar worries in more nuanced terminology. In all newspapers, the attention expressed a clear image of a controversial outsider. All nine newspapers were even so similar as to suggest the existence of a collective minimal-negative attention policy in the newsrooms.
6. Summary and discussion: theorising newspaper attention to the far-right

In the early nineties, we recognised two important socio-political developments. First, a sharp increase in the amount of asylum requests in West-European countries (Nicolaas, Sprangers & Korpel, 2007). Second, probably in reaction to this demographic development, the amount of far-right violence increased enormously, especially in Germany (Verfassungsschutz, 1991, 1993, 1995). In this period, the far-right grew in two ways: it did well in various elections (peaking in 1994) and its extra-parliamentary side was (violently) active as never before. In this way it caused a modest media hype with itself as the subject (i.e. Brosius & Eps, 1996). As the peak in popularity brought a lot of different troubles, it gave media instant opportunities to re-emphasise the image it had already created in previous years. Besides the (relative) novelty of electoral successes, the wave of far-right violence and the wave of scandals around newly elected far-right MPs raised media attention. Our analysis shows that all newspapers included in the study took up these opportunities and reported more than before on the far-right (volume attention). The focus of most of this coverage indeed is on these three topics, the electoral success, far-right violence and the malfunctioning of far-right politicians (substantial attention), thereby reinforcing the negative media image. So the media image did not change, although media attention shifted to those controversial aspects that were most newsworthy in this relatively hectic first half of the decade.

After this turbulent period, the far-right became less active, as it seemed, but the discussion of integration and immigration policies came to dominate public debate during the following years. Media attention to the far-right, in the three countries, started to show increasing variation, the media image became less rigid. While Vlaams Blok continued to grow, Flemish newspapers slowly traded their stigmatising associations and focus on xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints (substantial attention) for increased attention to unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors (support attention) throughout the following ten years. In other words, instead of explicating (possible) dangers of the far-right (as they previously did), they emphasised the incompatibility of the far-right with the mainstream political constellation in Belgium by reporting on the unfavourable attitudes of non-far-right actors, who were described as ‘the democratic parties’, implying that ‘the other’ is undemocratic. The media image of the controversial outsider was not exchanged for a new one, but became more subtle. In a period with little far-right activity and decreasing electoral results, Dutch newspapers slowly became milder as well, but not in the same way. Their coverage became more open (i.e. more active representation) and diverse (substantial and support attention), which is a greater step away from the original rigid media image than the Flemish one. In Germany, the far-right was less active than before (Mudde, 1998; Ignazi, 2006, Verfassungsschutz; 1995, 1999). In a few instances (of particular events), extra attention was drawn to controversial substantial aspects. Other than that, media attention in German newspapers did not change significantly. All together, in this period the first real changes in media attention occurred in Dutch and Flemish newspapers. More and different aspects of the far-right appeared in the news, nevertheless, the media image of the controversial outsider persisted (although less black and white).
In 2001, a completely new phenomenon appeared in both Dutch and German politics, in both cases first at a local, then at a national level and both being a one-man enterprise. In Rotterdam and Hamburg respectively, new populist politicians, Fortuyn and Schill, entered the political arena. They may be called far-right, but to many they were much more than just that (Faas, 2001; Pels, 2003; Van Praag, 2003). In German (national) media all this political controversy remained quite low-profile, in contrast to the Dutch situation. Fortuyn received enormous amounts of attention in the Dutch (and foreign) media. As his politics and approach to the media had all the ingredients for countless news stories he became a true media hype (see Pels, 2003; Van Praag, 2003; Koopmans & Muis, 2008). This was reflected in our data with a rapid increase of volume attention and stronger continuation of the opening and diversification of the newspaper content (substantial and support attention). Meanwhile the Flemish far-right crossed the 10% line in national elections for the first time and debate on the ‘cordon sanitaire’ became increasingly apparent in the coverage. Besides the various media hypes around Fortuyn and Schill, the German media attention did not really change, while the rise of Fortuyn caused an increase in the process towards more open and diverse media coverage in the Dutch newspapers. By 2004, the Dutch coverage even changed so much that it reached a balance in positive and negative news (especially support attention), long after the LPF hype was over. This indicates a change of media image.

6.1.3 CONCLUSION
In summary, until 1994 media attention in all three countries remained fairly similar and focussed on the controversial aspects of the far-right. Thereafter, differences between the three national contexts became increasingly apparent. From 1995 on three different processes can be distinguished. In Germany the far-right underwent almost no change during the research period, nor did the media attention: it continued its historically rooted (and culturally widespread) rejection. German newspapers persisted with a rather rigid image of the controversial outsider. As the Flemish far-right kept growing electorally, the coverage showed gradual alteration, however, with limited acceptation. They traded the rigid controversial outsider image for a more implicit (version of the) controversial outsider image. In the Netherlands a political crisis caused a gradual alteration to eventually become a significant change towards acceptation. This last phase in the Dutch press is directly related to the rise and fall of the LPF, which may be a one-time exception. From 1995 on the controversial outsider image became more diverse and open, until it changed so much in 2004 that we can no longer speak of a controversial outsider image.

Just like the Netherlands and Flanders, many surrounding countries, from France to Austria and the Scandinavian countries (Rydgren, 2005; Ignazi, 2006), witnessed a rise of evolving far-right parties. As we have argued in Chapter 4, there is a plausible explanation for the consequent minimal-negative attention ‘policy’ of the German newspapers: the German culture of contrition, which caused a high degree of sensitivity to anything that could be associated with the Nazis (Art, 2007). Germany was also one of the very few countries in Western Europe that has not seen a significant growth of far-right parties in national elections (Rydgren, 2005; Ignazi, 2006).
Therefore, it is not unlikely that the German case is somewhat of an exception in Western Europe concerning media attention to the far-right. With the recognition of the immigration issue in the political and public spheres and many far-right parties losing their sharp (sometimes already frayed) edges, the media image of the far-right in Western Europe has not changed fully, but at least has become more subtle and diverse, leaving a growing amount of space for approval and support.

6.2 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MEDIA ATTENTION AND FAR-RIGHT VOTING

Above, we have seen that media attention to the far-right is relatively stable. Nevertheless, it also depends on relevant events (sometimes cumulating in media hypes) as well as slow changes, within broader socio-political trends. In two of the three countries, for example, volume attention rose when immigration became a more prominent issue on public and political agendas. In this section we will look more precisely at the possible relationships between media attention to the far-right and far-right voting. In doing so, this study links up with previous research on the relationship between media and far-right voting (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001; Walgrave & de Swert, 2004; Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007).

6.2.1 ANALYSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIA ATTENTION AND FAR-RIGHT VOTING

After looking at developments in media attention over time, we will now investigate whether media attention relates to actual developments of the far-right, and if so how. Our main indicators for these actual developments are voting percentages and yearly figures of reported far-right violent incidents. Our premise is that actual events or changes in electoral strength will be reflected in media attention. An increase of the amount of far-right violent incidents, for example, would relate to increased attention to the far-right in roles in extra-parliamentary violence, or roles in legal conflict. Another example is that a decrease of the voting percentage would relate to a decrease of media attention to the far-right in roles in political actuality, as this role concerns parliamentary activity of the far-right, and if the number of MP’s decreases (after that election) there is thus less attention to be expected for their parliamentary activities. This means that we have two objectives. First, we set out to chart the absence or presence of such associations between media attention and voting percentages, or yearly figures of reported far-right violent incidents. Second, we are interested in the nature of these associations, pertaining to the question if they are positive or negative associations.

There are different measures of how the far-right developed over time. Some useful measures may be membership figures of far-right organisations, registered amounts of and type of far-right activities, or of far-right parties, the monthly voting intention data, which Lubbers and Scheepers used in their study (2001). As we do not have an uninterrupted series of (monthly) media attention data, we cannot use that same poll data to establish monthly associations. Instead, we use the voting percentages of the elections around which we collected the newspaper coverage of the far-right.
For Germany we also have yearly figures of reported far-right violent incidents at our disposal as a second indicator. That means that for Germany we have indicators for both the developments of far-right parties as well as the extra-parliamentary far-right. Unfortunately, these data of far-right incidents are not available for all election years in the Dutch and Flemish cases.

Our data have some limitations if we want to study the associations between media attention and far-right voting. First, they are limited in the number of cases (8 election years\(^{25}\)). Second, from the longitudinal media attention analyses (in chapter 3-5) we must conclude that we cannot expect linear relationships for most of the media attention variables. Due to these reasons, we cannot simply calculate statistical correlation measures, such as Spearman’s \(r\), as the absence of linear relationships would cause a high risk of underestimation of the strength of the correlation (Hinkle, Wiersma & Jurs, 1988: 114-5).

Yet we aimed to draw conclusions about the existence, or absence and the nature of associations between media attention variables and the external data. Therefore, we carried out an alternative procedure\(^{26}\). It does not produce exact association coefficients, but like a graphic analysis, it does produce the ‘decisive’ information. A summary of this analysis is presented in table 6.1. We were interested in whether there was a positive or negative association between the media attention indicator and voting percentages. In the table, a positive relationship is indicated with ‘+’, a negative relationship with ‘-’ and the absence of a relationship (or the independence of both variables) with ‘□’. For those relationships that we elaborate on, we also present the graphs.

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\(^{25}\) For the Dutch case we only have 8 election years because the elections of 1999 produced too little data (see chapter 2). We had 9 for both Germany and Flanders, but out of these elections 2 occurred in the same year in the Netherlands and Germany (national and European elections, 1994), therefore we excluded the European elections of that year for this analysis in all three cases. This led to respectively, 7 elections for the Dutch case and 8 for both the German and Flemish cases.

\(^{26}\) In order to get a grip on the strengths and directions of the associations we carried out the following procedure. First we calculated Spearman’s \(r\) for all associations. Second we judged these on three criteria. First: possible linearity (yes/no), second: calculated significance level (yes/no) and third: existence or absence of association in either direction. In practice the first two occurred only simultaneously. The calculation produced a few very strong correlations, only for variables that visually showed a linear relationship. These were given ‘++’ for positive associations (strong) and ‘--’ for negative associations (strong). For all other possible associations we decided that coefficients of .25 or -.25 or less meant no association and coefficients of .26 or -.26 or higher showed some level of association. As a check we than produced graphs of all possible associations in order to carry out a graphical analysis and see if the calculated measure could also be visualised. Only if that was possible, associations were given ‘+’ for positive associations and ‘-’ for negative associations. All other, non-associations, were given a ‘□’, meaning the absence of any association between the media attention variable and voting or far-right violence.
6. Summary and discussion: theorising newspaper attention to the far-right

Table 6.1
Relationships between far-right voting percentages and attention indicators and between absolute numbers of far-right violence incidents and attention indicators (Germany only).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NL Voting %</th>
<th>Germany Voting %</th>
<th>Far-right violence</th>
<th>Flanders Voting %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. Volume attention</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Average number of articles per day</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>II. Formal attention</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Headline appearance</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prominence</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. Substantial attention</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active representation</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in elections</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in political actuality</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Role in legal conflict</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in extra-parliamentary violence</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in extra-parliamentary peaceful situations</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Role internal, ordinary</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>□</td>
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<tr>
<td>Role internal, negative</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stigmatising associations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-establishment/populist standpoints</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>□</td>
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<td>Law &amp; order standpoints</td>
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<td>Traditional value standpoints</td>
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<td><strong>IV. Support attention</strong></td>
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<td>NFRA Favourable attitudes</td>
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<td>NFRA Unfavourable attitudes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debate on dealing with the far-right</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>□</td>
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++ strong positive relation; + positive relation; □ no relation; - negative relation, -- strong negative relation (strong relations are mostly linear with a significant and high r). Far-right violence figures were numbers of reported cases per year (Verfassungsschutz 1986-2004).

6.2.2 Patterns in the relationship between media attention and far-right voting

Only a few attention aspects relate strongly to far-right voting, as indicated in Table 6.1. However, there are some remarkable, often contrasting, relationships shown in the table. Below we describe the associations as they have been summarised in Table 6.1 and report on the patterns that we found in the relationship between media attention to the far-right, far-right-voting and far-right violence.
VOLUME ATTENTION
The first thing that stands out in the table is that in two of the three national contexts there is a strong association between volume attention and far-right voting (Figure 6.1). Both in the Dutch and Flemish cases there is a strong positive association between far-right voting and volume attention. In Germany such association is absent, but the association between far-right violence and volume attention is equally strong.

FIGURE 6.1A-C VOLUME ATTENTION IN RELATION TO VOTING PERCENTAGES PER ELECTION YEAR

A. NETHERLANDS ++
B. GERMANY □
C. FLANDERS ++

FORMAL ATTENTION
As Table 6.1 shows, formal attention aspects have an opposite relationship with far-right voting. Almost everywhere, there is a negative association between formal attention aspects and far-right voting as well as far-right violence. In two cases there is a complete absence of any kind of association between formal attention and far-right voting as well as far-right violence, headline appearance in the Dutch case (Figure 6.2a) and prominence in the Flemish one (Figure 6.3c).

FIGURE 6.2A-C HEADLINE APPEARANCE IN RELATION TO VOTING PERCENTAGES PER ELECTION YEAR

A. NETHERLANDS □
B. GERMANY *
C. FLANDERS *

FIGURE 6.3A-C PROMINENCE IN RELATION TO VOTING PERCENTAGES PER ELECTION YEAR

A. NETHERLANDS -
B. GERMANY *
C. FLANDERS □
Summary and discussion: theorising newspaper attention to the far-right

There could be two different explanations for the fact that the relation between formal attention and far-right voting is in contrast with that between volume attention and far-right voting. First, it might mean that as the far-right becomes more popular, a larger portion of its media attention becomes integrated in normal political news, which might be a sign of normalisation of the far-right’s media image. A different explanation could be that when the far-right becomes more popular, the media downplay the far-right and thus under-emphasise it in the reporting. Which of these opposing explanations holds true may be answered after we turn to the associations between substantial and support attention aspects and far-right voting.

Substantial attention
For active representation we found no positive associations: in the Dutch case there is none at all: for both Germany and Flanders there are negative associations. Electoral success does not relate to attention to the far-right in roles in elections in the Dutch and Flemish contexts. In the German context, roles in elections relate negatively to both far-right voting (strong) and far-right violence. There was no association between roles in political actuality and far-right voting in the Dutch case, but a positive association in the German case (Figure 6.4). In Germany attention to the far-right in political roles also related positively to far-right violence. In Flanders a negative association was found between roles in political actuality and far-right voting.

Figure 6.4 A-C Role in political actuality in relation to voting
Percentages per election year

A. Netherlands □ B. Germany+ C. Flanders -

Attention to roles in legal conflict related negatively to far-right voting (and far-right violence) in the Dutch and German cases. It has a positive association with far-right voting in the Flemish case. Associations between attention to roles in extra-parliamentary violence and far-right voting are negative (Dutch) or absent (Flemish), but positive in the German case. Between roles in extra-parliamentary violence and far-right violence there is even a strong positive association.

Associations between internal roles and far-right voting vary. Associations between roles in ordinary internal situations and far-right voting are absent in the Dutch and Flemish cases. In the German case they are negative (also for far-right violence). For roles in negative internal situations, the associations with far-right voting are negative in the Dutch and German cases and positive in the Flemish case. The relationship with far-right violence in Germany is absent. While there is a negative association between stigmatising associations and far-right voting in the Dutch and Flemish cases, it is positive in the German case (Figure 6.5).
Also the relation between stigmatising associations and far-right violence in Germany is positive. This contrast between the German case and the Dutch and Flemish cases suggests that German newspapers react to far-right success in the opposite manner to that of the Dutch and Flemish newspapers. Increasing ballot box success relates to tempering of the use of stigmatising associations in Dutch and Flemish newspapers, while it only encouraged stigmatising in German newspapers. This contrast, as the reader may have noticed, occurred for numerous other substantial attention aspects as well, namely roles in elections, in political actuality, extra-parliamentary violence and ordinary internal roles for the German context contrasts with the other two national contexts.

**FIGURE 6.5 A-C  STIGMATISING IN RELATIONSHIP TO VOTING PERCENTAGES PER ELECTION YEAR**

![Graphs showing stigmatising associations in relationship to voting percentages per election year for Netherlands, Germany, and Flanders.](image)

Attention to anti-establishment or populist standpoints related positively to far-right voting in both the Dutch and Flemish cases. There are no relations with far-right voting and far-right violence in the German case. In all three contexts, there is a negative association between attention to nationalist standpoints and far-right voting. For nationalist standpoints and far-right violence in the German case, the association is negative as well. While there is a negative association between xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints in the Dutch and Flemish cases, it is positive in the German case (Figure 6.6). Also, attention to xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints related positively to far-right violence in Germany. Attention to law and order standpoints then, related positively to far-right voting in the Dutch and Flemish context, no associations were found in the German case. In all three contexts, the association between attention to traditional value standpoints and far-right voting is negative, or absent (in the Dutch case, see Figure 6.7). Traditional value standpoints did relate negatively to far-right violence as well.

**FIGURE 6.6 A-C  XENOPHOBIC/EXCLUSIONIST STANDPOINTS IN RELATIONSHIP TO VOTING PERCENTAGES PER ELECTION YEAR**

![Graphs showing xenophobic/exclusionist standpoints in relationship to voting percentages per election year for Netherlands, Germany, and Flanders.](image)
6. Summary and discussion: theorising newspaper attention to the far-right

**FIGURE 6.7 A-C  TRADITIONAL VALUES STANDPOINTS IN RELATIONSHIP TO VOTING PERCENTAGES PER ELECTION YEAR**

So the contrast between the German case and the Dutch and Flemish cases concerning the nature of the associations was found for the attention to far-right standpoints as well. The contrast between the German case and Dutch and Flemish cases returns in a similar way throughout the range of substantial attention aspects.

**SUPPORT ATTENTION**
Attention to non-far-right-actors’ (NFRA) favourable attitudes towards the far-right has a positive association with far-right voting in the Dutch and Flemish cases (Figure 6.8). For the German case there is no relation with far-right voting and a negative association with far-right violence. Unfavourable attitudes have no associations with far-right voting or violence in the Dutch and German cases, but a positive association with far-right voting in Flanders. The last indicator, the debate on dealing with the far-right, relates negatively to far-right voting in the Dutch case. In the German case it has no association with far-right voting and a positive association with far-right violence. It also related positively to far-right voting in the Flemish case (Figure 6.9). So in Germany support attention is not associated with far-right voting at all, whereas it is in both other contexts, especially Flanders. The associations in Germany with far-right violence do suggest a clear relation between media attention to NFRA attitudes and public debate about the far-right and far-right violence. In times of increased violence, favourable attitudes drop, while debate on prohibition of far-right parties and organisations increases.

**FIGURE 6.8 A-C  NFRA FAVOURABLE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FAR-RIGHT IN RELATIONSHIP TO VOTING PERCENTAGES PER ELECTION YEAR**
6.2.3 TWO POSSIBLE MECHANISMS

In the whole range of reported associations, there are some regularities. A first pattern was the cross-national strong positive association between volume attention and far-right voting (or violence). The second pattern concerns the reversed direction of associations for formal attention. This contrast gave rise to two possible explanations.

The first possibility was that increased popularity of the far-right relates to normalisation of media attention to the far-right (and consequently its media image). This means that we should have found positive associations for roles in elections and roles in political actuality and for favourable attitudes, and negative associations with roles in extra-parliamentary violence, stigmatising associations and for unfavourable attitudes. The associations with active representation should at least not be negative, and associations with nationalist and xenophobic and exclusionist standpoints should at least not be positive. The normalisation thesis would be supported if a majority of the found associations fit in this expectation.

The second possibility was that increased popularity of the far-right relates to downplaying the far-right in the media attention. This means that we should have found negative associations for roles in elections, roles in political actuality and for favourable attitudes, and a positive association for stigmatising associations. Furthermore, associations for roles in extra-parliamentary violence, nationalist standpoints and xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints should at least not be negative, but either absent or positive. Associations for active representation and favourable attitudes should at least not be positive. The downplay thesis would be supported if associations for most roles, stigmatising and NFRA attitudes fit the expectations.

As has been shown above, almost none of the associations that would support the normalisation thesis have been found. For most substantial and support attention aspects, there are no associations at all, or the relations have opposite natures. Only the associations for stigmatising associations (negative) and favourable NFRA attitudes (positive) fit for two of the three national contexts. These two associations suggest that rough edges of media attention disappear and are replaced with milder descriptions and an increase of space for support of other parties, when the far-right gains electoral popularity.
Concerning the downplay thesis, associations with roles in elections and political actuality do match the expectations for the Dutch and Flemish cases. Other than that, however, there is no cross-national support for this thesis either.

We may conclude that cross-nationally there is hardly a clear mechanism of either (1) downplay or (2) normalisation in the relationship between media attention and far-right voting. The first conclusion may be less surprising than the second. As we concluded before, the overall media attention can be characterised as propagating an image of the far-right as controversial outsiders. This may imply that there is not much more space or need for further downplaying. The second conclusion is somewhat more unexpected, even odd. There is no structural normalisation mechanism of the media image associated with the (overall) rise of the popularity of far-right parties. However, for the German case there is more support for the first, that is the downplay thesis. Moreover, for the German case, we found numerous contradictory associations (compared with the Dutch and Flemish cases). For the substantial and support attention aspects, where we found associations confirming the normalisation thesis in the Dutch and Flemish cases, associations in the German case did not. The contradictory associations for the German case in precisely this manner, suggest a much stronger tendency of downplaying the far-right when these parties do well in elections. Oddly enough, for the German case roles in political actuality related positively to far-right voting. A final interesting point is that media attention in Germany related in a similar but stronger and clearer way to far-right violence, as to far-right voting and thus confirms the observed relationship between media-attention to the far-right and far-right success in Germany.

Despite strong associations between volume attention and far-right voting, other media attention aspects did not relate to far-right voting in a way that expressed normalisation of media attention, nor downplaying of the far-right in media attention. At best, associations between attention to certain roles and far-right voting point in the direction of downplaying (for Dutch and Flemish cases), while associations with stigmatisation and NFRA attitudes point in the direction of normalisation. This ambivalent result is in accordance with our earlier conclusion that for the most part the media attention is quite stereotypical and propagates an image of the far-right as controversial outsiders, although from 1998 on this image lost its sharp edges in Dutch and Flemish newspapers (see section 6.1). The contradictory associations of the German case form an exception; for the German case we did find associations that suggest more convincingly downplaying in the case of increased far-right voting. In conclusion, this means that the German case shows stronger support for the downplay-thesis. This suggests that the controversial outsider image is emphasised in times of far-right electoral success and confirms our conclusion that the German press is more sensitive to far-right activity than that in the other national contexts, due to its exceptional history (Schafraad, Scheepers & Wester, 2008: 377). Outside of Germany, media attention expressed its controversial outsider image of the far-right relatively more independent of fluctuations in far-right voting.
A last remarkable pattern is the relatively high amount of indicators of media attention in the Flemish case that relate strongly to far-right voting in either direction. A first general explanation could be of a methodological kind: the Flemish case is the only one in which there is a linear increase of voting percentages throughout the research period. A second one might have to do with the specific Flemish context, especially concerning the support attention aspects. As the far-right party Vlaams Blok continued to grow electorally, despite the gentlemen’s agreement to boycott all cooperation with them (‘cordon sanitaire’), NFRAs started to question this ‘cordon sanitaire’ policy more openly. Much of this debate is reported in newspapers, which becomes visible in the strong associations between favourable attitudes as well as the debate on dealing with the far-right and far-right voting.

6.2.4 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: CULTURAL CONSONANCE
As we have seen, the media image of the far-right is fairly consistent, despite the fact that some major shifts in the position, shape and behaviour of the far-right occurred throughout the research period. Changes in media attention were slow and subtle. In three countries and over a period of 18 years we only found one real radical shift of media images - that in the Dutch newspapers of 2004. As far as there were associations between media attention to the far-right and far-right voting, they did not point clearly to a mechanism of normalisation or downplay related to far-right success. The media attention to the far-right thus is relatively independent of political developments. Theories of news values, framing and discursive opportunities can be helpful to understand these deviant developments in media attention to the far-right that we have found in the coverage. In this section we evaluate how these theories may be helpful and add our own insights to improve them within this context.

THE PROCESS OF CULTURAL CONSONANCE
Whereas the far-right moved slowly towards, or even into, mainstream politics (especially in its public communication, Ignazi, 2006: 234/5), its media image remained that of the controversial outsider. Consequently the question that becomes apparent can be posed in at least two ways. Why did the media attention not ‘really’ change while the position of the far-right in politics did change considerably? Or, how could a cultural lag arise between media attention to the far-right and its political position?

As this study encompasses only a small part of the ‘chain of news communication’ (Galtung & Ruge, 1965: 65) about the far-right (excluding the production and reception phases that both encompass selection and distortion of media messages), we cannot completely solve this problem. However, analysing the newspaper content over this long period of time cross-nationally does offer relevant insights into these processes (especially towards the production side of things).

By now classic communication science studies showed how journalists create news in a highly routine manner, within institutions with their own limited capacities and applying a standardised set of values to decide what becomes news (i.e. Galtung & Ruge, 1965;
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Tuchman, 1978; Gans, 1980). Due to interaction of these journalist routines, news values and available frames, for each subject in the news, a standardised way of media attention/reporting comes about. As long as this way of reporting is more or less functional, or is not obstructed, it remains in use, despite possible developments in the field. However, if a crucial event, or new fact in the debate, or new forms of politics - such as that of Fortuyn - are introduced, these may become such an obstruction that the standardised or “hegemonic” way of reporting will have to change. Gitlin defines this major reason as a “political crisis” (1980: 273).

The contemporary far-right fits into a political tradition in which the major predecessors have had such an impact on history that it functions as a strong symbolic benchmark for ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Within contemporary West-European culture, this historical link has become a culturally shared moral tool, complete with a range of symbols in the form of standardised references (i.e. the use of the word ‘Nazi’) and taboos (comparing a political leader to Adolf Hitler). Because this historical link has gained such a strong cultural meaning and function it can easily be applied in rhetorical contexts. One of these fields is news on the subject of the far-right. Here, the historical link is easily reproduced as it contains multiple symbols that present certain ideas about the news fact to which they are connected. These symbols are used in this way by journalists on a regular basis, even if there is no direct cause to do so in the particular news event. The historical reference has become a label to evaluate the far-right actor (Shoemaker, 1984). The repeated use of these historical references has to be understood as the use of a recognisable and clear cultural frame (see Gitlin, 1980; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), meaning the historical roots have become a culturally shared point of reference. In a similar way as the mechanism of resonance in discursive opportunity theory (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004), the use of this historical-cultural frame reaffirms the connection between contemporary and earlier far-right, and through that de-legitimises the contemporary exponent.

In deciding what is news, familiarity, repetition, consonance with previous news, fit with existing dominant values, surprise, and negativity or bad news are important news factors (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neil, 2001). The affirmative consonance of a historical perception of the contemporary far-right is supported by this mechanism of news selection (and framing), in other words, cultural consonance is consolidated in these news factors. In this way, cultural consonance produces a continuous stream of news that pays attention to exactly those aspects of the far-right that fit that cultural frame. Cultural consonance is understood as the process wherein the news about a specific phenomenon (in this case the far-right) is being framed according to a historically rooted and culturally widely supported understanding of the phenomenon. This framing occurs on such a large scale that the phenomenon (the far-right) is predominantly understood within this frame, regardless of the frame’s factual relevance in the particular contemporary context of the news fact. The cultural consonance thus works in a similar way as the mechanism of news factors, as described by Galtung & Ruge (1965). However, cultural consonance here is not so much concerned with the newsworthiness of an event as in Galtung & Ruge’s argument, but with a social-political phenomenon that
carries a strong cultural meaning regardless of the event in which it is situated. Cultural consonance then explains not when but how this social-political category (the far-right) becomes news. It combines several news factors in its own mechanism, reinforces the standardisation of reporting on the subject and provides cultural legitimation for it.

CULTURAL CONSONANCE IN DUTCH, GERMAN AND FLEMISH NEWSPAPERS
Through this mechanism of cultural consonance, coverage of the far-right in all three countries continued its controversial outsider image of the far-right (rooted in the historical understanding of the far-right) for almost all of the research period, even though the far-right political family reached a very different position towards the end of the research period in two of the three national contexts.

In Germany, media attention is most univocal and constant throughout the research period and is most stably rooted in what Art calls a “culture of contrition”, meaning a high sensitivity towards any political party that bears any resemblance to the Nazis (Art, 2007: 338). On top of that, the electoral opportunities of far-right parties are much more limited due to the five percent threshold that obstructs the possibility of a frame altering ‘political crisis’. Moreover, the extra-parliamentary far-right in Germany is relatively active, compared to its Dutch and Flemish counterparts, in a way that confirms the existing media image. These circumstances are such that they facilitate the mechanism of cultural consonance.

In both Flanders and the Netherlands, exclusionist standpoints became more openly discussed outside the far-right and the far-right had become significantly more popular among voters, during the second half of the nineties (Jacobs & Swyngedouw, 2002; Walgrave & de Swert, 2004, Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007). As we have seen, this was reflected, to a limited extent, in increased volume attention and increased diversity of the media attention. However, even with a strongly increased electoral popularity, the media image of the far-right did not really change. The mechanism of cultural consonance prevented the media from mirroring these electoral developments.

In accordance with Gitlin’s claims, the ‘hegemonic routine’ of reporting, using the controversial outsider image, only changed after a political crisis occurred in the Netherlands. The rise of Fortuyn and the shock of his violent death caused such alteration of positions that this routine had become too far removed from every current attitude towards the far-right at that moment. In Gitlin’s terms, the cultural consonance “no longer contributed to social stability (Gitlin, 1980: 273).” The political crisis created the space for change in the routine. As this political crisis was followed by ‘after shocks’, such as the early end of the coalition government that included the LPF, it took some time until the alteration in reporting became visible. Another explanation for the delayed change in reporting after the ‘political crisis’ could be that the ‘hegemonic way of reporting’, was not abandoned entirely until the far-right lost its power position, which implies the cultural consonance was not disrupted directly by the political crisis. We found significantly changed media attention in the 2004 Dutch newspapers.
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As it occurred only in one national context in the very last research year, it is uncertain as yet whether this shift is a temporary exception, or a significant relatively permanent shift.

Meanwhile, the Flemish far-right party Vlaams Blok gained 24% of the Flemish votes in June 2004. However, this electoral growth still did not cause a ‘political crisis’, and the mechanism of cultural consonance did prevent the media attention of changing throughout the entire research period, causing a cultural lag between electoral support and media attention to the far-right.

Without such a political crisis, a media image based on such strong news values does not change, even though it is out of step with real world developments, as was increasingly so in Flanders. This conclusion is not only supported by contemporary theories of cultural and social change, but also agrees with McQuail’s argument that media are not mere agenda setters, but both mirror and moulder, sometimes even leaving a cultural lag (McQuail, 2005: 80). Media images are strong, as Van Zoonen already argued (1992: 457) as we have seen, they are often culturally shared and historically rooted and therefore very stable and shock-resistant. In other words, concerning their attention to the far-right, newspapers have been quite conservative, they do not change the media image easily, but once reality has pushed them forcefully enough, they may become a formative influence after leaving a cultural lag, as the late but radical change of the media image of the far-right two years after Fortuyn’s death suggests.

6.2.5 Conclusion
In this section we have provided explanations for the longitudinal and cross-national variation in the media attention to the far-right. First, we showed how media attention related to far-right voting. We found no patterns that clearly point to a mechanism of either normalisation or downplay in this relationship. The German situation came closest to the downplay mechanism, although it contained some odd irregularities. In both other countries we found evidence for the fact that there may be some ambiguous tendencies in both directions simultaneously. The simultaneous opposite tendencies, combined with all other aspects of media attention having a rather arbitrary relation, or no relation at all, with electoral support, suggest an independence of media attention from electoral support for the far-right.

As an explanation for this rather ‘stubborn’ continuation of a specific kind of media attention, expressed in the media image of the controversial outsider, we introduced the mechanism of cultural consonance. Cultural consonance refers to a mechanism or process that combines news factors and framing, and states that if there is a strong historical point of reference available that is culturally rooted and widely shared, and thus is very suitable to package news on the far-right, it enables a routine of media attention to the far-right in terms of a controversial outsider independent of electoral support for the far-right and regardless of its relevance in particular situations.
6.3 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TYPES OF NEWSPAPERS
In this section we discuss the cross-cultural comparative analysis of the differences between newspapers. We do this along two lines: first, along the distinction between quality and popular newspapers, second, along the distinction between left and right leaning newspapers. In doing so, we combine answering the third and fourth research question: (RQ3) are there any differences between the coverage of the far-right in different newspapers? What differences are there in the media attention to the far-right between Dutch, German and Flemish newspapers? (RQ4). Next, we discuss the outcomes of this analysis in the light of the theoretical debate that has been presented in Chapter 1.

6.3.1 QUALITY AND POPULAR NEWSPAPERS
A first distinction between newspapers in our study was made between so called quality and popular newspapers. This distinction has proven to be useful in many other studies (e.g. Ter Wal, 2004; Van Gorp, 2005; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2006; Scholten & Ruigrok, 2006; Heijting & de Haan, 2005). For each country we selected two quality newspapers (de volkskrant, NRC Handelsblad, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, De Morgen and De Standaard) and one popular paper (Telegraaf, Bild, Het Laatste Nieuws). Popular newspapers generally pay more attention to non-political subjects and have more visuals and shorter articles. Some, but not all, popular newspapers can also be characterised as tabloids. Of the popular newspapers in our study, Bild is the only newspaper that is generally characterised as a tabloid.

In hypothesis 1 we formulated two statements about expected differences between quality newspapers and popular newspapers. The first statement (H1a), quality newspapers pay more volume attention to the far-right than popular newspapers, is confirmed in all three national contexts, most radically in the German context (due to the tabloid characteristics of Bild) and least clearly (but still significantly) in the Flemish context where the popular paper HLN paid less volume attention to the far-right than quality papers DM and DS. On the aggregate level, concerning volume attention hypothesis 1 is confirmed. However, we found no significant differences in formal attention and thus no support for hypothesis 1b. The kind of newspaper does influence the amount of news, but once the far-right has become news there is no difference between quality and popular newspapers in the visibility or prominence of the far-right in that coverage.

In hypothesis 2 we postulated that a greater variation of substantial aspects would receive more attention from quality papers than from popular newspapers. In the analysis we focused this hypothesis especially on the range of roles (H2a) in which the far-right can be portrayed and the range of far-right standpoints (H2b) that received attention in the press. We found the same pattern in all three countries: there was hardly any difference between newspapers concerning the range of roles in which the far-right is portrayed. However, significant differences were found in the range of standpoints that receive attention. In quality papers, a more diverse range of standpoints received attention, while popular newspapers concentrated their attention on the most obvious
far-right standpoint, that of xenophobia and exclusionism, which confirms H2b. Thus for hypothesis 2, we found partial support across all three countries. An explanation might be that for the kind of role in which a party is portrayed, concrete events are a highly determining factor. Different events, then, cause newspapers to portray the far-right in different roles, while such a strong independent variable is absent for standpoints, as these are more steadier, making it less necessary for journalists to increase the complexity of the far-right media image.

The third hypothesis about quality and popular newspapers concerns support attention. Here again, we found a situation that demands a nuanced and secure interpretation of the outcomes. Quality and popular newspapers turned out to pay about the same level of attention to attitudes of non-far-right actors towards the far-right. Again the coverage of quality papers seemed more complex and detailed, because we did find differences (of varying strength) between quality and popular newspapers in the amount of attention they paid to debate among non-far-right actors about strategies to deal with the far-right. So quality newspapers do have higher levels of support attention, but only on a specific aspect of it. The often difficult discussions between non-far-right stakeholders about the legitimacy and efficiency of their strategies towards the far-right were most prominent in quality papers. More simple favourable or unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right feature in popular newspapers, just as they do in quality newspapers.

Despite the fact that not all hypotheses have been confirmed, we can conclude in general terms that quality newspapers give a broader and more diverse attention to the far-right than popular newspapers. An explanation for the fact that there were no differences in the attention to situated roles is probably that all newspapers have an event-driven reporting style. Attention to situated roles of course depends greatly on the kind of event, while the choice to discuss standpoints in the coverage can be made relatively independently of the news event.

6.3.2 LEFT-LEANING AND RIGHT-LEANING NEWSPAPERS
A second dimension in which we compared newspapers is between left-leaning and right-leaning. Although partisanship of the press has practically disappeared in contemporary democratic corporatist countries, the press is still politicised (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 180). Using media landscape literature, we distinguished between left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers, whereby DE VOLKSRANT, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG and DE MORGEN are left-leaning, while NRC HANDELSBLAD, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, DE STANDAARD, DE TELEGRAAF, BILD and HET LAATSTE NIEUWS are right-leaning newspapers (De Bens, 2001; Ward, 2004). In the analysis we placed more importance on the comparison between the left-leaning quality paper (VK, SDZ, DM) and right-leaning quality paper (NRC, FAZ, DS) than on the comparison between left-leaning (quality) papers and right-leaning popular papers in order not to confuse the two comparative dimensions.
Hypothesis 4 expected more volume and formal attention in left-leaning newspapers. Indeed, all left-leaning newspapers gave more volume attention to the far-right than the right-leaning newspapers. However, differences between Dutch and Flemish newspapers are very small. Moreover, there were no relevant differences between newspaper in formal attention. In conclusion, here too we have to distinguish between volume attention and formal attention. Concerning formal attention the hypothesis is not confirmed. Volume attention differences are relevant, but very small if we leave out the popular papers. This means, we found only weak support for hypothesis 4.

Hypothesis 5 expected more substantial attention in left-leaning than in right-leaning newspapers. Here we focussed especially on roles (H5a), stigmatising associations (H5b) and standpoints (H5c). In terms of roles something interesting shows in the table (Appendix 4.5 and 5.5). Right-leaning newspapers paid more attention to the far-right in roles in political actuality than left-leaning newspapers. On the other hand, left-leaning papers paid slightly (not significant in all cases) more attention to the far-right in legal conflicts and significantly more to roles in extra-parliamentary activity (especially violence). Due to this varying attention preferences H5a cannot simply be rejected, or confirmed. Both left- and right-leaning newspapers apparently have their own specific preferences for particular situated roles, and (or) downplay others. Stigmatising associations were found more in left-leaning newspapers than in right-leaning newspapers, but this difference was only significant for Flemish newspapers (H5b confirmed). Left-leaning newspapers paid more attention to far-right standpoints in general (H5c confirmed). The German SDZ is an exception, however. Looking at the specific standpoints to which left-leaning newspapers paid more attention, we found that especially anti-democratic standpoints and xenophobic-exclusionist standpoints received more attention in Dutch and Flemish left-leaning newspapers.

The statement that left-leaning newspapers not only pay more attention to the far-right, but also to a more diverse range of aspects of the far-right, is too general. Left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers each have their own accents in their reporting on the far-right. Most left-leaning newspapers in this study paid more attention to the most explicitly morally unacceptable features of the far-right - their frequent problems with the law, roles in extra-parliamentary violence and their xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints, while there is slightly more stigmatising in left-leaning newspapers as well. Meanwhile, right-leaning newspapers paid more attention to the far-right in roles in political actuality, which suggests more attention to ‘normal’ roles for political actors (parties), and the possibility that they downplay the morally unacceptable aspects.

Our sixth hypothesis about differences between newspapers expected more support attention in left-leaning than in right-leaning newspapers. Again with the exception of German newspapers, left-leaning newspapers paid more attention to attitudes of non-far-right actors towards the far-right, especially unfavourable attitudes. Debates on dealing with the far-right among non-far-right actors did not feature significantly more in left-leaning than in right-leaning newspapers. Strongest support was found for the hypothesis that left-
leaning newspapers generally pay more attention to unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right than right-leaning newspapers. Again this is a specification of the original hypothesis. All together, this means that we found support for hypothesis 6 concerning attitudes towards the far-right.

In conclusion we can state that left-leaning newspapers pay more attention to the morally unacceptable aspects of the far-right (whether their behaviour or standpoints) than right-leaning newspapers do. Left-leaning newspapers have a more confrontational approach to the subject. They emphasise the morally unacceptable characteristic to explicate their unacceptability.

CONCLUSION
Left-leaning quality papers are slightly more explicit and elaborate on the backgrounds of the far-right than right-leaning quality papers, which in their turn are slightly more explicit and elaborated than right-leaning popular papers. An explanation could be that quality press may be more concerned with its democratic function than popular newspapers, thus putting more effort than popular papers into explaining backgrounds and placing the far-right in perspective. At the same time there is greater ideological distance between left-leaning newspapers (and their audience) and the far-right than between right-leaning newspapers and the far-right. Therefore, left-leaning newspapers pay more attention to unfavourable attitudes towards the far-right and their opposite standpoints. This conclusion agrees with earlier research on political orientations of newspapers (Van der Eijk, 2000: 329). Although we have found relevant distinctions in the media attention of different types of newspapers across national borders, the general impression of the newspapers is that they propagate similar media images, whether popular, quality, left- or right-leaning newspapers. The differences express different accents within a media image rather than different media images. However, this does not mean there are no significant differences between types of newspapers.

**FIGURE 6.10  SUMMARY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NEWSPAPERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Popular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left-leaning</strong></td>
<td>Elaborate</td>
<td>Simple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most explicit</td>
<td>Explicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right-leaning</strong></td>
<td>Elaborate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whereas the same media image in popular newspapers is merely a caricature, in left-leaning newspapers it contains more moralism and in quality newspapers there is more contextualisation and interpretation. So the media image of the far-right in different types of newspapers is not contradictory, but receives different colouring. The explicitness in popular newspapers (Fig 6.10) for example, is caused by strong simplification, while the explicitness in left-leaning (quality) newspapers is caused by the extra investigative efforts they pursued.
6.3.3 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS: MODEST DIVERSITY

In their extensive volume on the relationship between the far-right and the media, Mazzoleni, Steward and Horsfield compare what they call ‘elite’ and ‘tabloid’ newspapers, a distinction that overlaps with our ‘quality’ and ‘popular’ newspapers (2003). Based on several (very different) case studies they conclude that the media “...to various extents, depending on whether elite or tabloid outlets – tend to highlight controversial aspects of the movement” (Steward, Mazzoleni & Horsfield, 2003: 226). But they found distinguishing characteristics of the coverage of the far-right in both kinds of newspapers as well: elite papers report on populists seriously, while tabloids focus on sensationalist aspects, stripped of complex details (Steward, Mazzoleni & Horsfield, 2003: 225; Plasser & Ulram, 2003: 27).

All three national contexts in our study belong to one type of media system; Hallin and Mancini have described it as the democratic-corporatist model (2004: 143). Ideal type democratic-corporatist media systems have partisan media. However, Hallin & Mancini argue convincingly that this is no longer reality in most contemporary democratic-corporatist media systems (ibid 178/9). According to them, this does not mean that media have become neutral. On the contrary, Hallin and Mancini argue that these media are still politicised, just not necessarily along party lines (ibid, 180-183).

We took these findings as a starting point to deepen the analysis of differences in their reporting on the far-right between newspapers. Where Mazzoleni et.al. gathered different case studies, mostly with little or no systematic content analysis and Hallin & Mancini base their arguments on a meta-study, we carried out a systematic content analysis of nine particular newspapers from three countries in order to compare systematically different types of newspapers across national contexts. We found significant differences between types of newspapers within one type of media system, the democratic-corporatist model. This too distinguishes our study from that of Mazzoleni et.al., as they compared across different media systems without really distinguishing them. We thus held two major consistencies in our design - first the measurement of the concept of media attention, and second the media system, which is the most relevant structural factor for our study. This makes the outcomes of our study better comparable within a certain realm, namely other democratic-corporatist media systems.

In their conclusion, Steward, Mazzoleni & Horsfield argue that the case studies in their book confirm their statement that popular newspapers focus on sensational aspects of the far-right and suggest this is to the benefit of far-right leaders, as these adapt their approach to the media in their turn by addressing the same issues (2003, 233). In their analysis, far-right actors, standpoints and issues sometimes blur. The beneficial effect of this particular attention focus of popular papers may be relevant when it concerns political issues and themes that both far-right leaders and popular newspapers like to address - migration and crime. In case of the attention to the far-right parties themselves this is not the case. As far as we found evidence for the assumption that popular newspapers focus their attention on sensational aspects of the far-right, these sensational aspects are
the extremism or deviant behaviour of the far-right, emphasising the controversial media image. The sensational aspects on which newspapers focus concern violent outbursts, internal struggles that are fought in public, or the amateurism of many far-right politicians. For example, the seemingly endless row of news items on dysfunctional MPs, illustrated by this news clip:

“Before the new parliament could start working, one of the DVU MPs withdrew: he did not know he had been candidate for a neo-Nazi party. Other DVU candidates are suspects of possession of illegal arms, battery and illiteracy.”

This means that an analytical distinction has to be made between news on the far-right actors (or the far-right as a political family) and news on political issues ‘owned’ by the far-right (i.e. migration and crime). The attention sensibility for sensational aspects may have contradictory consequences depending on whether a far-right actor (party) or a far-right issue is the subject.

In general terms, different types of newspapers do not express different media images of the far-right. In fact, they are univocal in their evaluation of the far-right (although not necessarily in the same way). Our analysis also confirms the conclusion of Steward, Mazzoleni & Horsfield (2003: 223) that popular newspapers focus more on sensational aspects of the far-right than quality newspapers. However, this is not across the board, but only holds true for specific aspects of the far-right, as we pointed out above. Popular newspapers single out one (sensational) far-right standpoint (xenophobic or exclusionist standpoints), but do not focus on more sensational roles, such as legal conflict or extra-parliamentary violence. Concerning these situated roles, quality and popular newspapers seem to follow a similar media logic (Mazzoleni & Schultz, 1999; Van Praag & Brants, 2006) of concentrating on the extraordinary. Concerning other substantial and support attention aspects, quality newspapers include many more nuances in the media image.

Moreover, our study shows that it is important to distinguish more than one type of newspaper difference. Not only the distinction between quality and popular newspapers showed significant differences in media attention, also Halin & Mancini’s thesis (2004) of continued politicisation of media (despite the decline of political parallelism) in the democratic-corporatist media systems has been confirmed in this study. Left-leaning newspapers emphasise different accents in their coverage of the far-right than right-leaning newspapers do. Political distance between newspaper and subject (the far-right) is relevant for the way the far-right is portrayed in the coverage. The greater the political distance between the newspaper and the far-right, the more explicitly they emphasise the controversial characteristics of the far-right.

6.4 EVALUATION OF THE MODEL OF MEDIA ATTENTION TO THE FAR-RIGHT

The central question of this study is ‘how do newspapers pay attention to the far-right?’ It demanded an analysis with more detail than a mere evaluation of the presence of the far-right in newspaper coverage. Former research on the topic of media coverage of the far-right was mostly focussed on the salience (or volume and formal attention) of far-right actors in the news (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001; Walgrave & de Swert, 2004; Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007). Salience is the common measurement of attention in much agenda setting research (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Kockski, 1993; Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006). Analysing the use of a set of ‘generic frames’ would have been a way to shed light on the angle whereby newspapers view the far-right (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; de Vreese, 2005). As the word ‘generic’ already indicates, this would be a rather rough and unspecified approach, especially, because our central topic is a rather specific political family. Therefore, we choose to develop our own model that is tailored to the purpose of this study. Like Brosius & Eps (1996) who studied the coverage of the extreme right assaults in Germany in the early nineties, we looked specifically at substantial aspects of media attention. Furthermore, we added the aspect of support attention because the portrayal of the far-right in the news happens within a context with other actors that obtain certain positions in relationship to the far-right.

6.4.1 A BETTER GRIP ON MEDIA ATTENTION?

These considerations let us to build a model of media attention to the far-right that consists of four aspects - volume attention, formal attention (both salience), substantial attention (portrayal of far-right actors and standpoints) and support attention (non-far-right-actors’ attitudes towards the far-right).

THE FOUNDATION OF THE MODEL

The substantial and support attention aspects of media attention to the far-right were based on the state of the art in sociological, historical and political science research, more specifically on both sociogenetic and ideological characteristics of the far-right in the contexts of Dutch, German and Flemish politics in the research period. This enabled us to formulate both theoretically and socially relevant variables of media attention to the far-right. Furthermore, this approach ensured the content validity of the model and instrument. Substantial and support attention have been subdivided in multiple dimensions and indicators by which we measured the levels of media attention. These indicators have been designed in order to include all possible variety due to both the longitudinal characteristics of the research project as well as the cross-national characteristics. For example, the support attention issue of ‘debate amongst non-far-right-actors about dealing with the far-right’ was included because such debates have been known to take place at times, especially in Flanders and Germany. In both countries the ‘strategies’ discussed are very different, so we formulated an indicator that would encompass such debate in newspapers from both national contexts.
APPLYING THE MODEL IN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
As has been shown in chapter two, section 4.3, we were able to reach reasonable to high reliability levels for coding based on the model. This means that with considerable coder training and instructions, the model is applicable in empirical research. In reliability tests we found that in one or two original indicators in the instrument there remained some reliability problems. These have been dealt with by either not using them in the analysis, or recoding and retesting them until sufficient levels of reliability were reached. All results of this study can therefore be taken as reliable. This is even more important due to the comparative design of the study. As suggested by Peter & Lauf (2002) language skills and context relevant political knowledge were two important issues for coder selection and training for this study. The levels of reliability show that extra effort in these matter as well as in the coder instructions as in the instrument paid off. Peter & Lauf’s emphasis on contextual knowledge for coders of course is equally important in longitudinal designs as it is in cross-national designs because in both cases coders have to interpret news from other contexts than that closest to the researcher. Maybe their argument is even more important in longitudinal designs than in cross-national ones, because the language and political knowledge issues can be dealt with by using native coders (as we did in this study). However, in longitudinal research designs, even the use of older coders can only partially solve the historical problem, as one cannot totally rely on their memory. Training is thus extra important.

MODEL BENEFITS
The most important test of a model of analysis is the question whether the model produced new relevant information about how the media pay attention to the far-right. As the previous pages convincingly show, the model did produce new and relevant information about the way Dutch, Germany and Flemish media paid attention to the far-right between 1986 and 2004. Apart from volume and formal attention, we could also indicate details on substantial and support attention aspects. The model enabled us to show changes and cross-sectional differences that revealed relevant patterns of media attention to the far-right. It even enabled us to indicate the generally (and cross-nationally) applied media image favoured for use in newspaper coverage - the controversial outsider.

LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL
Although the model answered all demands, there are two points on which improvements can be made. Both concern the substantial aspect of media attention to the far-right.

The dimension of representation now consists of two indicators, an identification of far-right actors and the actual manifest representation form in the news item (passive or active representation). However, these manifest representations can be used with various discursive meanings that are not considered in the model. On the contrary, it assumes that the discursive meaning of, for example a citation, equals the manifest meaning of active representation, no more, no less. An improvement of the model would be to add indicators for this part of the representation dimension in order to get a better grip on the complexity of representation of actors in media texts.
Another relevant supplement to the model would be to not only include attention to predefined far-right standpoints, but also far-right statements about any political issue. This improvement has multiple benefits. First, it would give a more complete image of the topics with which they are involved (and which newspapers find worthy of attention). This becomes increasingly important in contexts where far-right parties have growing numbers of MPs, such as in Flanders, or the last few years in the Dutch case. The second benefit is that possible changes, or paradoxes in standpoints that are reported become visible when both pre-defined far-right standpoints and the mere issues are coded, because this would give insight in the match between the attention to these standpoints and the issue of the standpoint.

CONCLUSION

With our model of media attention to the far-right, it is now possible to review large amounts of media coverage of the far-right in greater detail than previous research has done. The addition of the substantial and support aspects to the analysis of media attention to this political family served the purpose of filling the void in the knowledge about the way media deal with the far-right. Until now, only assumptions were made about the way media pay attention to the far-right. The model enabled us to analyse changes and differences in how newspapers paid attention to the far-right, as well as how much attention has been paid to the far-right by the media. The model served its purpose very well in the empirical studies. It answered all our demands; it delivered unique relevant information on the dynamics of how newspapers reported on the far-right; it was very applicable in systematic-quantitative content analysis and was well-tailored for use in comparative, longitudinal and cross-national research.

6.4.2 FUTURE RESEARCH

So far we have seen that this study delivered valuable results concerning the way newspapers paid attention to the far-right. The study covered a period of 18 years, three national contexts and nine leading newspapers. This does not mean we can generalise the results to an unlimited extent. Concerning the research period, one may wonder, for example, if the exceptional media image in Dutch newspapers in the last election year of the study is an exception, or the prelude to an overall definite change in the media attention to the far-right? It is hard to answer that question with good arguments, although the media image has proven to be quite stable, so a similar change is not necessarily to be expected in other countries.

The model is explicitly rooted in studies on the West-European far-right and has only been applied in countries with a democratic-corporatist media system. Therefore, generalisation of the outcomes of our study should remain within these two limits. Whether the outcomes can be seen as representative for the general situation within these limits, is still a difficult question. As we argued in section 6.1, the German newspaper attention is most likely the exceptional case. It shows that the cultural and historic contexts are very important. The Dutch situation in the new millennium shows that after a political crisis, a change in media attention may very well occur. Together these two conclusions should
be taken into account when generalising the outcomes to other contexts. This means that for West-European countries with a more or less similar media system and no very different cultural and historical contexts (regarding the far-right, or the political system), for example Scandinavian countries or perhaps France, the media attention to the far-right is probably not very different from that in the Flemish and Dutch (pre 2004) newspapers. A future endeavour would therefore be to extend the comparative dimension of this study and include more countries.

Another choice we had to make, which is not without consequences, is to incorporate particular newspapers in our research. We opted for three national daily newspapers with different backgrounds in terms of quality/popular and left-/right-leaning tendencies. We could only research a limited number of newspapers. Therefore we choose to take leading national newspapers which belong to the larger (in terms of print run) newspapers of the country. This choice suited our purpose of analysing trends in the coverage, and differences between countries and those between these particular types of newspapers. For a study on a less aggregated level, a different choice might be more logical. For studies of effects on individual readers for example, regional newspapers might be the better choice as their readership corresponds more closely to the backgrounds of people who are most likely to vote far-right (Bakker & Scholten, 2003: 16). Furthermore, for a more complete study of differences between newspapers, a greater variety of types of newspapers would be recommended, local and regional newspapers should be added, as well as the relatively new category of free newspapers (Bakker, 2007). The category of popular newspapers might also have to be split into popular and tabloid newspapers. In this study we put them together in one category, as they were too few to divide (BILD was the only tabloid), but if the characteristics of BILD are exemplary for tabloid newspapers, tabloids should be treated as a separate category of newspapers in terms of how they cover the far-right. A further investigation of newspaper differences is useful to further develop media system theory and test media logic hypotheses.

Another issue that we have left untouched here is the huge diversity within the far-right political family. As we have seen that precisely the most exceptional (among the rest) party eventually was the one that received a different media image, this may be less of an exception than it seemed. It is not unlikely that different types of far-right parties, as they have been distinguished by i.e. Ignazi (2006), or Fennema (2005) (see also Chapter 1), receive different media attention, which then again may have consequences for their political endeavours. This seems to be a promising research agenda, especially now that particular, often new, far-right parties become electorally successful with new ‘packaging’ of the far-right ideological agenda and also new features. A good example of this development is the rise of the PARTIJ VOOR DE VRIJHEID (PVV) of leader Geert Wilders in the Netherlands. Much of his agenda fits the general far-right agenda (i.e. exclusionism, law & order, nationalism), as does part of the PVV’s sociogenesis (non-democratic structure, voter support), but other features of that party are harder to position (see Davidović et al., 2008: 191-193).
It is not unlikely that research in that direction will find significant differences between coverage of different types of far-right parties and organisations, which would then help to explain variation within and between cultural contexts and time periods.

As this study showed that we have developed a useful model of media attention to the far-right and it has produced interesting outcomes about variety in newspaper attention to the far-right, a next step in the research on the relationship between media attention and the popularity of the far-right would be to incorporate it in agenda setting research. In the current research design it was not possible to do so, as the necessary collection of newspaper articles would be too much work to handle for 9 newspapers over 18 years, of which most material is not digitally available. In a different design with content analysis of both coverage of the far-right and the immigration issue, combined with time series analyses it would be very useful to explain the relationship between newspaper coverage and far-right voting.
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APPENDIX 1
LIST OF PARTY / POLITICAL ORGANISATION NAMES

CD Centrumdemocraten (Centre Democrats, Dutch far-right party)
CP Centrum Partij (Centre Party, Dutch far-right party)
CP'86 Centrum Partij '86 (Centre Party 1986, radical follow up of CP)
CSU Christlich-Soziale Union (Bavarian Christian democratic party)
DVU Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union, German far-right party)
FN Front National (National Front, Walone far-right party)
FAP Freiheitliche Arbeiter Partei (check) (Free Workers Party)
LR Leefbaar Rotterdam (Fortuyn’s local party in Rotterdam)
LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim Fortuyn, national party)
NA Nationale Alliantie (National Alliance, Dutch far-right splinter party)
NNP Nieuwe Nationale Partij (New National Party, Dutch far-right splinter party)
NPD Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
NR Nieuw Rechts (New Right, split off, from LR)
NSDAP-AO National-Socialistische Demokratische Arbeiter Partei – Aufbau Organisation
NVU Nederlandse Volksunie (oldest existing Dutch far-right party)
PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom)
REP Republikaner (Republicans, German far-right party)
VB Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang (Flemish Block/Interest)
Voorpost (Flemish nationalist organisation)
Wiking Jugend (Viking Youth, German Nazi organisation)
APPENDIX 2.1
CIRCULATION OF NEWSPAPERS IN THE THREE COUNTRIES

All circulation figures are from the year 2002 (Ward, 2004).
In all three countries the circulation numbers have decreased during the research period.

Netherlands 4.100.000
Total circulation of daily newspapers 4,100,000. Of which De Telegraaf is responsible for 767,000, De Volkskrant 326,124 and NRC Handelsblad 265,000. De Telegraaf is the largest title in NL. NRC Handelsblad & de Volkskrant are both in the top 5. 45% of newspapers is national.
Sample: 32%

Germany 28,000,000
Almost all of the newspaper sector is regional. 5.5 million copies of a total of 28.7 million are national newspapers. 3.9 million of these is Bild. Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung are second and third with 448,000 and 407,000 copies.
Sample: 15%

Flanders: 1,263,716
Het Laatste Nieuws has a circulation of 314,257 and is the largest newspaper in Flanders, De Standaard is the biggest of the two quality papers in the sample with 93,500 and De Morgen the smallest with 68,359. Top 5 are all regional papers except HLN and Het Volk.
Sample: 37%
APPENDIX 2.2
CODING INSTRUMENT

This is the original instrument excluding the items not used in this study.

Waarnemingsinstrument project ‘extreemrechts in de pers’
Versie 9.2 (25-05-07)
© Pytrik Schafrad

Dit is het waarnemingsinstrument voor het onderzoek naar de veranderingen, verschillen en overeenkomsten van/tussen berichtgeving over extreemrechts in landelijke dagbladen in Nederland, Duitsland en Vlaanderen. Het onderzoek is ingesteld naar aanleiding van aanwijzingen van andere onderzoekers, dat er een relatie bestaat tussen berichtgeving over extreemrechts in dagbladen en kiesgedrag, ofwel de populariteit van extreemrechtse partijen. Het onderzoek bestaat uit twee complementaire delen: een systematische inhoudsanalyse en een nadere kwalitatieve analyse van de inhoud van de berichten. Dit waarnemingsinstrument is t.b.v. de inhoudsanalyse. Onderzoekseenheden zijn krantenberichten waarin extreemrechts op enige wijze aan de orde wordt gesteld.

Het instrument (codeboek) bestaat uit vijf secties. Het eerste deel heeft betrekking op de algemene kenmerken van het bericht, zoals de plaats in de krant en de omvang. Het tweede, derde en vierde deel gaan over de inhoud van de artikelen. In het tweede deel worden vragen gesteld over de (extreemrechtse) actoren (met vragen over hun rol t.o.v. die van anderen). In het derde deel staan andere actoren centraal en in het vierde deel gaan we in op de ideologische thema’s van extreemrechts. Het vijfde deel is bedoeld om het algemeen karakter van het artikel te bepalen.

De werkwijze voor het toepassen van dit instrument is als volgt:
1. LEES HET BERICHT NOG NIET, registreer eerst de globale berichtkenmerken (item 1 tot en met 10);
2. Lees het totale bericht en beantwoord pas daarna de resterende items (11-34). Gebruik een markeerstift om relevante informatie die je al lezend tegen komt te markeren.
3. Zet de vraagnummers bij het tekstdeel waarop je het antwoord op de vraag baseert en lever de artikelen ook weer in.
4. Voer je coderingen na het lezen en markeren van het krantenbericht in met behulp van In-Data. Houdt daarbij constant dit codeboek erbij.
5. Noteer twijfelgevallen en onduidelijkheden en raadpleeg zonodig de onderzoeker.

♦ CODEUR IDENTIFICATIE

1. Codeurnummer (vul hier het aan jou toegekende codeurnummer in)
   <Var001, codeurnr>
1. **BERICHTKENMERKEN**

1.1 **IDENTIFICATIE ANALYSEEENHEID (HET KRANTENBERICHT)**

2. **Volgnummer.** Wat is het volgnummer dat rechts bovenaan het artikel is geschreven? <Var002, volgnr>

Het nummer ziet er bij voorbeeld zo uit: DM99-024, SDZ94BT-103, of NRC86-261.

1.2 **IDENTIFICATIE VAN HET DAGBLAD**

3. **Dagbladtitel:** Wat is de naam van de krant? <Var003, naamkrant>
   01. = De Morgen (DM);
   02. = De Standaard (DS);
   03. = Het Laatste Nieuws (HLN);
   04. = De Volkskrant (VK);
   05. = De Telegraaf (DTG);
   06. = NRC Handelsblad (NRC);
   07. = Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ);
   08. = Süddeutsche Zeitung (SDZ);
   09. = Bild (Bild);
   10. = Gazet van Antwerpen (GvA);
   11. = Nieuwsblad (NB).

4. **Datum** waarop het artikel is verschenen. <Var004, datum>
   Dag – Maand – Jaar

5. **Dag** waarop het artikel is verschenen. Wanneer dit niet aangegeven staat op het artikel, maak dan gebruik van de kalender in bijlage 8. <Var005, dag>
   01. = Maandag
   02. = Dinsdag
   03. = Woensdag
   04. = Donderdag
   05. = Vrijdag
   06. = Zaterdag

1.3 **UITERLIJKE KENMERKEN VAN HET BERICHT**

6. **Plaats in de krant:** Staat het artikel op de voorpagina van de krant? <Var006, plaats>
   00. = Nee
   01. = Ja
   02. = Onbekend
7. **Omvang** van het bericht: Hoe groot is het bericht? <Var007, omvang>

7a. Geef voor *alle* berichten aan in welke van de onderstaande vier categorieën het bericht past:

01. = Klein.

02. = Midden.
   151-400 woorden. Foto’s en illustraties tellen niet mee. Middenlange berichten uit het Lexus-Nexus of Mediargus archief zijn minimaal een halve en maximaal tot 1 pagina tekst. Indien het exacte aantal woorden op het bericht is aangegeven neem je dat als uitgangspunt.

03. = Groot.
   Berichten 400-800 woorden. Foto’s en illustraties tellen niet mee. Grote geprinte berichten uit het Lexus-Nexus of Mediargus archief zijn meer dan één pagina tekst. Indien het exacte aantal woorden op het bericht is aangegeven neem je dat als uitgangspunt.

04. = Zeer groot.
   Berichten langer dan 800 woorden. Foto’s en illustraties tellen niet mee. Grote geprinte berichten uit het Lexus-Nexus of Mediargus archief zijn ongeveer 2 pagina’s tekst of langer. Indien het exacte aantal woorden op het bericht is aangegeven neem je dat als uitgangspunt.

7b. Geef indien vermeld op de afdruk van het krantenbericht het exacte aantal woorden aan (open vraag). Indien het exacte aantal woorden onbekend is vul je nul in <0>.

8. Wordt in de *kop* duidelijk gemaakt dat het artikel gaat over *extreemrechts*?
   <Var008, erinkop>

00. = Nee

01. = Ja
   Er worden in de kop, of ondertitel (deze kan soms ook boven de hoofdkop staan) direct aan extreemrechts gerelateerde termen gebruikt. Bij voorbeeld een partijnaam, of de naam van een publiek bekend extreemrechts individu of een rechtstreekse verwijzing (neonazi, skinheads racisten, etc.). Zie *bijlage 1* voor de namen van partijen en *bijlage 2* voor publiek bekende extreemrechtse individuen (NB. Deze lijsten zijn niet uitputtend).
2. EXTREEMRECHTSE ACTOREN EN DE Rol VAN EXTREEMRECHTS IN HET BERICHT

2.1 EXTREEMRECHTSE ACTOREN

Voor het onderzoek zijn een aantal partijen specifiek geïdentificeerd als extreemrechts. Meestal op basis van hun ideologie, soms ook op basis van hun sociogenese. Over de aanwezigheid van deze partijen gaan de vragen 11-12. Wanneer het gaat om het herkennen van partijen, organisaties en groepen die niet bij de vragen 11-12 of in bijlage 1-2 genoemd worden dienen de volgende vragen als richtlijn:

- Wordt de betreffende actor expliciet als extreemrechts aangeduid?
- Bezigt de betreffende actor extreemrechtse standpunten? (bijlage 3: extreemrechtse standpunten);
- Bezigent de aanhang en/of leden van de actor extreemrechtse standpunten?

Indien op een of meer van deze vragen bevestigend antwoord gegeven kan worden dient de betreffende actor als extreemrechts geduid te worden bij een van de vragen 11-14.

11. Komen er een of meerdere extreemrechtse actoren op enigerlei wijze voor in het artikel? <Var011, eractor>

Een extreemrechtse acteur is een politieke partij (bij voorbeeld Vlaams Belang), politicus (bij voorbeeld Constant Kusters, of Phillip Dewinter), andere extreemrechtse organisatie (bij voorbeeld Blood & Honour), of een niet officieel georganiseerde groep (bij voorbeeld een groepje nazi-skinheads), of een expliciet als extreemrechts aangeduid individu (niet behorend tot een van bovenstaande actoren). Voor een lijst van politieke partijen, politici en organisaties zie bijlage 1.

00. = Nee;
01. = Ja zij wordt/worden alleen genoemd;
02. = Ja zij wordt/worden geparafaseerd;
D.w.z. de auteur van het artikel omschrijft met eigen woorden het gedachtengoed, of uitlatingen van de extreemrechtse acteur(en).
03. = Ja zij wordt/worden geciteerd;
D.w.z. letterlijke teksten uit publicaties of uitspraken worden herkenbaar (met aanhalingstekens) aangehaald of overgenomen in de tekst van het artikel;

12. Wat is de naam van de extreemrechtse acteur(en) die in het bericht voorkomt/komen? Gebruik bij partijen de afkorting zoals hieronder aangeven. In het geval dat het een politicus betreft, noem je de naam van de partij waar hij of zij bij hoort.

Centrumdemocraten (CD), Centrumpartij '86 (CP’86), Centrumpartij (CP), Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU), Nederlands Blok (NB), Nieuwe Nationale Partij (NNP), Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), Leefbaar Rotterdam (LR) (let op, andere leefbaren horen hier niet bij!), Nieuw Rechts (NR), Republikaner (REP), Deutsche Volksunion (DVU), Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), Partei Rechtstaatliche Offensieve (PRO), Schill Partei (Schill), Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang (VB), Front Nationale (FN).
2.2 DE ROL VAN EXTREEMRECHTS
De volgende vragen gaan in op de rol die extreemrechts in het artikel vervult. Zij kan bijvoorbeeld partij zijn in een juridisch geschil, deelnemer aan verkiezingen, of partij zijn in een debat over een onderwerp dat op de agenda van het parlement staat. Binnen een artikel kan zij ook een combinatie van twee of meer van die rollen vervullen. Wanneer verschillende extreemrechtse actoren voorkomen in het artikel en deze verschillende rollen vervullen telt bij deze vragen (13-18) het aantal verschillende rollen dat zij tezamen vervullen, los van de vraag welke actor precies welke rol vervult. Het gaat dus om de verschillende rollen die voorkomen in het bericht.

13. **Rol verkiezingen.** Vervult extreemrechts in het artikel een rol als deelnemer aan de verkiezingen? Dit is bij voorbeeld het geval wanneer het bericht (delen van) verkiezingsprogramma’s behandeld, gaat over opiniepeilingen, campagnes, uitslagen, de kabinetsformatie of verkiezingsbijeenkomsten. <Var013, rolverki>
   00 = Nee.
   01 = Ja.

14. **Rol politieke actualiteit.** Vervult extreemrechts in het artikel een rol als deelnemer aan de politieke actualiteit, d.w.z. *in het primaire* politieke proces. Dit is het geval als er een onderwerp op de beleidsagenda van politieke instellingen zoals het parlement, gemeentebestuur of ministerraad is waar een extreemrechtse partij zich over uitspreekt, of deelneemt aan een politiek debat (‘een nieuwe asielwet wordt voorgelegd aan het parlement’, of ‘partij x wil dat de gemeente hangjongeren strenger gaat aanpakken’)? <var014, rolpolac>
   00 = Nee.
   01 = Ja.

15. **Rol juridisch geschil.** Vervult extreemrechts een rol als partij in een juridisch geschil? Arrestaties, rechtzaken en veroordelingen door een rechter behoren hiertoe. Bij voorbeeld wanneer een extreemrechtse politicus veroordeeld wordt wegens racisme, of criminele activiteiten zoals drugshandel. <Var015, roljusti>
   00 = Nee.
   01 = Ja.

16. **Rol extraparlementair.** Vervult extreemrechts een rol in buitenparlementaire activiteiten? Bij deze vraag onderscheiden we een drietal soorten buitenparlementaire activiteit <Var016, rolexpar>
   00 = Nee.
   01 = Ja, in gewelddadige (racistische) activiteiten;
   (bij voorbeeld het plegen van aanslagen)
   02= Ja, in rellen of confrontatie met politie of politieke tegenstanders;
   03= Ja, in geweldloze buitenparlementaire activiteiten.;
   Bij voorbeeld vreedzame demonstraties en ludieke acties.
17. **Rol intern.** Vervult extreemrechts in het artikel een rol in ontwikkelingen en gebeurtenissen binnen extreemrechtse kringen? Bijvoorbeeld een partijcongres, of een ruzie tussen partijleden. <Var017, rolinter>

00 = Nee.
01 = Ja, in een positieve interne gebeurtenis (partijcongres, lijsttrekkerverkiezing, de leden-parij).
02 = Ja, in een negatieve interne gebeurtenis (ruzies, intriges, partij splitsingen).

18. **Andere rol extreemrechts.** Vervult extreemrechts een andere rol dan die genoemd zijn bij de vragen 13 tot en met 17? Beantwoord deze vraag alleen bevestigend als je kunt beredeneren waarom de rol bij geen enkele van bovenstaande rollen past. <Var018, rolander>

00 = Nee;
01 = Ja.
3. NIET-EXTREEMRECHTSE ACTOREN EN HUN VERHOUDING MET EXTREEMRECHTS

3.1 NIET EXTREEMRECHTSE ACTOREN
De volgende vragen gaan over niet-extreemrechtse actoren die eventueel voorkomen (een rol spelen) in het artikel. Dat kunnen zowel politieke partijen, politici, maatschappelijke organisaties, sociale bewegingen, overheidsorganisaties, of anonieme en naamloze groepen/organisaties, dan wel burgers al dan niet in hun rol als kiezer zijn. Het gaat bij deze vragen niet om het al dan niet voorkomen van de actoren in het bericht, maar om de vraag welke herkenbare (en dus expliciet aanwijsbare) houding ten opzichte van extreemrechts zij hebben.

19. **Positieve attitudes.** Komen er in het artikel een of meerdere niet-extreemrechtse actoren aan het woord, of wordt hun standpunt over een bepaald onderwerp naast of tegenover dat van extreemrechts gezet op dus danige wijze, dat dit duidt op een positieve attitude ten opzichte van extreemrechts, of een extreemrechts standpunt? 
   Er is sprake van een positieve houding t.o.v. extreemrechts wanneer de betreffende de niet-extreemrechtse actor een zelfde of soortgelijk standpunt inneemt als extreemrechts (in het artikel),
   of op een andere manier steun betuigt aan extreemrechts;
   00. = Nee. **GA DAN VERDER met vraag 21.**
   01. = Ja.

21. **Negatieve attitudes.** Komen er in het artikel een of meerdere niet-extreemrechtse actoren aan het woord, of wordt hun standpunt over een bepaald onderwerp naast of tegenover dat van extreemrechts gezet op dus danige wijze, dat dit duidt op een negatieve attitude ten opzichte van extreemrechts, of een extreemrechts standpunt? 
   Er is sprake van een negatieve attitude is wanneer de betreffende de niet-extreemrechtse actor een tegengesteld standpunt heeft ten opzichte van dat van extreemrechts (in het artikel), of op een andere manier extreemrechts of haar standpunt verwerpt, of ontkracht. Bij voorbeeld ook in het geval een rechter een extreemrechtse actor veroordeeld/schuldig bevindt, dan wel deze expliciet verdacht wordt van een strafbaar feit (niet bij enkel een arrestatie of onderzoek naar eventuele feiten);
   00. = Nee. **GA DAN VERDER met vraag 23.**
   01. = Ja.

3.2 VERHOUDING EXTREEMRECHTS – NIET EXTREEMRECHTS ALS ONDERWERP VAN DISCUSSIE IN HET BERICHT.

23. Is de manier waarop niet extremrechtse actoren om gaan, of zouden moeten gaan met extreemrechts onderwerp van discussie voor de actoren in het artikel? Is een z.g. cordon sanitaire, samenwerking, partijverbod, demonstratieverbod, of een ander manier van omgaan met, of bestrijding van extreemrechts onderwerp van discussie? 
   00 = Nee;
   01 = Ja.
4. **IDEOLOGISCHE Thema’s VAN EXTREEMRECHTS IN HET ARTIKEL**

Hoewel de term extreemrechts een grote variëteit aan partijen en organisaties dekt, die verschillen in standpunten en mate van radicaliteit, zijn er wel degelijk een aantal ideologische kernthema’s aan te wijzen die tot het extreemrechts gedachtegoed behoren. Met de volgende vragen wordt de aanwezigheid van die thema’s in het artikel getoetst. Zie bij twijfel ook bijlage 3 waarop een toelichting op de extreemrechtse issues staat.

24. **Antiprogressief.** Komt het thema antiprogressief voor in het bericht, of is er sprake van antiprogressieve uitspraken? <Var024 antiprog>
   00. = Nee;
   01. = Ja.
   In het bericht komt het thema antiprogressief aan de orde doordat een van de volgende termen vermeld staat, of een omschrijving daarvan: antifeminisme, tegen emancipatie, anticommunisme, of er is sprake van antiprogressieve, of antilinkse uitspraken, bijvoorbeeld in termen van bestrijding van volksvijandige elementen.

25. **Antidemocratisch.** Komt het thema antidemocratisch voor in het bericht, of is er sprake van antidemocratische uitspraken? <Var25 antidem>
   00. = Nee;
   01. = Ja.
   In het bericht komt het thema antidemocratisch aan de orde doordat een van de volgende termen vermeld staat, of een omschrijving daarvan: afschaffen of beperken van het democratisch systeem, autoritaire staat, sterke leider, of een explicitering van een hiërarchisch systeem waarbinnen vrije verkiezingen en stemrecht sterk of geheel beperkt worden.

26. **Populisme algemeen.** Komt het thema Populisme of anti-establishment voor in het bericht? <Var026, popalg>
   00. = Nee;
   01. = Ja.
   In het bericht komt het thema populisme aan de orde doordat een van de volgende termen vermeld staat, of een omschrijving daarvan: populisme, populistisch, opportunisme, proteststem, anti-partij, anti-establishment, regenten, ‘de haagse kaasstolp’, het centraal stellen van gevoelens die onder het volk ‘leven’, of doordat er op een andere wijze blijk wordt gegeven van het tegen de politieke elite zijn.
27. **Nationalisme.** Komt het thema nationalisme voor in het bericht?

   <Var027, national>

00. = Nee;
01. = Ja.

In het bericht komt het thema nationalisme aan de orde doordat een van de volgende termen vermeld staat, of een omschrijving daarvan: etnisch nationalisme, staatsnationalisme, nationalisme, ijerbedevaart, Vlaamse beweging, communautair, splitsing sociale zekerheid, Vlaamse onafhankelijkheid, of nationaal socialisme. Nationalisme wil zeggen dat een Volk en haar (vermeende, vaak homogene) identiteit centraal worden gesteld.

28. **Xenofobie algemeen.** Komt het thema xenofobie voor in het bericht?

   <Var029, xenoalg>

00. = Nee;
01. = Ja.

Xenofobie is de angst voor andere bevolkingsgroepen. In het bericht komt het thema xenofobie (vreemdelingenhaat) aan de orde doordat een van de volgende termen vermeld staat, of een omschrijving daarvan: xenofobie, vreemdelingenhaat, racisme, fascisme, discriminatie, apartheid, antisemitisme, of een angst voor gastarbeiders, asielzoekers, illegalen, buitenlanders, moslims, migranten, sans papiers. Bijvoorbeeld uitspraken in termen van ‘volksvreemde’ elementen, of in programmapunten zoals het 70 puntenplan van het Vlaams Blok, en partijleuzen als ‘vol is vol’ of ‘eigen volk eerst’.

29. **Exclusionisme algemeen.** Komt het thema exclusionisme voor in het bericht?

   <Var029, exclualg>

00. = Nee;
01. = Ja.

Exclusionisme = de actieve uitsluiting (of het (beleids-)voornemen daartoe) van andere bevolkingsgroepen. Zijn uitsluitingsideologieën, uitsluitingsplannen of beleid of de concrete uitsluiting van gastarbeiders, asielzoekers, illegalen, buitenlanders, moslims, migranten, sans papiers onderwerp in het bericht? Bij voorbeeld de uitsluiting van een van deze groepen (‘grenzen dicht voor asielzoekers’, ‘geen migrantenstemrecht’),

30. **Law & order algemeen.** Komt het thema law & order voor in het bericht?

   <Var030, lawalg>

00. = Nee;
01. = Ja.

In het bericht komt het thema law & order aan de orde doordat een van de volgende termen vermeld staat, of een omschrijving daarvan: sterke staat, ‘meer blauw op straat, ‘zero tolerance’ beleid, criminaliteitsbestrijding, veiligheid als issue, of doordat op andere wijze de nadruk op orde en gezag wordt gelegd.
Traditionele waarden algemeen. Komt het thema traditionele waarden voor in het bericht? <Var031, tradwtalg>

00. = Nee;
01. = Ja.

In het bericht komt het thema traditionele waarden aan de orde, bij voorbeeld door een van de volgende standpunten vermeld staat, of een omschrijving daarvan: tegen abortus, tegen het homohuwelijk, tegen euthanasie, het gezin als hoeksteen van de samenleving, of in termen als: gezinspolitiek, ‘de ethische partij’. Meestal gaat het hier inderdaad om ethische kwesties. Wanneer het politieke ideologieën betreft, valt dit onder vraag 27 ‘anti-progressief’.
5. EXTREEMRECHTS ALGEMEEN

32. **Extreemrechts expliciet.** Wordt in het artikel het thema extreemrechts als zodanig benoemd op een manier dat de extreemrechtse actor als stereotype extreemrechts wordt neergezet? Wordt er in het artikel expliciet gemaakt dat de lezer hier te doen heeft met extreemrechts? Wordt de lezer daar op geattendeerd door expliciete terminologie? <Var032, extrrech>

| 00. = | Nee; |
| 01. = | Ja. |

In het artikel komt minstens 1 keer een van de volgende termen (of een verbuiging ervan) voor: extreemrechts, rechtsradicaal, nationaal-socialisme, (neo-) nazi, bruinhemden, skinhead, lonsdale jongere, rechtse extremist, of een andere duidelijke term, of rechtstreekse verwijzing naar Nazi-Duitsland (1933-1945). Impliciete verwijzingen, of alleen het noemen van namen van partijen of individuen leiden tot het antwoord ‘Nee’.

33. **Prominente plaats.** Is extreemrechts in het bericht het belangrijkste thema, of vervult het de rol van hoofdrolspeler of centraal onderwerp in de narratieve structuur? De hoofdrolspeler is de belangrijkste actor in de verhaallijn. In de literatuur ook wel de drager van het (nieuws)verhaal genoemd. <Var033, prominent>

| 00. = | Nee; |
| 01. = | Ja. |

34. **Titel.** Hoe luidt precies de titel van het bericht? <Var034, titel>

Geef eerst de titel en dan de ondertitel. Onderscheidt titel en ondertitel door een punt (.) Als het onderscheid niet duidelijk is, neem dan de groots weergeven titel op als titel en de kleiner afgedrukte titel (zowel boven als onder de hoofdtitel weergegeven) als ondertitel. Indien in LNA en Mediargus materiaal dit onderscheid is weggevallen de chronologische volgorde aanhouden.
BIJLAGEN CODEERINSTRUCTIE
Waarnemingsinstrument ‘Extreemrechts in de pers’ V9.1 (Dld)

Mei 2007

Inhoud:
1. Extreemrechtse partijen
2. Extreemrechtse politici
3. Extreemrechtse standpunten
4. Politieke partijen (progressief, liberaal, conservatief)
5. Overzichtje verkiezingsdata BT en EP
6. Overzicht relevante gebeurtenissen rond de verschillende verkiezingsjaren

Losse bijlagen:
7. InData instructie ‘invoeren’ (je kunt ook de gehele handleiding downloaden van de website van het RTOG http://www.socsci.kun.nl/rtog/
8. Kalenders t.b.v. coderen van dag: item 5 in het codeboek —>
   Ook op je computer op te vragen als je bijvoorbeeld beschikt over ‘Outlook’.
Bijlage 1 – Extreemrechtse partijen

Dit overzicht is niet volledig, doch alle relevante, in parlementen vertegenwoordigde partijen zijn opgenomen, plus enkele anderen.

1. Nederland
   - Centrumdemocraten (CD).
   - Centrum Partij (CP) – wordt in 1986 opgeheven en opgevolgd door CD en CP’86.
   - Centrum Partij ’86 (CP’86) – wordt in 1998 verboden.
   - Nieuwe Nationale Partij (NNP) – kan gezien worden als opvolger van CP’86.
   - Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU) – oudste extreemrechtse partij in Nederland.
   - Nederlands Blok (NB) – lokale Utrechse partij.
   - Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) – populistische partij met enkele extreemrechtse kenmerken.
   - Leefbaar Nederland (LN) – populistische partij met enkele extreemrechtse kenmerken.
   - Leefbaar Rotterdam (LR) – populistische partij waarmee Fortuyn in 2002 de Rotterdamse gemeenteraadsverkiezingen won. Onafhankelijk van LN.
   - Conservatieven.nl – afspilting van LPF.
   - Nieuw Rechts (NR) – lokale Rotterdamse partij, afspilting van Leefbaar Rotterdam
   - Groep Wilders – afspilting van de conservatief-liberale VVD.
   - Boerenpartij – partij van boer Koekkoek die vanaf de jaren vijftig tot begin jaren zeventig in het parlement zetelde.

2. Vlaanderen
   - Vlaams Blok (VB) – wordt in 2004 gedwongen haar naam te veranderen.
   - Vlaams Belang (VB) – nieuwe naam Vlaams Blok.
   - Front National – Waalse extreemrechtse partij.

3. Duitsland
   - Republikaner (REP) – met name actief in zuid Duitsland.
   - Deutsche Volksunion (DVU) – partij van extreemrechtse uitgever.
   - Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) – meest traditionele extreemrechtse partij in Duitsland.
   - Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat – zeer kleine partij die meestal niet meedoet aan nationale verkiezingen.
   - Partei Rechtsstaatliche Offensive (PRO) – populistische partij, aanvankelijk onder leiding van Schill.
   - Schill Partei – populistische partij rond voormalig strafrechter Schill.

4. Andere Europese landen
   - Front National (FN) – Frankrijk
   - British National Party (BNP) – Verenig Koninkrijk
   - Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) – Oostenrijk
### Bijlage 2 – Extreemrechtse politici

Supplement behorende bij het codeboek van het project ‘extreemrechts in de pers’
Bij vraag 11-13

NB: Deze lijst is niet volledig

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Nederland</th>
<th>2. Vlaanderen</th>
<th>3. Duitsland</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Hans Janmaat (CD)</td>
<td>Karel Dillen (VB)</td>
<td>Rolf Schlierer (REP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wil Schuurmans (CD)</td>
<td>Gerolf Annemans (VB)</td>
<td>Franz Schönhuber (REP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wim Beaux (CD/CP'86)</td>
<td>Filip Dewinter (VB)</td>
<td>Udo Voigt (NPD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martijn Freling (CP’86)</td>
<td>Frank Vanhecke (VB)</td>
<td>Gerhard Frey (DVU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joop Glimmerveen (NVU)</td>
<td>Filip Deman (VB)</td>
<td>Roland Schill (Schill Partei / PRO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant Kusters (CP’86/NVU)</td>
<td>Alexandra Colen (VB)</td>
<td>Deckert (NPD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michiel Smit (NR)</td>
<td>Francis van den Eynde (VB)</td>
<td>Mußgnug (NPD)</td>
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<td>Wim Vreeswijk (NB)</td>
<td>Johan Demol (VB)</td>
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<td>Mark Hoogstra (NNP)</td>
<td>Anke van der Meer (VB)</td>
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<td>Tim Mudde</td>
<td>Marie-Roos Morel (VB)</td>
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<td>Hilbrand Nawijn (LPF)</td>
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<td>Marcel Rütten (Voorpost)</td>
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Appendices

Bijlage 3 – Extreemrechtse standpunten

Supplement behorende bij het codeboek van het project ‘extreemrechts in de pers’ bij sectie 2.1 (vraag 11-13). NB: Deze lijst is niet volledig en geeft enkel aan hoe standpunten kunnen voorkomen.

- Politieke attitudes

1. Populisme
Opportunistisch, zegt als enige wel namens het gewone volk te spreken en te weten wat er onder de mensen leeft. Tegen de politieke elite. Populisme kan onderscheiden worden in populistische standpunten (tegen het establishment, het geleefde belang van het volk voor op stellen) en een politieke attitude waarin een opportunistische stijl (het verkondigen van eenvoudige directe oplossingen voor maatschappelijke problemen etc.). Veelal gaan beide samen.

2. Antiprogressief
Zeer anticommunistisch, antifeministisch, actief en expliciet tegen progressieve politieke bewegingen (vaak in termen van ‘volksvijanden’) en gedachtegoed in het algemeen, vaak antidemocratisch. Deze en de xenofobe standpunten gaan vaak gepaard met complotdenken.

3. Antidemocratisch
Tegen het systeem van parlementaire vertegenwoordiging, of voor inperking daarvan. Tegen persvrijheid, of voor inperking daarvan. Voorstanders van een systeem met een sterke (absolute) leider.

- Ideologische standpunten met betrekking tot etnische relaties

3. Nationalisme
Blut und Bodem ideeën; Etniciteit gebonden aan territorium. Een voorbeeld is het Vlaams nationalism, of de ‘grootduitse gedachte’. Het belang van het aan een expliciet territorium gebonden volk staat voorop.

4. Xenofobie
Angst voor of haat tegen andere dan de eigen groepen, in het bijzonder etnische groepen, of vreemde religies. Ook wel in termen van het ‘volksvreemde’. Men is bij voorbeeld bang dat ‘moslims de boel hier overnemen’, of ‘Marokkanen hier straks in de meerderheid zijn’.

5. Exclusionisme
Uitsluiten van bepaalde groepen van delen van de samenleving, burgerrechten e.d.
Bij voorbeeld: Grenzen dicht voor asielzoekers, geen stemrecht voor migranten of homoseksuelen uitsluiten van het huwelijksrecht.

- Conservatieve standpunten

6. Law & Order
Sterke staat, militarisme (geldt meestal alleen voor traditionele extreemrechtse partijen), represieve houden t.o.v. criminaliteit (zware straffen, doodstraf, ‘three strikes and you are out’).

7. Traditionele waarden
Het gezin centraal, (mannelijk) kostwinnerschap, tegen abortus en euthanasie, tegen het homohuwelijk, adoptie door homoparen en vaak ook openlijk discriminerend tegenover homoseksuelen in het algemeen.
Bijlage 4 – Politieke Partijen

Supplement behorende bij het codeboek van het project ‘extreemrechts in de pers’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nederland</th>
<th>Vlaanderen (inclusief Waalse partijen)</th>
<th>Duitsland</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>Progressief</strong></td>
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<td>Socialistische Partij – Anders (SP-A) Partij van de Arbeid Ecolo Parti Socialiste (PS) Spirit Agalev Groen! Vivant</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conservatief/Confessioneel</strong></td>
<td>Christen Democratisch Appel (CDA), Christen Unie (CU), Gereformeerde Volkspartij (GVP), Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie (RPF), Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)</td>
<td>Christendemocratisch en Vlaams (CD&amp;V) Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie (NV-A) Volkspartij (VU) centrum democratie Humaniste (cdH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberaal</strong></td>
<td>Democraten ’66 (D’66), Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)</td>
<td>Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (VLD) Mouvement Reformerateur (MR) PRL FDF</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Andere partijen (bij voorbeeld lokaal)</strong></td>
<td>Leefbaar ... (plaatsnaam) Dorpsbelangen Ouderenpartij/Unie 55+ AOV (Algemeen Ouderen Verbond) Europa Transparant</td>
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APPENDIX 2.3
RELATIVITY

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<th>π</th>
<th>German case (n 186)</th>
<th>Holsti</th>
<th>π</th>
<th>Flemish case (n 156)</th>
<th>Holsti</th>
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<td>0.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debate about dealing with the far-right</td>
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<td>0.84</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
THE SPPS MATRIX USED TO CALCULATE RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS WAS DEVELOPED BY PIETER VAN GROENENSTIJN. THIS VERSION IS APPLICABLE IN SPSS 15.

set printback none.

/*---------------------------------------------------------------.

define !coder3 (!pos !tokens(1) / !pos !tokens(1)).
dataset name pietje.

AUTORECODE
   VARIABLES=I1 I2 /INTO @newvar1 @newvar2
   /GROUP
   /PRINT.
VAR LEVEL @newvar2 @newvar1 (ORDINAL).
OMS
   /SELECT TABLES
   /IF SUBTYPES = ["Custom Table"]
   /DESTINATION FORMAT = SAV
       OUTFILE = “C:\temp\outputfile_oms.sav”.
* Custom Tables.
CTABLES
   /VLABELS VARIABLES= @newvar2 @newvar1 DISPLAY=DEFAULT
   /TABLE @newvar1 [COUNT F40.0] BY @newvar2
   /CATEGORIES VARIABLES= @newvar2 @newvar1 ORDER=A KEY=VALUE
   EMPTY=INCLUDE.
OMSEND.
match files file = *
   /drop @newvar1 @newvar2.

GET FILE="C:\temp\outputfile_oms.sav" /DROP=Command_ TO Var2.
MATRIX.
get mat /file=*.
compute nkol = ncol(mat).
compute nrij = nrow(mat).

DO IF ((nrij = 1) AND (nkol = 1)).
compute holsti = 1.
compute pi = 1.
compute kappa = 1.
compute alpha = 1.
else.
compute rowa = rsum(mat).
compute rowb = t(csum(mat)).
compute k = ncol(mat).
compute abmean = (rowa+rowb)/2.
compute n = csum(rowa).
compute expk = trace((rowa*t(rowb)/(n*n))).
compute exps = trace((abmean*t(abmean)/(n*n))).
compute agr = trace(mat).
compute holsti = trace(mat)/n.
compute pi = (holsti-exps)/(1-exps).
compute kappa = (holsti-expk)/(1-expk).
compute rowab=rowa+rowb.
compute pmt=(msum(rowab*t(rowab))-trace(rowab*t(rowab)))/2.
compute pfu= n-agr.
compute alpha = 1 - (((2*n)-1)*(pfu/pmt)).
END IF.

** print results **.

print /title = "coder reliability".
compute agre = {holsti; pi; kappa; alpha}.
print agre /title = " /rlabels = "Holsti" "Scott pi" "Kappa" "Alpha" /format = F10.4.
end matrix.

dataset activate pietje.

dataset close pietje.
!enddefine

/*-----------------------------------------------*/
APPENDIX 2.4
PROTOCOL SELECTION RELEVANT ARTICLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General</th>
<th>Applied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Developing a keyword list</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Derive overview relevant characteristics of central themes of research from theoretical framework and from a random sample of newspaper articles in order to guarantee theoretical and empirical relevance. Define key concepts and synonyms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operationalisation in keyword list (first version).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Test productivity and selectivity of the keyword list by applying to one or more small samples.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Second version.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Repeat testing until the list of key words has reached a sufficient level of productivity and selectivity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Carry out a search with the keyword list in a electronic data source and compare outcomes to a paper search. If the paper search does not reveal relevant articles that have not been found with the keyword list, the keyword list is ready for application.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Final version.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **B. Selection of the articles/sampling** | | |
| 1. Carry out a search within the set time period and newspaper title with the complete keyword list. When searching paper or MF data, scan headlines, leads and then paragraphs for key words. | • Electronic: type in the keywords in ‘search term’ box and define title and dates; |
| | • Paper/MF: Scan pages of the newspapers in the given time period for the keywords. |
| 2. Save the resulting rough selection. | • Electronic: There is an option for downloading the selection; |
| | • Paper/MF: Print/copy the selected articles. |
| 3. Scan the rough selection by hand, delete irrelevant articles based on explicated criteria: | Exclude for example articles found: |
| • the delineation of newspaper sections | • With a last name of a politician that appears to deal with another person with the same name; |
| • topic relevance | • Lists of (chosen) MP candidates; |
| • possible included disambiguities | • Foreign news covering other countries then the Netherlands, Belgium or Germany; |
| • case specific criteria (for example related to critical events) | • Articles from the literature sections (book reviews); |
| | • Articles from the culture and leisure sections: CD reviews (especially in Dutch papers); |
| | • Reviews of plays, films and other cultural events, sections not mentioned in step 2; |
| | • Articles on the dioxin affair in the Flemish papers. |
| 4. Save final selection. | • Electronic: save each article starting on a new page (needs editing in the case of LNA) and print for filing; |

APPENDIX 3
TABLES BELONGING TO CHAPTER 3

APPENDIX 3.1 SIZE OF ARTICLES PER NEWSPAPER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>VK</th>
<th>NRC</th>
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<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>1315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S (&lt;150 words)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M (150 – 400 words)</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L (&gt;400 words)</td>
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<tr>
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APPENDIX 3.2 FRONT PAGE, HEADLINE & PROMINENCE

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<th>NRC</th>
<th>Tel</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
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<td>330</td>
<td>1315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontpage</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headline appearance</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>Prominence</td>
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</table>

*) de Telegraaf figure is an underestimation, as de Telegraaf corpus retrieved from lexis-nexis did not contain this information.

APPENDIX 3.3 REPRESENTATION OF THE FAR RIGHT IN THREE NEWSPAPERS

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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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APPENDIX 3.4 SITUATED ROLES PER NEWSPAPER

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<td>n</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>521</td>
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<td>1314</td>
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<td>In elections*</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>In political actuality*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>In legal conflict*</td>
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<td>In extra-parliamentary activity</td>
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*) differences significant at $p < 0.05$
### Appendix 3.5 Stigmatising Associations per Newspaper

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<td>1315</td>
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### Appendix 3.6 Percentage of Coverage Including One or More Far-Right Standpoints

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### Appendix 3.7 Far-Right Ideological Standpoints per Newspaper

<table>
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<th>NRC</th>
<th>Tel</th>
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<td></td>
<td>464</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>1315</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-progressive *</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-democratic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Anti-establishment/populist</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Xenophobic/Exclusionist</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law &amp; Order*</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional Values</td>
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</table>

* ) differences significant at $p < 0.05$

### Appendix 3.8 NFRA Attitudes per Newspaper

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<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>Exclusively favourable attitudes</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusively unfavourable attitudes</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Both fav. and unfav. attitudes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
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### Appendix 3.9 Debate about Dealing with the Far Right

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</thead>
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<td>Debate</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
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APPENDIX 4
TABLES BELONGING TO CHAPTER 4

APPENDIX 4.1 SIZE OF ARTICLES PER NEWSPAPER

<table>
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<td>Small</td>
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<td>Medium</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>X Large</td>
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APPENDIX 4.2 FRONT PAGE, PROMINENCE AND HEADLING APPEARANCE PER NEWSPAPER

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<td>Prominence</td>
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APPENDIX 4.3. REPRESENTATION OF THE FAR RIGHT (IN PERCENTAGES)*

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<td>302</td>
<td>262</td>
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<td>189</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive representation</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>70</td>
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*) \( p < 0.05 \)

APPENDIX 4.4. REPRESENTATION IN THREE NEWSPAPERS*

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<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active representation</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
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<td>None/no actor</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
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*) \( p < 0.05 \)
APPENDIX 4.5. COVERAGE WITH THE FAR RIGHT IN SPECIFIC ROLES IN THREE NEWSPAPERS

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<td>1621</td>
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<td>In elections</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>In political actuality*</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In legal conflict</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>In extra-parliamentary peaceful</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>In normal internal</td>
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*) p < 0.05

APPENDIX 4.6. COVERAGE WITH FAR RIGHT IN POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ROLES

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*) p < 0.05

APPENDIX 4.7. COVERAGE WITH STIGMATISING ASSOCIATIONS IN THEE NEWSPAPERS*

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<td>Stigmatising associations</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>67</td>
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*) p < 0.05

APPENDIX 4.8. PERCENTAGE OF THE COVERAGE WITH FAR-RIGHT STANDPOINTS*

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological standpoints present</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not present</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
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*) p < 0.05
Appendices

**APPENDIX 4.9. COVERAGE WITH FAR RIGHT STANDPOINTS IN THREE NEWSPAPERS**

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>n</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-progressive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-democratic*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-establishment/populist*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobic or Exclusionsit</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law &amp; order*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional Values</td>
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*) $p < 0.05$

**APPENDIX 4.10. PERCENTAGE OF THE COVERAGE WITH NON-FAR-RIGHT ACTOR’S ATTITUDES*:

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<td>n</td>
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<td>859</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourable attitudes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavourable attitudes</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Both</td>
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<tr>
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<td>51</td>
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<td>100</td>
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</table>

*) the chi-square test (fisher’s exact) shows a too high $p$ value ($p = .518$)
the found scores can therefore not be viewed as significantly different.

**APPENDIX 4.11. PERCENTAGE OF THE COVERAGE WITH DEBATE ON DEALING WITH THE FAR RIGHT*: 

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<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No debate</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including debate on dealing with the far right</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
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</table>

*) the chi-square test showed a too high $p$ value ($p = .496$) for the complete table.
Between the two extremes the difference has also been found insignificant ($p = .326$).
APPENDIX 5
TABLES BELONGING TO CHAPTER 5

APPENDIX 5.1
SIZE OF THE ARTICLES (IN PERCENTAGES)

<table>
<thead>
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<td>n</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>2356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S &lt;150</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M 151-400</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L 401-800</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XL &gt;800</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX 5.2
FRONT PAGE, HEADLINE APPEARANCE AND PROMINENCE (IN PERCENTAGES)

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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headline appearance</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prominence*</td>
<td>55</td>
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*) significant at $p < .05$

APPENDIX 5.3
REPRESENTATION PER NEWSPAPER (IN PERCENTAGES)*

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<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>2358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No actor</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive representation</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active representation</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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*) no significant differences found
### Appendix 5.4
**The Far Right in Situated Roles (in Percentages)**

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<tbody>
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<td>881</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>2356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In political actuality</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In legal conflict</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In extra-parliamentary violence</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In extra-parliamentary confrontation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In extra-parliamentary peaceful situations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In normal internal situations</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In negative internal situations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendix 5.5
**The Far Right in Positive and Negative Evaluated Roles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>DM</th>
<th>DS</th>
<th>HLN</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>2356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive roles</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative roles</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendix 5.6
**Percentage of Coverage Including Stigmatising Associations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>DM</th>
<th>DS</th>
<th>HLN</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>2358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigmatising associations</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) significant at p < .05

### Appendix 5.7
**Percentage of Coverage Including Any Far-Right Standpoints**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>2356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One or more standpoints</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 5.8
PERCENTAGE OF COVERAGE INCLUDING FAR-RIGHT STANDPOINTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>DM</th>
<th>DS</th>
<th>HLN</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>2356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-progressive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-democratic*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-establishment/populist*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobic/Exclusionist*</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law &amp; Order</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Values</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) significant at p < .05

APPENDIX 5.9
NON-FAR-RIGHT ACTOR’S ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FAR RIGHT (IN PERCENTAGES)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>DM</th>
<th>DS</th>
<th>HLN</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>2356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive favourable attitudes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive unfavourable attitudes</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both fave. And unfave. attitudes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) significant at p < .05

APPENDIX 5.10
DEBATE ON DEALING WITH THE FAR RIGHT AMONG NFRA*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>DM</th>
<th>DS</th>
<th>HLN</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>2358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No debate</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) significant at p < .05
SAMENVATTING

INLEIDING
Dit proefschrift gaat over media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts. Op welke manier besteden kranten aandacht aan deze familie van partijen en organisaties en hoe verhoudt die media-aandacht zich tot de (electorale) positie van uiterst-rechts? Dit zijn de vragen die aan de oorsprong van dit proefschrift liggen en relevant zijn omdat zowel in de wetenschappelijke literatuur als in het maatschappelijk debat een belangrijke rol wordt toegedicht aan de manier waarop media zouden berichten over uiterst-rechts en de soms marginale positie waarin uiterst-rechtse partijen zich bevinden, of de juist volgens velen verontrustende groei van deze partijen.

UITERST-RECHTS
Sinds de electorale opgang van uiterst-rechts in diverse Europese landen eind jaren tachtig en begin jaren negentig, staat uiterst-rechts regelmatig in de belangstelling van politicologen en sociologen. Veel van hun onderzoek is erop gericht verklaringen te vinden voor de grote verschillen in electoraal succes die vertegenwoordigers van de uiterst-rechtse partijfamilie behalen. Inmiddels staat vast dat een combinatie van individuele kenmerken van kiezers (o.a. attitudes tegenover immigranten), contextuele kenmerken (werkloosheidscijfers, variaties in aantallen immigranten) en de gepercipieerde positie van uiterst-rechtse partijen (afstand ten opzichte van meest rechtse conventionele partij, (on)democratisch imago) in het politiek bestel in onderlinge samenhang het meest bepalend zijn. Ook is van belang dat uiterst-rechts alles behalve een homogene partijfamilie is. De onderlinge verschillen zijn groot. Sommige partijen lijken in hun gedrag, historische achtergrond en voorkomen (sociogenese) en ideologie sterk op nationaal-socialistische partijen uit de eerste helft van de vorige eeuw, anderen hebben daarmee weinig of niets van doen, maar delen met de eersten wel een aantal kenmerken waaronder hun positie op de links-rechts schaal, een aversie tegen gevestigde politieke partijen (of elites) en een ideologie waarin voor buitenstaanders (vaak etnische minderheden) beperkte ruimte is. Wetenschappers gebruiken bovendien verschillende termen om de partijfamilie of leden ervan aan te duiden: ‘extreemrechts’, ‘radicaal rechts’, ‘racistische partijen’, ‘anti-immigratiepartijen’, of ‘rechtspopulisten’. In dit proefschrift wordt de term ‘uiterst-rechts’ gebruikt als overkoppelende term omdat deze wel alle verschillen binnen de partijfamilie omvat, maar niet, of althans in mindere mate, een stigmatiserende (en wellicht verkeerde) indruk geeft.

UITERST-RECHTS EN DE MEDIA
Hoewel er inmiddels een overtuigend complex aan verklaringen voor de variatie in electorale prestaties van uiterst-rechts bestaat, wil dat niet zeggen dat alle factoren voldoende onderzocht zijn. Diverse auteurs wijzen erop dat de rol van de media onderbelicht blijft. Deze wordt op een enkele uitzondering na ook niet meegenomen bij de toetsing van diverse verklaringen. Enkele auteurs vonden wel correlaties tussen de media-agenda en de programmatische agenda van groeiende uiterst-rechtse partijen, maar de manier waarop uiterst-rechts zelf in de media geportretteerd wordt, bleef tot nu toe buiten beschouwing.
Dit ondanks dat zowel in de wetenschap als onder voor- en tegenstanders van uiterst-rechts de assumptie leeft, dat de manier waarop uiterst-rechts in de media komt een serieuze invloed is op het (uitblijven van) verkiezingssucces van uiterst-rechts.

VIJF ASPECTEN VAN MEDIA-AANDACHT VOOR UITERST-RECHTS
Auteurs die wel aandacht besteedden aan media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts beperken zich meestal tot aandachtsvolume (aantallen berichten in een bepaalde periode) en soms formele aandacht (omvang en prominentie van die aandacht). Daarmee is de manier van berichtgeven over uiterst-rechts nog steeds niet voldoende bevraagd. De manier van berichtgeven staat daarom juist wel centraal in dit proefschrift.

Om in een gedegen antwoord op die vraag te voorzien is in hoofdstuk 1 een model ontwikkeld waarin naast (1) aandachtsvolume en (2) formele aandacht ook de inhoudelijke aandacht voor uiterst-rechts en aandacht voor attitudes van derden ten opzicht van uiterst-rechts zijn opgenomen.

SUBSTANTIELE AANDACHT
De inhoudelijke aandacht voor uiterst-rechts(e) actoren is het derde aspect van media-aandacht dat we substantiële aandacht (3) hebben genoemd. Daarin onderscheiden we vier dimensies: representatie (actief, of passief) de verschillende rollen waarin uiterst-rechtse actoren wel en niet in de krant komen (bij voorbeeld in de politieke actualiteit of in juridisch conflict), of er al dan niet stigmatiserende typeringen worden gebruikt en de ideologische standpunten van uiterst-rechts waarmee zij in de media naar voren komt.

SUPPORT AANDACHT
voor het vierde aspect van media-aandacht, support aandacht (4), is gekeken naar de mate waarin er aandacht is voor gunstige en ongunstige attitudes ten opzichte van uiterst-rechts en naar de mate van aandacht voor debat onder andere actoren over te prefereren omgangsvormen met uiterst-rechts.

DE ONDERZOEKSVRAAG
Met behulp van dit model van vier aspecten van media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts kunnen we de als volgt geformuleerde onderzoeksvraag beantwoorden: Hoe berichten Nederlandse, Duitse en Vlaamse kranten over uiterst-rechts in de periode 1986-2004. En welke veranderingen vinden daarin plaats, en welke verschillen zijn er tussen de drie landen en tussen verschillende kranten?

OPZET VAN DE STUDIE
om de onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden werd een systematisch-kwantitatieve inhoudsanalyse uitgevoerd waarbij de vier aspecten van media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts centraal stonden (hoofdstuk 2). Uit elk land werden drie landelijke dagbladen met verschillende kenmerken (populair vs kwaliteitskrant en van diverse politieke oriëntaties) geselecteerd voor het onderzoek. Uit elk van die kranten werd alle berichtgeving waarin uiterst-rechts voorkwam uit periodes van drie maanden rondom landelijke en Europese
verkiezingen geselecteerd. In totaal werden 5.292 berichten geanalyseerd. Om uitspraken te kunnen doen over de relatie tussen veranderende media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts en politieke (in het bijzonder electorale) ontwikkelingen, werden er in hoofdstuk zes ook secundaire data gebruikt, verkiezingsuitslagen van uiterst-rechtse partijen en gegevens over uiterst-rechts geweld in Duitsland (voor de andere 2 landen waren die laatste gegevens niet beschikbaar voor de volledige onderzoeksperiode).

Het onderzoek is zo opgezet dat de onderzoeksvraag in afzonderlijke hoofdstukken voor elk van de drie landen (n.b.: met Vlaanderen als Nederlandstalig landsdeel van België met haar eigen Nederlandstalige politieke partijen) beantwoord is. In het laatste hoofdstuk wordt een cross-nationale vergelijking gemaakt, alsmede een vergelijking tussen verschillende typen kranten. Tenslotte wordt een theoretische verklaring geformuleerd voor het ontstaan en de ontwikkeling van het aangetroffen media-imago van uiterst-rechts.

**DE DRIE LANDENSTUDIES**

De bevindingen van de drie afzonderlijk uitgevoerde landenstudies toen belangrijke verschillen, die specifieke betekenis hebben in hun afzonderlijke contexten.

**NEDERLAND**

De Nederlandse journalisten werden in de onderzoeksperiode voortdurend geconfronteerd met nieuwe uiterst-rechtse partijen, waarbij oude kopstukken steeds weer opdoken. Bovendien was het boegbeeld van uiterst-rechts in de jaren tachtig en negentig bepaald niet sterk in zijn relatie met de media, in tegenstelling tot Fortuyn die bij de landelijke verkiezingen van 2002 feitelijk de positie van de CD in het polieke landschap overnam. Het onderling verschil in zowel sociogenese als ideologie was, ondanks ideologische overeenkomsten, zeer groot. Het zou dus niet verbazingwekkend zijn als de media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts in de jaren tachtig en negentig anders was dan die in de periode waarin de LPF de voornaamste partij aan het uiterst-rechtse firmament was.


**DUITSLAND**

Gedurende de hele onderzoekperiode waren er in Duitsland steeds dezelfde drie uiterst-rechtse partijen actief, NPD, Republikaner en DVU, hoewel deze partijen niet aan alle verkiezingen meededen). In 2001/2 was er kortstondig een vierde partij actief, Schill Partei, vernoemd naar haar leider Roland Schill.
Van de vier partijen hadden de Republikaner op landelijk niveau de grootste aanhang in de hele periode. De drie eerstgenoemde partijen hebben een sociogenese waarin banden met (ex-)Nazi’s of nationaal-socialistische ideologie in meer of mindere mate een vaste plek hebben, terwijl de Schill Partei sterke overeenkomsten had met de LPF van Fortuyn.


VLAANDEREN

Net als in Duitsland en Nederland was de berichtgeving in Vlaanderen aanvankelijk zeer beperkt in volume en wat betreft substantiële en supportaandacht (hoofdstuk 5). Het aandachtsvolume steeg met de electorale groei van het Vlaams Blok. De substantiële aandacht deed dat echter niet, en waar aandacht voor stigmatiserende associaties en negatieve kenmerken van uiterst-rechts afnamen, steeg de aandacht voor attitudes van derden ten opzichte van uiterst-rechts. Op die manier veranderde het naar voren gebrachte media-imago op zich niet, maar de manier waarop wel, steeds meer in de supportaandacht en minder in de substantiële aandacht.

HET MEDIA-IMAGO VAN UITERST-RECHTS
In hoofdstuk zes vonden we voor twee van de drie landen (Nederland en Vlaanderen) een positief verband tussen aandachtsvolume en de verkiezingsresultaten van uiterst-rechts. Een zeldzame verband tussen de drie andere aspecten van media-aandacht en verkiezingsre-
sultaten ontbreekt, of er is een tegengesteld verband. Toch is er, vanuit cross-nationaal perspectief een patroon te ontwaren in de ontwikkeling van de media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts.

In de jaren tachtig was er zeer beperkte aandacht voor uiterst-rechts, zowel in volume, formele, substantiële en supportaandacht. De aandacht die er wel was, is zeer beperkt en gericht op de controversiële kenmerken van uiterst-rechts: gewelddadig racisme, stigmatiserende associaties en bijna exclusief ongunstige attitudes van derden. Die vorm van aandacht is te typen als een media-imago waarin uiterst-rechts een controversiële buitenstaander is.

In de eerste helft van de jaren negentig veranderde een aantal aspecten van de media-aandacht tegelijkertijd met een stijgende electorale populariteit in Vlaanderen en Nederland alsmede een explosieve toename van uiterst-rechts geweld in met name Duitsland. Het volume van de aandacht steeg, maar ook kwam er iets meer variatie in de rollen en standpunten waarmee uiterst-rechts de krantenkolommen haalt. De aandacht lag echter nog steeds in grote meerderheid bij de controversiële kenmerken van uiterst-rechts, waaronder racistische geweldplegingen en slecht functionerende uiterst-rechtse parlementariërs.

Na deze turbulente periode, die ongeveer aanhield tot en met 1995, lijkt het rustiger (of zelfs stil) te worden op het uiterst-rechtse front, maar in bredere kringen kwam er steeds meer debat over immigratie en integratiebeleid. De media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts werd nu echt breder in haar focus. Niet langer was de aandacht gericht op attitudes ten opzichte van uiterst-rechts van andere partijen exclusief gericht op ongunstige attitudes. Het algemeen beeld van controversiële buitenstaander dat uit de media-aandacht naar voren komt, bleef wel het zelfde, maar werd daardoor minder direct.

In de periode na de eeuwwisseling zette deze trend zich vooral in Vlaanderen gestaag voort. In de Nederlandse media raakte zij in een stroomversnelling vanaf 2003, als een vertraagde erkenning van Fortuyn. In 2004 was de media-aandacht in Nederlandse kranten zodanig veranderd dat het ontstane imago van controversiële buitenstaander niet langer dominant is. In Duitsland echter, is deze verandering in het geheel niet aangetroffen.

Gedurende de hele periode is de media-aandacht cross-nationaal in meerderheid gericht op controversiële kenmerken en gedragingen van uiterst-rechtse partijen, groeperingen en politici. Daarbij bleven bijvoorbeeld in Vlaanderen de toenemende parlementaire activiteiten (het aantal uiterst-rechtse parlementariërs steeg iedere vier jaar) onderbelicht. Wel verbreedt de focus en werd de manier, waarop dat media-imago naar voren wordt gebracht, minder direct en eenvormig.

Betekent dit nu dat de media-aandacht voor uiterst-rechts normaliseert, of dat uiterst-rechts in de media juist gebagataliseerd wordt, bij electorale groei? De bevindingen wijzen voor de Duitse kranten voorzichtig op het laatste, maar voor de andere twee
landen vonden we geen duidelijke aanwijzingen voor het een of het ander. Aan de ene kant blijft het controversiële buitenstaander imago intact, aan de andere kant wordt het naar mate uiterst-rechts electoraal groeit, van haar scherpe randjes ontdaan.

**Cultuurele consonantie**
Het controversiële buitenstaanderimago dat in alle drie de contexten in de berichtgeving uit de jaren tachtig werd aangetroffen, blijkt dus wel opgerektheid te worden in de berichtgeving. We zagen dat ondanks veranderingen in de context (zoals groeiende acceptatie exclusionistische standpunten en electorale groei uiterst-rechtse partijen), het controversiële buitenstaanderimago in bijna de hele onderzoeksperiode in alle drie de landen manifest aanwezig blijft in de berichtgeving over uiterst-rechts.

Gezien de soms sterk veranderde contexten is dit een opmerkelijke constatering. Zij valt te verklaren met behulp van theorieën over journalistieke routines, nieuwsselectie en culturele archetypen (hoofdstuk 6). Omdat de journalisten in de manier van berichtgeven (met name wat betreft substantiële en supportaandacht) sterk aansluiten bij een cultureel gedeelde en historisch gevoed idee over uiterst-rechts, zijn zij niet genoodzaakt af te wijken van hun routine om op deze manier aandacht te besteden aan uiterst-rechts. Ook niet als er maatschappelijke en politieke veranderingen plaatsvinden, die dit media-imago in verminderde mate doen passen bij de feitelijke electorale positie en andere kenmerken van de op dat moment actuele uiterst-rechtse partijen en andere actoren.

**Verschillen tussen kranten**
In veel media onderzoek wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen populaire kranten en kwaliteitskranten. Daar deze kranten veelal ook een ander lezerspubliek bedienen, is het relevant om te bekijken of er verschillen zijn tussen populaire kranten en kwaliteitskranten. Daarbij wordt verondersteld dat populaire kranten zich beperken tot de meer sensationele kenmerken van en gebeurtenissen rondom uiterst-rechts, terwijl kwaliteitskranten een breder perspectief zouden hebben en dus meer aandacht voor de minder sensationele kenmerken van uiterst-rechts. Voor de eerste verwachting werd geen duidelijke bevestiging gevonden. Wel bleken de kwaliteitskranten inderdaad breder en genuanceerder over uiterst-rechts te berichten dan de populaire kranten (hoofdstuk 6).

Een tweede onderscheid dat werd gemaakt tussen de kranten is dat tussen meer links georiënteerde kranten en meer rechts georiënteerde kranten. Hedendaagse kranten hebben geen directe binding met politieke partijen en ook zijn geen van de onderzochte kranten uitgesproken links of rechts, toch kunnen we volgens andere auteurs verwachten dat de links georiënteerde kranten meer aandacht besteden aan uiterst-rechts omdat zij ideologisch verder van uiterst-rechts af staan en daarom meer reden hebben uiterst-rechts als controversieel te duiden. Het onderzoek wijst uit dat er inderdaad significant verschil is tussen links en rechts georiënteerde kranten, maar niet zo rechtlijnig als aanvankelijk verondersteld (hoofdstuk 6). Links georiënteerde kranten hebben een meer confronterende benadering en leggen meer nadruk op ‘onacceptabele’ aspecten van uiterst-rechts of haar activiteiten dan rechts georiënteerde kranten doen.
CURRICULUM VITAE

Pytrik Schafraad currently lives in Arnhem and lectures at the Department of Communication Science at the Radboud University, Nijmegen as well as the Department of Media & Communication at the Erasmus University, Rotterdam. He was born on July 31st 1973 in Enschede and lived the most part of his life in Noord-Brabant. He studied Social Work in ‘s-Hertogenbosch (1997) and Social Cultural Sciences at de Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam (2001). His MA thesis, entitled Against the grain. The cultural and political practices of DIY Culture deals with the symbiosis of subculture and activism. In his first jobs, he taught at the same department and worked as a consultant in the field of diversity policy. In 2004 he came to Nijmegen to work on the PhD project that resulted in this dissertation, a cross-national analysis of media attention to the far-right. Pytrik has published in Communications, Publizistik, Migrantenstudies and several edited books on youth culture and on media attention to the far-right. His main fields of study are political news, journalism and framing.

www.pytrikschafraad.nl